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Since its re-emergence under Anwar El-Sadat in the 1970s, the Muslim Broth-
erhood has provided millions of Egyptians with a valuable array of social ser-
vices, from discounted food, to education, to medical care. Yet this distribution
is uneven- some areas host extensive social service networks, while others are
passed over or receive only minimal attention. This project examines the spatial
variation in the Muslim Brotherhood’s social service network through three in-
terlocking questions: Under what conditions does the Brotherhood extend social
service provision? What are the effects of this social service provision on patterns
of sociopolitical mobilization? And what is the causal pathway through which
social service provision influences a recipient’s beliefs and behaviors? Using spa-
tial, qualitative, and experimental data I show how Egypt’s authoritarian political
economy incentivized the Brotherhood to channel social service resources away
from Egypt’s myriad poor neighborhoods and villages and into middle class,
electorally competitive areas. In those districts, the group’s provision of social ser-
vices drove electoral support neither through the contingent, episodic exchange of
clientelism nor by generating a cadre of Islamists seeking to establish God’s rule
on earth. Instead, the Brotherhood’s professional and compassionate social ser-
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Many media reports on the eve of Egypt’s winter 2011-2012 parliamentary
elections contained at least a cursory mention of how the Muslim Brotherhood’s
extensive network of social services would drive the group to victory. One Asso-
ciated Press dispatch, for instance, pointed out that the Brotherhood’s “machine”
would “appeal to poor voters” and power the group’s inevitable triumph. But
towards the end of the report a resident of the village of ’Elwan, a “poor farm-
ing community, where most people live on government-subsidized bread and
suffer from poor sanitation, roads, schools and hospitals,” complained to the cor-
respondent that “the Muslim Brotherhood never helped here.”1 In a separate
dispatch on those same elections, PBS Newshour’s Margaret Warner opened her
report from the Brotherhood’s bustling al-Farouq hospital in the southern Cairo
suburb of Ma’adi. Medical facilities like this, Warner surmised, were part of the
reason the Brotherhood was expected to succeed in the upcoming elections.2 But
Ma’adi is one of Cairo’s wealthiest suburbs, home to diplomats, expats, and many
of Cairo’s westernized elite. Why does the Brotherhood provide social services
in one of Egypt’s wealthiest neighborhoods, yet has “never helped” in ’Elwan,
where these efforts are sorely needed?
I use a variety of historical, spatial, qualitative, and experimental data to show
how Egypt’s underlying socioeconomic terrain and overarching electoral institu-
tions shaped the Muslim Brotherhood’s distribution of social services. Specif-
ically, they incentivized the Brotherhood to divert social service resources away
from Egypt’s myriad poor neighborhoods and villages where the National Demo-
cratic Party (NDP) held an effective political monopoly and into middle class,
1Ben Hubbard, “Muslim Brotherhood’s Machine Helps in Egypt Vote,” Associated Press,
November 30, 2011. Available online at: http://goo.gl/wO2Qcy. Accessed July 11, 2015.
2“Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Flexes Potent Political Force,” PBS Newshour, September 14,
2011. Available online at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-july-dec11-egypt_09-14/.
Accessed July 11, 2015.
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electorally competitive electoral districts. In those districts, the group’s social ser-
vice provision drove electoral support neither through the contingent, episodic
exchange of clientelism nor by generating a cadre of Islamists seeking to establish
God’s rule on earth. Instead, the Brotherhood’s high quality and compassionate
social service provision generated a powerful reputational effect that worked to
the group’s benefit on election day.
Prior scholars have suggested that Islamist groups use social service provi-
sion to recruit and cultivate group solidarity (Cammett 2014, Berman 2011, Clark
2004, Wickham 2002, Munson 2001), construct an alternative state and foment
revolution (Davis and Robinson 2012, Bayat 2007a, Deeb 2006, Berman 2003, Wik-
torowicz and Taji-Farouki 2000), or to express the ideals of Islamic charity (Mishal
and Sela 2006, Hammad 1997). In theory, it should be easy to research and test
these competing hypotheses. Authors describe the Brotherhood’s social service
initiatives in a way that makes it seem as if one must make a concerted effort
to ignore them. To note but a few passages, this network is supposedly “vast”
(Miller 1997, 179) and able to “rival or better the state’s social services” (Ismail
2006, 36). Davis and Robinson describe the Brotherhood’s “massive decentralized
network of mosques, religious schools, clinics and hospitals, Islamic banks, textile
factories, day care centers, youth clubs, social welfare agencies, services for the
unemployed, and legal aid agencies” (2012, 7). Berman tells us that Islamists’
“grass-roots involvement in practically every nook and cranny of Egyptian life”
gives them essentially unlimited pathways through which to reach ordinary citi-
zens (2003, 261). An enterprise so ubiquitous should be rather easy to research.
Yet there is an uncomfortable contradiction at the heart of nearly all of these
studies: their sweeping conclusions rest on shaky evidence. A review of Arabic-
language literature summarizes that “despite widespread controversies about Is-
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lamic Associations or ‘NGOs’ in Egypt and the Arab countries, specific studies
about them remain limited, and detailed, specialist studies are rare” (Shukr 2006,
7). Likewise, Bibars notes that although “the existence of this shadow and parallel
[Islamist] welfare system is an important phenomenon with a profound ideologi-
cal impact on society, it has not been studied comprehensively“ (2001, 107). Even
those researchers most familiar with the Muslim Brotherhood or Egypt note the
difficulty of studying the phenomenon. “Any endeavor to plumb the depths of
the Brotherhood’s social service network,” according to Masoud, is bound to en-
counter “enormous difficulties” (2008, 147). Abdelrahman tells us that studying
the subject is essentially an “impossible task” (2004, 122). This is why, as Cammett
and Jones Luong concluded in a recent review essay, even the most basic aspects
of Islamist social service provision remain “presumed rather than demonstrated”
(2014, 188).
This lack of empirical detail makes assessing basic claims difficult. For in-
stance, one author asserts that the Brotherhood operates “more than 20,000 clin-
ics” throughout Egypt, yet provides no source for the claim (Ibrahim 1988, 642-
643). Davis and Robinson state that the Muslim Brotherhood operates 1000 medi-
cal clinics throughout Egypt, and 300 in Cairo alone (2012, 55). Yet the article they
cite as evidence actually mentions Islamic medical clinics, not Brotherhood ones
(Talhami 2001, 317).3
This project moves the study of the Brotherhood’s social service provision out
3To further illustrate the point, even those numbers (1000 Islamic medical clinics in Egypt, and
300 in Cairo) are likely incorrect. The raw numbers originated in an unsourced column in an
Egyptian newspaper in the late 1980s, which Suheir Morsy cited in her article “Islamic Medical
Clinics in Egypt: The Cultural Elaboration of Biomedical Hegemony” (1988). Clark cited both
Morsy’s academic article as well as the newspaper column in her own academic article (1995),
although she wisely included a disclaimer about the original source, the newspaper column. Tal-
hami, in turn, cited Clark’s article for the 1000/300 figure, but dropped the disclaimer. Davis and
Robinson then cited Talhami’s article. Thus a weakly-sourced and dubious claim about Islamic
clinics in general is transformed into a statement about the Brotherhood’s medical empire.
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of the realm of questionable claims and unfalsifiable “just so" stories and onto
the terrain of theoretically precise, empirically supported inquiry. To do so, I
marshal a variety of original historical, spatial, qualitative, and experimental data
exploring the reach of the Brotherhood’s social service network, illuminating its
history, revealing how it functions, and examining how its activity influences the
beliefs and behaviors of those it benefits. The qualitative aspects of this project
distill nearly a decade’s worth of study of the Brotherhood, including dozens
of interviews with leaders and members of the organization, written memoirs
and oral histories of key figures, archival documents, coverage in contemporary
Islamist periodicals, and over 50 years worth of Egyptian laws, court cases, and
media coverage. The fieldwork for this project encompassed close observation of
multiple social service endeavors, both those affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood
and not.
Studying spatial relationships is a fruitful and underutilized way to under-
stand the interaction between the Muslim Brotherhood and the larger sociopoliti-
cal environment in which it exists. A key contribution of this project is an original
dataset charting the spatial distribution of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s
social service activism across Egypt, which I assembled through a combination
of open source research, satellite maps, and in-person site visits during which
I recorded the facilities’ precise longitudes and latitudes from my smartphone.
The bulk of this dissertation focuses on the over three dozen “brick-and-mortar”
(Cammett and Issar 2010) medical facilities operated by the Islamic Medical As-
sociation (IMA), the Muslim Brotherhood’s largest organized social service orga-
nization. The conclusion expands the spatial analysis to over 1,000 of the group’s
community associations and roughly 75 of its schools.
To analyze the relationship between the Brotherhood’s social service network
4
and electoral mobilization, I nest these facilities’ locations within ArcGIS-based
reconstructions of Egypt’s electoral map. These include both district races for
Egypt’s lower house of parliament (Majlis al-Sha’b) under Hosni Mubarak as well
as geolocated ballot-box data for the Summer 2012 presidential run-off between
Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi and former Mubarak-era Prime Min-
ister Ahmed Shafiq. As part of this analysis, I compiled a complete and original
dataset of hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood candidates for Egypt’s lower house
of parliament, stretching from 1976 (the year of the group’s first post-Nasser po-
litical foray) to 2011. To these maps I append highly disaggregated socioeconomic
data on religiosity, wealth, availability of public infrastructure, density of Islamist
activism, and electoral statistics such as candidate entry. This material not only
allows the most complex and rigorous tests of hypotheses purporting to explain
Islamic social service provision to date, it continues “the spatial revolution that is
transforming the social sciences” (Kocher and Laitin 2006, 25).
Finally, in order to evaluate how social service provision influences individual
behavior, in early 2014 I oversaw a roughly 2400-person telephone survey of Egyp-
tians.4 In addition to collecting basic information about Egyptians’ experiences
with medical provision, this survey also contained a randomized experimental
component. By subtly manipulating basic information presented to the respon-
dents about medical services in Egypt, the survey was able to precisely assess
how the Brotherhood’s social service provision affected political attitudes, includ-
ing how likely an individual was to support the Brotherhood in elections and how
they perceived the group’s candidates for elected office.
Together, these materials constitute the most detailed account of the Muslim
4The survey was conducted in collaboration with Jason Brownlee of the University of Texas at
Austin.
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Brotherhood’s social service network that has ever been assembled. Yet the ambi-
tions of this dissertation are broader than just explaining the observed empirical
variation between the “poor farming village” of ‘Elwan and the upscale, leafy sub-
urb of Ma’adi. The story of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s social service pro-
vision motivates a broader theoretical question about elections in non-democratic
regimes, and in particular the conditions under which opposition parties can suc-
cessfully mobilize voters.
Why Opposition Parties Win
While this dissertation is about social service provision, the story is impossible
to tell without an appreciation of the broader ways that political competition-
even in non-democratic environments- influences actors and shapes societies. As
such, this project marks somewhat of a departure from the field’s focus on regime
durability as a key outcome variable in the study of authoritarian and dominant
party elections (Blaydes 2011, Levitsky and Way 2010, Brownlee 2007, Greene
2007, Magaloni 2006, Geddes 1999). Indeed, amidst stilted electoral competition,
rampant irregularities and fraud, feeble opposition parties, and popular apathy
authors cautioned against reading too much into the particular characteristics
and outcomes of these contests. Brownlee, for instance, suggests that we instead
explore “nonelectoral mechanisms of power” such as labor strikes, protests, and
anti-regime violence (2011, 822).
While this emphasis on regime durability and extra-institutional activism has
generated a series of important insights, it has also created “a paucity of compar-
ative literature” (Posusney 2005, 19) that asks why opposition parties and can-
didates enter non-democratic elections, how they appeal to voters, why voters
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might choose to support an opposition party over the regime, or indeed choose
one opposition party over another (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). By examining
these mechanics, this project heeds Lust’s call to take such political competition
in non-democratic settings seriously (2008).
From Anwar El-Sadat’s introduction of limited pluralism in 1976 to Hosni
Mubarak’s exit from power in 2011, Egypt was an exemplary case of a regime
that maintained its authoritarian essence underneath a veneer of electoral com-
petition. Blaydes, for instance, calls Mubarak-era Egypt “the modal authoritarian
regime that exists in the world today” (2011, 21).5 Without entering into a de-
bate over typologies or subtypes, I assume that while elections would likely never
serve to challenge the Egyptian regime’s political primacy (indeed, it took massive
street protests to dislodge Hosni Mubarak), neither were these contests “façades”
(Levitsky and Way 2002, 53). In other words, while there was little struggle over
the commanding heights of the state, I assume that examining the mechanics of
where a regime’s favored candidate wins or loses, when an opposition candidate
chooses to run or sit out, or why one opposition party is able to triumph while
another fails can provide important insight into vital questions of how power is
organized, applied, and the conditions under which it can be successfully con-
tested.
Egypt offers numerous parallels with outside cases of non-democratic elec-
tions. Yet one notable disjuncture concerns the divergent fates of the country’s
various opposition parties. In his study of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional,
which dominated Mexican politics for over 70 years, Greene identifies a particu-
5Scholars differ over how exactly to classify Mubarak-era Egypt, variously referring to it as
a case of “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler 2006), “semi-authoritarianism” (Ottaway 2003),
“hegemonic electoral authoritarianism” (Diamond 2002), and “closed authoritarian” (Levitsky and
Way 2010), among others.
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larly crippling affliction that besets opposition parties. Because they cannot com-
pete against the dominant party’s resource advantage, the opposition must lean
ever more heavily on specialized and single-issue platforms to attract voters. And
while this facilitates electoral mobilization in the short term, in the long term the
emphasis on strident ideological appeals renders these parties unable to appeal
beyond a “niche” of committed activists (2007).
This argument certainly seems to explain what happened to Egypt’s non-
Islamist opposition parties, who continually fractured and struggled to broaden
their electoral coalitions throughout the Mubarak years (Albrecht 2013, Stacher
2004). The Brotherhood, which began in the 1970s as a niche party dedicated to
implementing Islamic law (the Sharia) above all else, would seem a prime candi-
date to follow this trajectory. But not only did the group escape the trap Greene
identified, they reversed it: the Brotherhood steadily grew its electoral coalition
so that, during the waning years of the Mubarak era, it sat atop a broad elec-
toral coalition of leftists, revolutionaries, Islamists, labor, and activist youth. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the trend by charting the divergent electoral fates of the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Hizb al-Wafd, one of Egypt’s premier non-Islamist opposition
parties, under Hosni Mubarak.6
Why was the Muslim Brotherhood so adept at mobilizing supporters in Egypt’s
authoritarian elections, while their opposition counterparts were so maladroit?
As Naguib puts it, how did the Brotherhood “transform itself from a fringe phe-
nomenon in the early 1970s to the largest opposition force in the country by the
first decade of the twenty-first century” (2009, 104)? And this is more than just
a question about politics under authoritarianism: when Hosni Mubarak fell in
6Note that nearly all opposition parties- including the Brotherhood and Hizb al-Wafd boycotted
the 1990 elections in protest of a change in electoral laws.
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Figure 1: Electoral History, Muslim Brotherhood versus Hizb al-Wafd






























Brotherhood = dashed line
Hizb al-Wafd = solid line
February 2011, Egypt’s non-Islamist parties’ struggles to mobilize voters con-
tinued into the country’s brief democratic interlude. The Brotherhood, in con-
trast, launched from this pre-existing legacy of success to dominate elections and
plebiscites throughout 2011, 2012, and 2013. Ultimately, it took a military coup to
expel them from power in the summer of 2013.
One interpretation of the Brotherhood’s successes during this period is that
Egypt simply became more conservative or, in other words, the electorate “Is-
lamized.” For instance, Abdo writes of the “triumph of Islam” during the 1990s
(2000). Hamid suggests that the Brotherhood’s electoral success stems from a fun-
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damental compatibility between the group’s Islamism and the religiosity of the
Egyptian electorate (Hamid 2014). Blaydes tells us that the Brotherhood is “the
largest recipient of ideology votes in Egypt” (2011, 101 (fn. 1)).
While ideological explanations for the Brotherhood’s political success are in-
tuitive, they tend to be theoretically underdetermined. For instance, if the Broth-
erhood’s success was a product of their proximity to Egypt’s theoretical conser-
vative median voter, then why were other parties unable to capture more voters
by shifting rightwards (Downs 1957)? Indeed, the aforementioned Hizb al-Wafd,
built on a platform of cooperation between Egypt’s Christians and Muslims, in-
creasingly emphasized its Islamic credentials throughout the 1980s in an attempt
to capture more conservative voters. As Hamid notes:
In [the Hizb al-Wafd’s] original 1977 program, there was only one pass-
ing mention of Sharia as the “original” (aseel) source of legislation. The
1984 program, in contrast, included an entire section devoted to the
application of Islamic law (tatbiq al-Sharia), in which the Wafd stated
that Islam was both “din wa dawla” (religion and state) and that the
Sharia was the principal source of legislation (2014, 86).
Even successive Egyptian governments, led by military men such as Anwar El-
Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and Abdelfattah El-Sisi, have gone to great lengths puff
up their Islamic credentials (Masoud 2014a, Skovgaard-Petersen 1997). Among a
crowded field of competitors all loudly touting their Islamic identity, why did Is-
lam’s supposed “electoral advantage” accrue to the Brotherhood alone (Pepinsky,
Liddle and Mujani 2012)?
An ideological component is undeniably part of the story of the Brotherhood’s
success- it is, after all, an Islamist organization. But deciphering the Brotherhood’s
political triumphs requires appreciating how Egypt’s authoritarian electoral ge-
ography and the Muslim Brotherhood’s proficiency in social service provision
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interacted. The next section reviews a batch of new studies about electoral mobi-
lization in Egypt and social service provision in the Middle East and beyond to
briefly introduce a theory connecting the Muslim Brotherhood’s uniquely profi-
cient delivery of social services to their uncommon success in Egypt’s authoritar-
ian elections.
Islamist Parties and Non-Islamist Voters
Masoud’s recent study of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood offers a rich and
theoretically sophisticated explanation for both Islamist success and non-Islamist
failure (2014a). Dispatching ideological and material arguments, he finds that
Egypt’s authoritarian political economy simultaneously locked poor voters into
pro-regime clientelist networks while freeing middle-class voters to lob “paper
stones” at the regime (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). These middle class vot-
ers preferred the Brotherhood as a receptacle for protest votes not because they
identified with the organization ideologically, but rather because they found its
middle class identity and vaguely pro-business platforms more palatable than
leftist parties’ calls for economic redistribution.
I build on Masoud’s argument about how Egypt’s authoritarian political econ-
omy helped generate the Muslim Brotherhood’s political advantage. Yet I differ
on two key points. Masoud tells us that, under Mubarak, middle class voters
shied away from non-Brotherhood (leftist) opposition parties because of differ-
ences with these parties’ redistributionist policy platforms. Yet in Egypt’s author-
itarian regime control over national policy was never at stake for the opposition.
Second, the choice facing the disaffected middle class was not whether to voice
support for shrill leftist parties or the moderate Muslim Brotherhood. The exit
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option (Hirschman 1970) of simply staying at home was, as scholars have noted,
an increasingly common strategy for many Egyptians (Soliman 2006, Wickham
2002). In the pages that follow I demonstrate that the Brotherhood’s competency
and compassion in social service provision not only explains what middle class
Egyptians were voting against, but what they were voting for.
My focus on how parties distribute social service provision contributes to and
extends a vibrant new literature in comparative politics. For instance, in her re-
cent work on ethnic parties in Lebanon, Melani Cammett (2014, 2010) explores
how strategies of political mobilization, ethnic cleavages, and intergroup compe-
tition incentivize parties to prioritize either in-groups or out-groups in their social
welfare provision. Although the absence of an analogous ethnic cleavage in the
Egyptian case (as well as institutions that reify such cleavages) makes drawing
cross-national inferences difficult, one key divergence concerns the behavior of
Islamist groups in each country. Whereas Lebanese Hezbollah has historically
prioritized co-ethnics over outsiders, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood eschews
such discrimination. As the IMA’s motto states, the organization exists to “pro-
vide medical service for all, regardless of nationality, religion, or social class.”
My specific focus on how social service provision generates political success
also engages with Tariq Thachil’s recent work on the Indian Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) (2014b, 2014a, 2011). As he shows, outsourcing electoral mobilization to
affiliated social service organizations allowed the bourgeois BJP to mobilize poor
voters without alienating their base. While there exist a number of interesting
parallels between the cases, the Muslim Brotherhood’s social service provision
generates political support through a fundamentally different pathway than the
exchange-based linkage that benefits the BJP. In fact, nearly every visitor to the
Brotherhood’s medical facilities pays in cash, obviating the quid-pro-quo nature of
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the clientelistic relationship. Instead of a “material mechanism” (Thachil 2014b,
454), the Brotherhood’s social service provision sends a powerful and politically
beneficial signal of the group’s honesty, professionalism, and approachability.
As I show in the following chapters, Egyptians did not walk out of the Broth-
erhood’s social service facilities convinced of the supremacy of Sharia law, the
necessity of sacrifice for the Brotherhood’s greater good, or the obligation to re-
pay these material benefits at the ballot box. Against the government’s corruption
and incompetence and the opposition’s cheap talk, Egypt’s middle class voters
supported the Brotherhood because they believed that the high-quality and com-
passionate care that they experienced at the Muslim Brotherhood’s social service
facilities was a harbinger for how the group would behave in political office.
What’s Ahead
The task throughout the following pages is twofold: to build an empirical record
of the history, spatial distribution, electoral impact, and attitudinal effects of the
Brotherhood’s social service provision, and then to articulate and support a causal
chain connecting social service provision to electoral support, rather than recruit-
ment, charity, or revolutionary activism. With this in mind, I designed the follow-
ing chapters to explicitly test multiple empirical implications of each competing
theory against the historical, spatial, qualitative, and experimental evidence. The
goal throughout is to build an empirically supported, theoretically sophisticated
account connecting the Muslim Brotherhood’s provision of social services to the
group’s uncommon ability to thrive in non-democratic elections.
Chapter one elaborates a theory of social service provision and political mo-
bilization in non-democratic regimes, focusing on now underlying socioeconomic
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cleavages and overarching authoritarian electoral institutions interact. As pro-
regime clientelist networks proliferated in poor districts, electoral competition
blossomed in middle class ones. The Brotherhood capitalized on this dynamic
by erecting medical facilities in middle class areas, and in particular in electoral
districts where the group put forward candidates. In those locales, social service
provision drove electoral support not through clientelism or Islamization, but by
convincing voters of Muslim Brotherhood candidates’ compassion and profes-
sionalism.
Chapter two examines the history of the Brotherhood’s social service network-
and the Islamic Medical Association in particular- since its re-emergence under
Anwar El-Sadat in the 1970s. The chapter relies on a variety of primary docu-
ments, interviews with founding members, and articles from Islamist periodicals
to show how successive Egyptian rulers encouraged Islamist social service initia-
tives as part of their efforts to mitigate popular discontent over painful economic
reforms. At the same time, a draconian regulatory architecture monitored and
subjugated Islamists’ activism, ensuring that it never graduated into a challenge
against the regime’s political primacy. This chapter not only illuminates an un-
known chapter of Egyptian history, the story of how the Brotherhood’s social
service network backstopped Egypt’s authoritarian regime challenges arguments
about the subversive and revolutionary character of this provision.
Harking back to the examples of ’Elwan and Ma’adi that opened this intro-
duction, chapter three considers the conditions under which the Brotherhood dis-
tributes or withholds social services. The theory that these facilities are related
to political mobilization is not unchallenged- scholars have suggested a number
of alternative rationales behind the Brotherhood’s use of these facilities, includ-
ing charitable provision, recruitment, and a strategy to alienate their recipients
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from institutional politics. This chapter empirically tests these theories against
new spatial data on the spread of the Brotherhood’s medical facilities. Instead of
poor areas, locales with dense networks of members, or neighborhoods and vil-
lages where the regime was weakest, these facilities exist in middle-class districts
in which the Brotherhood put forth a candidate for elected office. Then, by illu-
minating the non-discriminatory and for-profit model upon which these facilities
are based, the remainder of the chapter casts further doubt on theories of both
clientelism (which require a quid-pro-quo mechanism) and recruitment (which
focus on discrimination in favor of movement participants).
Chapter four tightens the lens to analyze how the Brotherhood’s provision
of social services shapes local patterns of electoral mobilization. The chapter’s
first sections use media coverage, campaign biographies, and site visits to eluci-
date the linkages between these facilities and the Muslim Brotherhood candidates
that appeared in their districts. It shows that many of the Brotherhood candi-
dates in districts with Islamic Medical Association facilities were linked to these
facilities- as either founder, funder, or employee. The remainder of the chap-
ter uses the Summer 2012 presidential run-off between Mohammed Morsi and
Ahmed Shafiq to identify the local effect of social service provision on the out-
come of this contest. Spatial analysis of neighborhood-level voting in the Cairo
governorate reveals that those ballot boxes proximate to IMA facilities were more
likely to support Mohammed Morsi than those ballot boxes distal to IMA facili-
ties.
Neither chapter three’s discussion of how the Brotherhood distributes social
services nor chapter four’s discussion of this targeting’s political effects explains
how social service provision influences individual beliefs and behaviors. To ex-
plicate this linkage, chapter five introduces an original survey of approximately
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2400 Egyptians charting their experiences with Islamist social service provision.
In addition to capturing valuable empirical evidence about these facilities, an ex-
perimental manipulation embedded in the survey shows how individuals map
the honest, compassionate, and engaged care they receive in these facilities onto
the Brotherhood’s candidates for elected office. At the same time, the results
do not support arguments that these facilities alienate recipients from electoral
politics or inculcate a more politicized understanding of Islam.
Chapter six summarizes the evidence introduced in the preceding chapters
and explores the main implications of those findings. Empirical implications
across the historical, macro, meso, and micro levels of analysis align in support
of the theory connecting the Brotherhood’s social service provision to electoral
mobilization. In contrast, empirical support for the alternative hypotheses is scat-
tered and contradictory. Then, to drive home the theory’s explanatory power,
the conclusion applies chapter three’s spatial analysis on different sectors of the
Brotherhood’s social service network, namely schools and community associa-
tions, to show that they too conform to the electoral logic advanced above.
The conclusion also explores a number of implications that follow from these
findings. The counterintuitive absence of religion from the above story of Islamist
social service provision prompts the question “if religion was so unimportant,
why was only the Muslim Brotherhood able to reap a reputational effect from
these services?” The answer circles back to the dynamic identified in the first
chapter: these facilities emerged in middle class areas and adopted a particu-
larly businesslike manner of operation. While many other parties deployed social
services in an attempt to win over voters, they did so clientelistically, providing
services for free in order to gain a recipient’s support on election day. Yet this
mode of provision also decreased the quality of these services, robbing them of
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Elections and the Parties That Win Them
Understanding why the Brotherhood “never helped” in ’Elwan and, more broadly,
how the group navigated successive authoritarian elections without collapsing
into a niche party, requires examining Egypt’s authoritarian political economy.
This chapter presents a theory of social service provision and electoral mobi-
lization, focusing on how decades of pro-regime clientelist mobilization in poor
areas channeled electoral competition to middle class environs. In these more
well-to-do towns and cities, the Muslim Brotherhood maximized their chances
for victory by proliferating social services in those districts where they put for-
ward candidates for elected office. In these districts, the Brotherhood’s social
services drove electoral mobilization by sending a politically-powerful signal of
the Brotherhood’s honesty, professionalism, and modesty.
The next section probes the conceptual difference between this study’s specific
focus on the Muslim Brotherhood’s social service network versus prior authors’
decision to examine Islamic social service networks. Not only does this specify
the dependent variable, it also helps delineate the project’s scope. The follow-
ing sections draw from literatures on clientelism, non-democratic regimes, and
reputational voting to explicate the core theory. First, I show how authoritarian
political economies tend to depress electoral competition in poor areas while en-
abling it in middle class ones. This socioeconomic cleavage affected the Muslim
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Brotherhood’s electoral challenge as well, incentivizing the group to provide so-
cial services in electorally competitive middle class districts. The final theoretical
section explores how these facilities signal Brotherhood candidates’ honesty, pro-
fessionalism, and approachability, and how this reputational effect drives support
on election day.
The concluding section articulates a research design that focuses on testing the
empirical implications of the theory (and its alternatives) with different analytical
frameworks and multiple types of data. Each chapter draws out the observable
effects of each theoretical mechanism, in other words, those processes that could
show the theoretical mechanism at work, and evaluates them against the evidence.
This approach structures the following empirical chapters, as I move from exam-
ining the historical context of the Brotherhood’s social services, to their spatial
distribution, to their impact on electoral mobilization, and finally to their effect
on recipients’ attitudes. Not only does this approach help adjudicate among the
theory and its alternatives; focusing on how well the theory’s implications cohere
internally reduces the risk of drawing fallacious inferences.
The Dependent Variable: The Islamic Medical Association
This dissertation seeks to explain the conditions under which the Muslim Broth-
erhood provides social services and, just as importantly, those conditions under
which it does not. As related lines of enquiry, it considers how this provision
affects local patterns of political mobilization, as well as the precise effects this
provision has on recipients’ beliefs and behaviors.
While these questions speak to developments in the Middle East and beyond,
Egypt furnishes the empirical materials on which to test the theory. Egypt is
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where the Brotherhood began and where the group’s social service networks have
grown the largest. It is also where the group has its longest history of political
engagement, culminating in a brief period of political primacy during Egypt’s
democratic interlude, from the spring 2011 constitutional referendum to the sum-
mer 2013 military coup. Yet both under Mubarak and after him, the group’s
electoral fortunes shifted over both time and space. This, coupled with the in-
triguing local variation in social service provision hinted at in the introduction,
suggests “scaling down” to a subnational research design (Snyder 2001, Gibson
2005). Not only does this approach maximize the number of cases while pre-
serving variation on both the dependent and independent variables, it holds a
number of potentially confounding national-level variables constant (King, Keo-
hane and Verba 1994, Lijphart 1971). This, as much as possible, helps to isolate
causal and outcome variables (Slater and Ziblatt 2013, George and Bennett 2005,
George 1979).
This project’s specific focus on the Muslim Brotherhood, as opposed to a more
general conceptualization of “the Islamic movement” or “Islamic activism,” dis-
tinguishes it from prior studies. Studies of Islamic social activism, broadly con-
ceived, have yielded valuable evidence on mobilization (Wickham 2002), middle
class networks (Clark 2004), the interface of charity and neoliberalism (Atia 2013,
Tuğal 2013, Harrigan and El-Said 2009), relations with the state (Harmsen 2008,
Wiktorowicz 2000) and development (Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999, Sullivan
1994). Yet as the introduction highlighted, there exists no investigation of spe-
cific Muslim Brotherhood social service networks, and how they either support or
confound theories of Islamic social activism writ large.
“Social services” include a wide array of goods and services, from discounted
food, clothing, school supplies, job training, childrearing and education, medical
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and health services, and other similar types of endeavors. For analytical purposes,
however, this dissertation considers the activities of one particular social service
organization: the Islamic Medical Association (IMA). As chapter two discusses in
more detail, the IMA is the oldest and largest organized Muslim Brotherhood so-
cial service initiative. In 2011, the Brotherhood referred to the IMA as “the largest
medical charity initiative established by the Brotherhood to date" (Shamakh 2011,
86). In 1977 Dr. Ahmed al-Malt, deputy to three leaders of the Muslim Broth-
erhood, founded the IMA with a group of colleagues. As one measure of the
organization’s importance, the Brotherhood’s flagship Arabic-language magazine
al-Da’wa covered the IMA prominently and consistently until the magazine was
shuttered following Egyptian President Anwar El-Sadat’s assassination in 1981.1
From 1976-1981, the magazine contained 11 articles about or advertisements and
announcements from the IMA.2 The next most prominent social service initia-
tive that the magazine covered, the Brotherhood’s al-Nassar Hospital in the city
of Suez, appeared only twice.3 The IMA’s prominence grew steadily throughout
the Mubarak years and, by the summer of 2013 the association had an annual
operations budget of around 100 million Egyptian Pounds (EGP, roughly $14 mil-
lion) and treated nearly two million Egyptians per year.4 When Egypt’s military
1Following Anwar El-Sadat’s assassination al-Da’wa moved operations to Geneva (and later
Pakistan). It also shifted from a generally Egypt-centric magazine to a bulletin covering the
broader Muslim World. I have found no mention of the IMA in these issues.
2I also found an advertisement for the Islamic Medical Association in the Egyptian Islamist
magazine Liwa’ al-Islam. See issue no. 2 (May 17, 1988), p. 58. IMA founder Ahmed al-Malt also
had a regular column in Liwa’ al-Islam, and these were later compiled into his 1993 book, Risalati
Illa al-Shabab (My Message to the Youth).
3See the inside cover advertisements in al-Da’wa issues no. 57 (January 1981) and no. 58 (Febru-
ary 1981). There was also an article discussing the charitable efforts of the Brotherhood-leaning
industrialist Uthman Ahmed Uthman (whom Kepel calls the “Egyptian Rockefeller” (2003, 109).)
See “’Ashrat min Dawr al-’Ibada wa al-’Alm Tuqaam li-’Alaa’ Kalamat al-Haq wa al-Deen (Tens of
Places of Worship and Learning are Created to Uphold the Word of Truth and Religion),” al-Da’wa,
No. 12 (May 1977), p. 44.
4Author Interview, IMA Executive A, January 15, 2013. See also: Mohammed Taha, “Dirasa:
’al-Jama’iyya al-Tibiyya’ Tu’alij Nahu 7 Milyon Marid Khilal 4 Sanawat (Study: ’(Islamic) Medical
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regime seized the IMA’s properties and other physical assets in January of 2015,
their value reportedly totaled nearly 300 million EGP (around $42 million).5
While there exist other organizations that could conceivably be included in the
study, I do not include them for two reasons. First, their links to the Brotherhood
are often more tenuous. As chapter two shows, the IMA clearly functioned as an
appendage of the Muslim Brotherhood- in fact, when I queried Muslim Brothers
about where I might start my enquiry into the group’s social service networks
they almost universally recommended I visit the IMA. Members of the IMA, for
their part, were hardly circumspect about their relationship to the Muslim Broth-
erhood. In the case of other social service organizations the relationship is not
so clear, complicating efforts to isolate the precise relationship between the Mus-
lim Brotherhood’s political fortunes and their involvement in a particular social
service initiative.
Second, potential alternative institutions are regional rather than national. For
instance, the Mowasah (Compassionate) Association is centered in the Menoufiyya
governorate, and among its initiatives are a handful of hospitals (the IMA op-
erates the flagship facility in Shibin al-Kom).6 There are also “independent”
Association’ Treats Approximately Seven Million Sick over Four Years),” al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-
Islamiyya, January 2, 2015. Available online at: http://www.ima-egy.net/2013-09-24-14-31-06/607-
7-4. Accessed March 15, 2015.
5Ibrahim Qasim, Nourhan Hasan, and Mohammed al-’Alim,“Ba’d Qarar al-Tahfiz ’ala Amwal
wa Mumtalakat al-Gam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya: ’Hasr Amwal al-Ikhwan:’ Thani Akbar Mus-
dar Tamwil lil-Jama’at bi-Qima 300 Milyon Guinea.. (Follow Up to the Decision to Take Control of
the Accounts and Assets of the Islamic Medical Association...Inventorying the Brotherhood’s Ac-
counts: The Second-largest Source of Funding for the Group is Valued at 300 Million Pounds...),"
El-Watan, January 14, 2015. Available online at: http://goo.gl/DuvdTw. Accessed May 12, 2015.
6On the Mowasah Association, see Ahmed al-Sukkari, “al-Sadat Yatarid ’ala Hal Gam’iyyat
’al-Mowasah’ (Sadat Disagrees with the Dissolution of the Mowasah Association),” al-
Wafd, December 22, 2010. Available online at: http://goo.gl/rpkTv9. Accessed Jan-
uary 10, 2015; Mohammed Essawy, “260 Mowazifan wa Maridan bi-Mistashfa al-Mowasah
bil-Menoufiyya Yatathahiroun Ihtijajan ’ala Qarar Hal al-Gam’iyya (260 Employees and Pa-
tients of the Mowasah Hospital in Menoufiyya Rally to Protest the Decision to Dis-
solve the (Mowasah) Association),” al-Ahram, December 21, 2010. Available online at:
http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=379034&eid=715. Accessed January 10, 2015.
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Brotherhood hospitals scattered throughout Egypt, such as the Tibah Hospital in
the Delta governorate of Gharbiyya (Abdelrahman 2013). The IMA is national,
with roughly three dozen facilities scattered across Egypt’s two dozen-odd gov-
ernorates.
The project also does not consider the deployment of public resources the
Brotherhood may have accessed, for instance patronage jobs in government min-
istries under President Mohammed Morsi7 or joint campaigns between the Broth-
erhood and the Ministry of Health.8 The dissertation also does not track the
resources of third-party institutions that the Brotherhood may have infiltrated
or influenced, such as the sprawling Islamic charity organization al-Gam’iyya al-
Shar’iyya (Ben Néfissa 2002) or Egyptian syndicates.9 Finally, the project does not
attempt to account for private resources, for instance a Brotherhood member who
happens to also be a doctor opening his personal clinic to district residents a few
nights a week.10
This strict focus on the IMA is necessary in light of the difficulties of research-
ing an organization as guarded as the Brotherhood, in an authoritarian state that
7Following Mohammed Morsi’s election, for instance, a number of prominent IMA mem-
bers were appointed to the Ministry of Health. Saad Zaghloul and Ibrahim Mustapha
became Assistant Ministers of Health for Curative Care (al-tib al-alaji) and Health Insur-
ance, respectively. Another member became the Health Minister’s official spokesperson, see:
Mustapha al-Marsafawi, Ayat al-Gabal, and Omar Abdel Aziz, “Hukumat Moqattam, fi Wiz-
arat Qandil (The Government of Moqattam (where the Brotherhood’s Headquarters was lo-
cated), in Qandil’s Ministry),” al-Masry al-Youm, February 15, 2013. Available online at:
http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=371220. Accessed March 22, 2015.
8“al-Jamiyya al-Islamiyya Tunazim Qafela Tibiyya bi-Aswan fi Nihayat November (Islamic As-
sociation Organizes a Medical Caravan in Aswan at the End of November),” al-Mashhad, Septem-
ber 20, 2011. Available online at: http://goo.gl/wZouQ3. Accessed November 3, 2014.
9Egyptian syndicates resemble white-collar unions, and often use member subscription fees to
provide members and their families with myriad benefits, including health insurance, loans, and
other services. Especially in the 1990s Brotherhood members successfully contested elections for
seats on the boards of these bodies (Wickham 2002).
10see Robert F. Worth, “Egypt’s Human Bellwether,” The New York Times, January 19, 2012.
Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/magazine/mohamed-beltagy-future-
of-egypt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Accessed May 18, 2014.
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holds as tightly to elementary information as does Egypt. Yet the ambitions of
this project are larger, to use the specific case of the IMA to gain explanatory
leverage over other aspects of the Brotherhood’s vaunted social services portfolio.
To test the generalizability of the theory- and mitigate concerns that the IMA only
represents a misleading slice of a larger and more complicated reality- the con-
clusion expands the spatial analysis to approximately 75 Brotherhood-operated
schools and nearly 1,000 of the group’s community associations. This analysis
shows the theory’s explanatory power on additional cases, raising confidence that
the project’s findings are not just an artifact of the IMA or of medical networks
specifically.
The following pages articulate a general theory of social service provision and
electoral mobilization in non-democratic regimes in three stages. The next sec-
tion focuses on how these regimes use clientelist networks mobilize their own
supporters, and how this tends to foreclose competition in poor locales while en-
couraging it in wealthier ones. The section immediately following examines the
other side of the coin, exploring how the Muslim Brotherhood leveraged their
social service networks to exploit this flowering of competition in middle class
districts. The final theoretical section specifies the causal mechanism connecting
the Brotherhood’s social service provision to electoral support, focusing on the
powerful signal of competency and compassion that these facilities broadcast to
Egyptian voters.
Authoritarian Regimes and their Clients
As the introduction specified, one key difference separating this project from prior
efforts is an explicit focus on electoral mobilization as a key causal variable. While
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alternative clusters of literature provide important insights into the phenomenon
of Islamic provision of social services, they are also notable for the limited role
they allow for the politics of campaigns, elections, and voter mobilization. Indeed,
the theoretical frameworks with which these scholars structure their respective
analyses- be they social movement theory, civil society, or ideological paradigms-
are often explicitly counterpoised to regular, institutionalized politics. Whereas
electoral politics sits at the margins of these theories, it takes center stage in this
dissertation.
Non-democratic regimes are especially able to mobilize voters through clien-
telism, given their access to resources and ability to “raid the bureaucracy” (Shefter
1994, 21) for other sweeteners such as insider deals on privatization, jobs, entry
into certain schools or access to certain programs (Levitsky and Way 2010, Lust
2009, Greene 2007, Magaloni 2006, Chu 1999, Wang 1994). Yet these networks of
electoral mobilization do not drape evenly across the socioeconomic terrain. Be-
cause the poor place a higher value on simple consumption goods such as sugar,
cooking gas, and cash, the marginal cost of purchasing their support is less than
their middle class counterparts (Dixit and Londregan 1996). As Calvo and Murillo
put it, the poor offer the resource-maximizing political machine the greatest “bang
for the buck” (2004).11
Egypt’s authoritarian regime was no different. For decades the ruling Na-
tional Democratic Party (NDP) stocked the parliament through a combination of
coercion and electoral mobilization, the latter based largely on the contingent and
episodic exchange of consumption goods (Soliman 2011, Blaydes 2011, King 2009,
11This is not to say that the poor are purely materialist: while their interests or ideological
affinities are as varied as their more affluent counterparts, especially in non-democratic settings
their immediate material needs ensure that their ability to vote those interests and affinities remain
weak (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast 2006).
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Shehata 2008, Ben Néfissa and ’Arafat 2005, Kassem 1999). The country’s yawn-
ing socioeconomic cleavage powerfully influenced the shape and reach of these
pro-regime clientelist networks. As in other cases, the regime’s immense advan-
tage in resources meant that any politician or party who sought to oppose the
regime’s favored candidate would be swimming upstream. The smart strategy
for the opposition- Islamist or otherwise- would be to simply avoid competing
in Egypt’s myriad poor neighborhoods and villages where victory was not an
option (Brown 2012). Egypt’s middle class districts, in contrast, offered the oppo-
sition the chance to make hay amongst those voters who are freer to defect from
the ruling party and make “ideological investments” in opposition candidates
(Magaloni 2006, 22), (Chandra 2007). As Masoud shows, this gifted the largely
middle-class Muslim Brotherhood an advantage over non-Islamist parties whose
redistributionist platforms were fundamentally unattractive to the middle class
audiences whom they needed to woo (2014a).
Charting the relationship between electoral competition and district wealth
empirically supports this argument. I generate a new metric of competitiveness
not through post-hoc statistics about margin of victory, which the regime itself
could easily manipulate, but instead by examining ex-ante variation in candidate
entry across electoral districts. Prior authors have observed that voters heavily
weigh a candidate’s orientation vis-à-vis the regime when considering how to
apportion their electoral support. For instance, in his study of Egypt Hinnebusch
noted “the tendency of many voters, out of hope for advantage or deference to
authority, to support candidates known to have government approval and avoid
those in disfavor” (1988, 171). Similarly, Lust notes how “voters do not elect
candidates whom they perceive as unable to work with the government” (2009,
239).
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I assume that all Egyptians share common knowledge about where and when
these favored pro-regime candidates exist and, just as importantly, where and
when they are absent. Those Egyptians pondering an electoral challenge will
make their decision either to abstain or enter electoral contests in a given district
based on this knowledge. Candidates, in other words, can foresee where a race
is likely to be uncompetitive, and will simply sit out the election rather than
expending resources to register, campaign, and mobilize supporters for a lost
cause. In contrast, if no clear pro-regime candidate exists, potential candidates
will perceive in the district an opportunity. If the above theory is correct, the
data should reveal a direct correlation between district wealth and competition
(as proxied by number of candidates entering the race): the wealthier the district
the more intense the political competition, and vice-versa.
According to Egyptian law, all candidates for parliament must publish their
names in a national newspaper prior to the election. I coded pre-election issues
of the state Arabic-language dailies to assemble information on the number of
candidates who entered races in each electoral district for five lower-house par-
liamentary elections: 1990,12 1995,13 2000,14 2005, and 2010.15 Plotting this metric
of competition against a measure of electoral district wealth quintiles, where one
is the poorest and five is the wealthiest, renders Figure 1.1.16 Points are jittered in
12The al-Ahram Center compiled the candidate numbers in their study of the 1990 elections
(al Samea 1991, 39–44).
13al-Ahram, November 27, 1995, pp. 38-44.
14It is not clear if a full pre-election list was ever published, although a first-round list did
appear in al-Gomhuriyya, October 11, 2000, pp. 17-19. As a proxy for these elections, I use
the number of candidates who registered for these elections in the first 24 hours after the regis-
tration period opened. See “Ha’ula’ Qademu Awraqhum...Lil-Barliman al-Amal...fi 24 Sa’at (Here
are Those Who’ve Submitted their Paperwork...(to Contest) the Parliament Elections...in (the first)
24 hours),” al-Gomhuriyya, September 23, 2000, pp. 3-5.
15I appreciate Tarek Masoud sharing the candidate entry data for the 2005 and 2010 elections
with me.
16The x-axis in Figure 1.1 is based on the DHS-computed wealth index. I discuss this measure
more fully in chapter three. I lack the precise geographic boundaries for the two South Sinai
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Figure 1.1: Competition vs. Electoral District Wealth, 1990-2010
order to prevent over-plotting.
Figure 1.1 vividly shows the interaction between district wealth and politi-
cal competition in Mubarak’s Egypt (the relationship between the two variables
is positive and statistically significant at p < .000). Specifically, Egypt’s authori-
tarian regime essentially monopolized political competition by proliferating stout
clientelist networks throughout the country’s myriad poor neighborhoods and vil-
lages. In these conditions, any opposition group seeking electoral traction would
be well advised to seek their political fortunes in Egypt’s comparatively wealthier
districts, al-Tour and Ras al-Sadr. I extrapolate by cross-referencing the DHS location data with
the Markaz/ Qism that compose each of the South Sinai districts, as listed in Egypt’s electoral law,
Law 206 of 1990 (Majls al-Sha’b 1990, 267).
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cities and provincial towns. Judging by the results above, they did.
This relationship is a foundational piece of the dissertation’s core argument
that the spatial distribution of political competition in Mubarak’s Egypt shaped
the Muslim Brotherhood’s social service provision. Particularly notable was the
interaction between the country’s underlying socioeconomic characteristics and
overarching electoral institutions, and how this funneled electoral competition
into middle-class areas. The next section focuses on the opposition, specifically
considering how the Muslim Brotherhood managed to successfully mobilize vot-
ers in Egypt’s wealthier environs.
The Puzzle of Islamist Success
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood notched a remarkable degree of success in
Egypt’s authoritarian elections, presaging their political dominance after Mubarak
fell. How did the Muslim Brotherhood do so well in Egypt’s authoritarian elec-
tions, while their opponents did so poorly?
In order to test explanations for Islamist success empirically, I constructed an
original dataset of all 578 candidates the Muslim Brotherhood put forward for
election to Egypt’s lower house of parliament from 1976-2011, including the dis-
trict in which they competed.17 Not only is this dataset comprehensive, focusing
on where the group competed rather than where they won furnishes two important
benefits. First, it captures the Brotherhood’s own logic of where they thought
that they would be best able to marshal electoral support (as al-Anani shows, the
Brotherhood expended considerable effort studying where to compete in order
17Appendix A discusses this dataset in more detail. Although the dataset captures all the
Brotherhood’s candidates for elected office from 1976-2010, a change in electoral district laws in
1990 makes combining the pre and post-1990 systems difficult.
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to maximize their success (2007, 251-258).) Second, charting ex-ante statistics of
candidate entry rather than ex-post results controls- as much as possible- for the
regime’s interference in the electoral process.
An additional problem with quantitative explanations for where the Brother-
hood competes and wins is the lack of high quality subnational data on popula-
tion characteristics. This is particularly pronounced when it comes to measuring
the level of religious- and specifically Islamic- conservatism in a given district. I
craft a measure of each district’s Islamic conservatism by compiling the percent-
age of Muslim women in the district who believe that female genital mutilation is
a religious obligation.18 While of limited use outside Egypt, there exists no other
way to create such a fine-grained Islamic conservatism.19
Figure 1.2 plots on the Y axis the percentage of times the Brotherhood fielded
a candidate in a given electoral district for the years 1995-2010. For example, if
the Brotherhood fielded a candidate in the district in three of the four election
years (’95, ’00, ’05. and ’10), it receives a score of .75. On the X axis is the above-
described district-by-district measure of Islamic conservatism.
FIgure 1.2 should increase skepticism of ideological explanations for the Broth-
erhood’s electoral successes. If the Brotherhood rose to power on the backs of con-
servative Muslims, then there should appear a correlation between those districts
in which the group fielded candidates and those featuring a high degree of reli-
gious conservatism. As this shows, however, the relationship is indistinguishable
from random statistical noise during the years 1990-2010 (p < .26). If anything, the
relationship trends negative; at least under Mubarak, it seems that the group was
18I appreciate Tarek Masoud’s suggestion to consider this variable, as well as Vickie Langohr’s
advice for how to interpret it.
19Most surveys either do not ask about religious belief, or simply do not ask enough respon-
dents, to assemble an alternative measure. Spatial proxies, such as the number of mosques, are
not feasible due to limited data outside of major metropolitan areas.
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Figure 1.2: Muslim Brotherhood Candidate Entry vs. Electoral District
Religiosity, 1995-2010
more politically active in districts with a higher percentage of relatively liberal
Muslims.
Figure 1.1 showed how Egypt’s authoritarian political economy structured
general political competition in the country. Rather than existing as an outlier, the
Brotherhood’s strategy of electoral contestation fits this pattern. Figure 1.3 recre-
ates Figure 1.1, except that in this iteration, the Y-axis is not a general measure
of electoral competition (total candidates in the district), but instead the specific
measure of how many times a candidate from the Muslim Brotherhood competed
in the district.
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Figure 1.3: Muslim Brotherhood Candidate Entry vs. Electoral District Wealth,
1995-2010
The strong positive correlation from Figure 1.1 reappears in Figure 1.3: the re-
lationship between district wealth and where the Brotherhood contested elections
is also statistically significant at p < .000. In other words, the Brotherhood consis-
tently put forward candidates for elected office in middle class districts where the
regime’s clientelist networks were least effective. This finding serves as the second
foundation piece for the dissertation’s core theory and ties the argument advanced
here to broader literatures about political competition in non-democratic regimes.
As the third chapter shows in detail, the group’s deployment of brick-and-mortar
medical facilities was embedded in this logic: it was not simply middle class ar-
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eas which hosted the Brotherhood’s social service networks (Clark 2004), it was
those middle class districts in which the group put forward candidates for elected
office.
The structure of electoral incentives provides traction to explain the differing
fates of the upscale Cairene suburb of Ma’adi and the “poor farming village”
of ’Elwan discussed in the introduction. As these scatterplots predict, the elec-
toral district encompassing Ma’adi (and the al-Farouq hospital) had, for decades,
been the site of intense electoral competition between the Brotherhood and the
NDP. ’Elwan’s district, in contrast, had never hosted a candidate from the Muslim
Brotherhood prior to the Arab Spring.20
The preceding analysis invites the following question: if Egypt’s authoritarian
political economy was channeling all political competition to middle class areas,
why was only the Muslim Brotherhood able to capitalize on the opportunity, and
turn their candidates into parliamentary deputies? The answer lies in the partic-
ular linkages that the Muslim Brotherhood’s social services forge with Egyptian
voters. Instead of clientelist or ideological relationships, the Brotherhood’s social
services produced a powerful reputational effect, in which the honest, capable, and
compassionate care at these facilities benefitted Brotherhood candidates at the
ballot box.
20As this argument intimates, the pernicious effects of Egypt’s authoritarianism stretched be-
yond political competition and into the social realm. Not only could Egypt’s regime use threats
of withholding resources to force Egyptians to vote against their preferences (Blaydes 2011, Diaz-
Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast 2006). By establishing political monopolies in the poorer areas,
the regime removed the incentives for opposing political entities to extend social services to these
areas in an attempt to compete. As if embedding a brutal authoritarian regime was not bad
enough, this particular political arrangement funneled resources to those middle class voters who
already, by dint of their surplus wealth, faced an easier time of it that their poorer countrymen
and women.
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Social Service Provision and the Role of Reputation
After the Brotherhood’s considerable success in the 2005 parliamentary elections
(89 seats)21 Ibrahim Eissa, editor of the independent newspaper al-Dustor, penned
a blistering editorial explaining why Egyptians chose the Muslim Brotherhood
over the NDP. The column is worth quoting extensively:
Egyptians vote for the Brotherhood because they did not nominate the
corrupt, bank robbers, thieves, or officers of State Security involved
in torturing their fellow citizens. They did not nominate kingpins,
tycoons, drug dealers, or phonies, those who profited from the sale
of Egypt’s resources abroad or looted the public sector. They did
not nominate sycophants, hypocrites who cheer meaningless laws and
normalization with Israel, or collaborators with American economic
schemes. People voted for the Brotherhood because their members,
despite being arrested, tortured, imprisoned, and killed, and despite
being pursued by State Security and having their livelihoods threat-
ened, refuse to abandon their principles (regardless of whether you
agree with them or not). If people had the choice of (son of president
Hosni Mubarak) Gamal Mubarak or (Muslim Brother) Essam al-Erian,
they will choose Essam al-Erian. If they had the choice of (NDP Figure
and steel tycoon) Ahmed ’Ezz or (Muslim Brother) Abdelmoneim Abu
El-Fotouh they will choose Abu El-Fotouh. If they had the choice of
(longest serving NDP deputy) Kamal el-Shazly and (Muslim Brother)
Mohammed Habib, they will choose Mohammed Habib!22
Eissa’s column vividly captures the frustration with the NDP’s corruption,
double-dealing, and incompetence. But his focus on the particular contrasts that
Egypt’s Islamists drew against their NDP opponents taps into a phenomenon
that is clearly much wider. For instance, in his recent study on the Brotherhood,
21While most accounts list 88 deputies, the al-Ahram Center’s official parliamentary directory
for the 2005-2010 session identifies 89 deputies affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood (Rabie and
’Azbawi 2006).
22Ibrahim Eissa, “Limatha Yukhtar al-Muwatin al-Masri Murash al-Ikhwan? Wa Limatha Yun-
tusir al-Masriyun lil-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi Hathahi al-Intikhabat?” (Why Does the Egyptian
Citizen Vote for the Brotherhood Candidate? And why Do Egyptians Contribute to the Triumph
of the Muslim Brotherhood in these Elections?), al-Dustor, November 26, 2005.
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Masoud notes how the organization’s “reputation for probity with more afflu-
ent voters” factored into the group’s electoral ascent (2014a, 11). According to
Brown, Islamists are able “to convey a spirit of probity and piety” that distin-
guishes them amongst a crowded field of competitors (2012, 177). In Moroccan
elections, the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) “stressed their ad-
vanced degrees, competence, and professionalism” (McFaul and Wittes 2008, 26).
In the Palestinian Territories, Hamas has garnered a “reputation for probity and
efficiency” (Legrain 2012, 191). Hezbollah emphasizes their candidates’ “honesty
and seriousness in their municipal work” (Hamzeh 2000, 744). “In many cases,”
summarized The Economist, “the [Muslim Brotherhood] have profited electorally
less from ideology than from impressions of relative honesty and competence.”23
While these observations help illustrate a potential pathway through which
the Brotherhood was able to amass electoral success, they leave one question con-
spicuously unanswered: why was the Brotherhood so good at convincing voters
of their honesty and competence? Especially when the existing governments per-
formed so poorly, all opposition parties- not just Islamists- would seem to convey
these traits simply by contrast. Yet only the Brotherhood was able to leverage
their reputational advantage into political success.
While considering this question, in the spring of 2013 I travelled to Banha,
in Qaloubiyya governorate north of Cairo. I went there to interview Mohsen
Radi, one of the Brotherhood’s veteran parliamentary deputies (he had ran in
the 1995, 2005, 2010, and 2012 majlis al-sha’b elections, winning in 2005 and 2012)
and author of an important book on the Brotherhood’s history and activities in
parliament (1990). To see him in his district office I had to wade through a crush
23“It’s Hard Being in Charge,” The Economist, March 9, 2013. Available online at:
http://goo.gl/UKpFi7. Accessed July 12, 2015. See also “The Power of Religion,” The Economist,
July 13, 2013. Available online at: http://goo.gl/MVEV8V. Accessed July 12, 2015.
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of constituents asking for favors or seeking material aid. Eventually we escaped
to a waiting car only to spend the rest of the afternoon driving around the area
as Radi tirelessly solved his constituents’ problems.
Radi was quick to note that his reputation was the key to his political success
in Banha: “people know me, they know my reputation for honesty and my strong
relationships with the people who live here, and they know I am professional.”
He had only been elected, he said, after he had spent time volunteering in the
district, building up his profile and reputation, and helping solve people’s prob-
lems. In fact, one of the ways Radi was known in the community was through
his position as founder and chairman of the Brotherhood’s al-Fath school, which
enrolled over 2000 children. Close by Radi’s office was one of the IMA’s hospitals,
and the Brotherhood also operated an orphanage elsewhere in Banha.24
Radi’s “homestyle” highlighted the quotidian reasons why an Egyptian might
vote for a candidate from the Muslim Brotherhood (Fenno 1978). There was
doubtlessly an ideological core of Radi’s supporters who would back him sim-
ply because he championed their interpretation of Islam. He was, after all, a
member of the Muslim Brotherhood. But what stood out was Radi’s ability to
attract those beyond what Robert Michels referred to as the “ideal world” of party
cadre (1915/1966, 219).
The way that Radi combined social service provision, personal reputation, and
electoral success aligns with broader findings about how candidates’ rectitude
and competency drives support at the ballot box. Researchers in American politics
have increasingly focused on how voters form impressions of candidates and,
correspondingly, the power of those perceptions to drive vote choice (Fridkin
and Kenney 2011, McGraw 2003, Bartels 2002, Funk 1996, Huddy and Terkildsen
24Author Interview, May 9, 2013.
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1993). Specifically, Fiske notes that “honesty and competence” are the twin axes
that “account almost entirely for how people characterize others” (2007, 77). Traits
such as “competence or honesty,” McGraw tells us, “are inferred from observable
qualities of the politician” (2003, 399).
The Brotherhood’s unique proficiency, capability, and compassion in social
service provision demonstrates precisely these traits. This, in turn, generates for
the Muslim Brotherhood a powerful political boost. The corruption, disinter-
ested staff, and poor sanitation that have made Egypt’s public facilities “synony-
mous with mediocrity” (Soliman 2011, xiv) are almost completely absent from the
Brotherhood’s facilities. The Brotherhood’s hospitals and clinics offer reasonable
prices, predictable availability of doctors and staff, and they are clean and well
stocked with necessary supplies and equipment. Doctors are competent and mo-
tivated, and the nurses and administrative staff share a general dedication to their
patients that is absent in public facilities. Managers and employees are chosen and
promoted based on their competence, and a series of internal organizational stan-
dards are constantly enforced across all facilities. While all parties may trumpet
values of competence, honesty, and good government, only Islamists possess the
types of social service networks able to demonstrate to voters what this means in
practice. Put differently, Islamist candidates are able to credibly convey an image
of honesty, competence, and modesty in the political realm because they manifest
these very characteristics in the social realm.
It is worth expanding on how the reputational linkage between Islamists and
voters differs from traditional studies of the contingent, episodic exchange of
clientelism (Hicken 2011). Most obviously, the Brotherhood’s facilities overwhelm-
ingly serve paying customers, precluding the quid-pro-quo mechanism at the heart
of clientelism. Two additional factors are also worth specifying. First, clientelist
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benefits are generally understood to be contingent on political support. If that
support ends, so will the delivery of benefits. In contrast, the Brotherhood’s pro-
vision of “brick-and-mortar” medical facilities is much less revocable: while a
vote broker may simply never return to a neighborhood if its residents defected
in a prior election, it is much more difficult to disassemble a structure. In fact, the
irrevocability of the Brotherhood’s structures are a key part of the group’s reputa-
tional advantage- physically anchoring these facilities in communities is a costly
signal to the citizens in that area that their commitment extends beyond election
day (Cammett 2014). By distancing- at least conceptually- their social service pro-
vision from an explicit requirement for political support, the Brotherhood is able
to increase the power of its reputational linkage (Thachil 2011).
Counterpoising the subtle reputational effect against the explicit exchange of
clientelism helps to illuminate the second key aspect of the Brotherhood’s reputa-
tional advantage. Standard clientelism studies share the assumption that, absent
the provision of goods, voters will not support the provider (they will either de-
fect to their preferences in the privacy of the voting booth or simply stay home).
Because clientelism requires individuals to act against their preferences, political
machines must also develop some mechanism to monitor recipients’ behavior to
ensure they do not renege on their election day obligations (Stokes 2005). Yet
the reputational mechanism at the core of this theory shifts recipients’ underlying
preferences to the point that there is no conflict in the voting booth. By influenc-
ing how Egyptians perceive the Brotherhood, the group’s use of social services
works to bring voters’ preferences and behaviors into alignment.
The above sections show how Egypt’s authoritarian political economy incen-
tivized opposition groups to compete for political support among Egypt’s middle
classes and forsake campaigning among the poor. Rather than an outlier, the
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Brotherhood was highly susceptible to these incentives. In those middle class ar-
eas, the Brotherhood generated powerful linkages with Egyptian voters based nei-
ther on ideological affinities nor exchange-based clientelism. Instead, the Broth-
erhood’s social service networks demonstrated their candidates’ honesty, compe-
tence, and approachability, and this generated the group’s advantage on election
day. Figure 1.4 depicts the theory as it develops across the dissertation’s chapters,
showing how social service provision fueled the Brotherhood rise to Egypt’s most
powerful political opposition under Hosni Mubarak.
Figure 1.4: Causal Argument, Macro to Micro
Social Service Provision
Electoral District Character
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Chapter three more fully discusses a number of alternative hypotheses for the
Brotherhood’s social service provision. These clusters conceptualize the provision
not as a mechanism for electoral mobilization but as a strategy to provide for
Egypt’s most needy, to recruit or retain members, to Islamize the population, or
to alienate citizens from government institutions and foment revolution.
To adjudicate amongst these theories, the following pages spend considerable
energy drawing out the empirical implications of each and testing them against
a variety of historical, spatial, qualitative, and experimental evidence. In other
words, the research strategy at the core of this project rests on attempting to iden-
tify those relationships and processes that would appear assuming that a particular
theory’s explanation were true, and then assessing those predictions against the em-
pirical evidence (Brady and Collier 2010, Platt 1964). This effectively expands
the surface area of each theory and leverages more empirical material with which
to test it, a valuable consequence particularly when information is limited or of
questionable quality.
Each theory purporting to explain Islamist social service provision implies
particular characteristics that should appear in the historical development of these
facilities. For example, if these facilities are part of a strategy to create a “parallel
state” in competition with Egypt’s authoritarian regime, then we are likely to un-
cover evidence that these facilities attempt to evade legal regulations and operate
subversively. Similarly, the theories each predict a particular spatial distribution
of the Brotherhood’s social service network. For example, if these facilities are
vehicles of Islamic charity, then they should broadly cluster in poor areas of the
country and avoid wealthier areas. These theories further anticipate a series of
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local-level effects on patterns of mobilization. So if the Brotherhood’s social ser-
vice provision truly serves to mobilize voters, then ballot boxes in the immediate
vicinity of the facility should turn out for Brotherhood candidates at higher levels
than at boxes further away. Finally, the theories all predict how individual-level
attitudes and behaviors should change in response to interaction with these facil-
ities. Thus if these facilities serve to propagate the Muslim Brotherhood’s vision
of Islam to prospective supporters, then individuals who patronize these facilities
should report higher levels of support for the Brotherhood’s interpretation of Is-
lam than those who do not visit. Systematically drawing out these implications
and tracking how they cohere or diverge through each level of analysis increases
confidence the theory linking social service provision and electoral mobilization.
Considering multiple levels of analysis with different research methodologies
also reduces the risks of drawing improper inferences. For example, a spatial
analysis alone would run the risk of an ecological fallacy by inferring local-level
traits (who visits the facilities) from aggregate characteristics (where the facilities
are located). Limiting the investigation to aggregate evidence might show that the
Brotherhood’s networks are located in middle class areas, but would leave open
the possibility that it is poor Egyptians traveling from elsewhere who predomi-
nantly visit these facilities. Or these institutions may cluster in districts with a
high proportion of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, but members who visit
may not receive any special treatment at the facilities themselves. At the other
end of the spectrum, survey evidence may yield support for an individual-level
effect of social service provision on voting behavior. Yet absent information on
the spatial distribution of these facilities it becomes difficult to isolate the tangible
effect of this provision on patterns on electoral mobilization. Highlighting the
extent to which the evidence supports each theory’s historical, macro, meso, and
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micro-level empirical implications ameliorates concerns about improper inference
(Lieberman 2005, Kiser and Hechter 1998).
The pages that follow expand on and ground these arguments in historical,
spatial, qualitative, and experimental evidence. The argument unfolds in four
stages, beginning by charting the historical development of these facilities and,
in particular, the way that they developed with the acquiescence, and even active
support, of the successive authoritarian regimes of Anwar El-Sadat and Hosni
Mubarak. The next stage supports the contention that the existence of Brother-
hood’s social services correlates strongly with middle class electoral districts in
which the group competes. The third stage singles out the effects of these services,
the measurable implications that follow from the overall argument connecting so-
cial service provision to electoral mobilization. The final stage turns to the voters
themselves, and shows that the Brotherhood’s provision of social services gener-
ates electoral support by conveying an image of the Brotherhood’s candidates for




Why would an authoritarian regime bent on holding power allow its opponents to
pursue strategies that forge cross-cutting coalitions? In the Politics Aristotle writes
that “a tyranny is never overthrown until some men trust each other.”1 Why
was the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood allowed to use social service provision to
connect with new constituencies- a development that usually augurs the end of
non-democratic regimes (Gandhi and Reuter 2008, Van de Walle 2006)?
Anwar el-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak found in the Muslim Brotherhood’s grad-
ualist, regulated, and institutionalized activism a crucial counterweight against
the revolutionary protest able to truly threaten the regime. In particular, as
both leaders embarked on economic reforms designed to dramatically shrink the
country’s social safety net, they found that encouraging non-state social service
providers- including the Brotherhood- could help catch those who fell through
the cracks. By pursuing a policy of “privatization by NGO” (Harvey 2006, 51-52)
el-Sadat, and Mubarak after him, hoped to mitigate the most immediate and dan-
gerous sociopolitical consequences of economic liberalization, exemplified in the
January 1977 Bread Riots. At the same time, an oppressive legal and bureaucratic
apparatus ensured that these non-state providers could not challenge the stability
or fundamental legitimacy of the regime.
1Aristotle, Politics, 1314a.12 (Book 5, Chapter 11).
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This broader political and economic context is vital to understand the emer-
gence and growth of the Muslim Brotherhood’s social service network. The
remainder of this chapter compiles a variety of contemporaneous primary and
secondary sources, including a series of articles from the Muslim Brotherhood’s
flagship Arabic-language periodical al-Da’wa, to reveal the history of the Islamic
Medical Association. From its 1977 founding the IMA sought to operate legally
and openly, even if this meant submitting to the regime’s onerous bureaucratic
strictures: they followed regime laws, registered with relevant ministries, and
submitted to constant inspections. And for their willingness to play by the rules
of the game the IMA reaped rewards from the regime. These were both financial
and symbolic, for instance when the Egyptian military gifted the Brotherhood the
land for its first hospital, or when Anwar el-Sadat himself laid the foundation
stone for that facility.
By encouraging and supporting non-state providers to backstop destabilizing
economic reforms, the regime blunted the knives of its most immediate oppo-
nents. Yet in the long term the strategy sharpened the challenge of groups like the
Brotherhood because it allowed them to use their institutional presence to make
larger and larger demands of the regime (Brownlee 2010). The chapter closes
by examining how the Brotherhood’s increasing political success in the 2000s-
and the role of the group’s network of social services in this success- forced the
regime to reconsider and ultimately vitiate the tacit agreement that allowed the
Brotherhood’s social services to function unmolested. This confrontation crested
during the 2010 parliamentary elections, when the regime forced a majority of the
IMA’s facilities to close for months in an attempt to strip the Brotherhood of their
political support.
Beyond illuminating a largely unknown aspect of Egyptian political history,
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examining how the Brotherhood’s social service networks intertwined with the
regime has important theoretical ramifications for this project. Specifically, the
fact that the Brotherhood not only registered their social service activism with
the regime, but that the two were active collaborators, revises arguments of a
“parallel Islamic sector” (Wickham 2002) or a grassroots response to a weak or
sporadically present state (Davis and Robinson 2009). In the below pages the
Egyptian state is anything but weak or absent: it actively encouraged and even
funded the growth of these organizations, set the boundaries of their activism,
and effectively integrated them into official networks of public goods provision.
Rather than a symbol of debility, the Egyptian regime’s ability to monitor, con-
trol, and benefit from the Brotherhood’s provision of social services speaks to the
resilience and power of the authoritarian state.
Subcontracting Social Welfare
One of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s most noteworthy domestic achievements to extend
to Egyptians a social safety net that included a substantial public health compo-
nent (Nasser 1954, 208), (Gallagher 1990). Yet during the second half of the 1960s
internal and external burdens combined to frustrate his strategy of aggressive
state-led development. Domestically, the industrialization policy had exhausted
its “easy” stage, and further growth required a potentially dangerous shift in the
social and political coalition on which the regime rested (Ayubi 1996, 336). Ex-
ternally, Israel’s dramatic victory in the 1967 war required Nasser to devote the
state’s limited resources to the task of rebuilding Egypt’s decimated military. By
the time of Nasser’s death in 1970 Egypt was in dire financial straits.
Growing debt, lagging domestic productivity, and a debilitating military stale-
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mate forced his successor Anwar el-Sadat to cope with an economy that had
“fallen below zero” (El-Sadat 1981, 214-215). To navigate out of the crisis Sadat
proposed to fight on two fronts. First, he hoped his limited military campaign in
1973 would force Israel to the negotiating table, thus allowing him to carve away
the military expenditures that were monopolizing Egypt’s budget (Brownlee 2012,
20-23). Then, in the 1974 October Paper and in the accompanying Law 43 of 1974
Sadat outlined his long-term plan to revitalize Egypt’s moribund economy by re-
ducing currency controls and establishing the tax incentives he hoped would spur
Arab and Western investment. He also proposed reductions in social spending,
pointing to a “growing awareness of the need to call to account the public sector,
public utilities, and public services” (1974, 32).
Sadat’s new policy of infitah (opening) marked a potentially dangerous reshuf-
fling of the country’s economic winners and losers. The gains of Egypt’s new
trajectory would mainly accumulate to a rising bourgeoisie comprised of busi-
nessmen and state elites (El-Naggar 2009, Ayubi 1991b, Hinnebusch 1988, Water-
bury 1985). Meanwhile, subsidy cuts, rising inflation, and the reduction of state
services would hammer the poor and stress the middle class.
In the health sector, Sadat’s plan anticipated that emerging private providers
would perceive in the middle class market an opportunity. In effect, the new
private sector would help wean middle class Egyptians off of the generous social
benefits to which the Nasser years had accustomed them, but which Sadat was
no longer able to maintain (Tadros 2006, 247).2 As Hinnebusch summarizes:
Public hospitals fell into abysmal squalor; standards of sanitization
2Of course, given Egypt’s rapid population growth and urbanization imposed serious struc-
tural constraints on government action and almost guaranteed that access would decline no matter
the government policy. Yet Waterbury also notes how the Egyptian government essentially re-
signed themselves to dramatically worsening quality in these facilities (1983, 218-223).
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were appalling, quality nursing almost absent, and equipment old and
deteriorating...unable to reform or upgrade the public medical service,
the strategy of the Sadat regime was to neglect it and encourage the
development of a quality private sector (1988, 272).
Whatever the plan, the practical effect of the reforms was to create a private
sector of “investment” or “international” hospitals that increasingly catered to
the wealthiest Egyptians while leaving everyone else to brave the country’s strug-
gling public system (Chiffoleau 1990). For the middle class this was an especially
painful reckoning. Instead of selecting upwards into mid-market private options,
the infitah squeezed them downward into public facilities already swollen with
the ranks of the poor (Bayat 2006, 139). As Egyptian economist Galal Amin notes,
in the wake of the infitah “the Egyptian middle class suffered a series of blows
that slowed its growth rate sharply, lowered its standard of living, and made it
even less distinguishable from the lower class” (2011, 96-97). For longtime Broth-
erhood leader Abdul Moneim Abu el-Fotouh, himself a young doctor at the time,
the choice was particularly galling. “The poor people would have to go to the
governmental service, and it was humiliating,” he conceded. “But what about
a judge...or a new doctor like me? If someone like us would have to go to the
government service, we would be humiliated. But we can’t afford the private
hospitals.”3
For Sadat, the risk that an increasingly put-upon citizenry would revolt was
not abstract. Following maladroit subsidy cuts in early 1977, Egypt’s citizens had
erupted into nationwide rioting in protest of a government dedicated to “austerity
and cuts in consumption for those at the bottom and and growing consumption
and enrichment for those at the top" (Hinnebusch 1988, 71). Chanting “no liber-
alization without food!” Egyptians overwhelmed the police in cities around the
3Author Interview, January 23, 2013.
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country.4 After a tense few days the military regained control of Egypt’s streets
and squares.
The event was a powerful rebuke to Sadat. He had initially hoped that concur-
rent political liberalization would compensate Egyptians for their economic hard-
ships (Brumberg 1992). In the aforementioned 1974 October Paper he had pro-
posed this democratic bargain by also authorizing parliamentary elections under
the umbrella of three official political platforms: left, right, and center (El-Sadat
1974).5 Yet the strategy had backfired; instead of dampening popular mobiliza-
tion, the political liberalization had sparked it (Beattie 2000, 222). Although in the
October Paper of 1974 Sadat confidently proclaimed that “we do not fear differ-
ence of opinion, nor are we perturbed by free debate and expression” (1974, 39),
in a speech following the 1977 riots he indicted democracy for having “fangs one
hundred times sharper than the extraordinary measures of dictatorship.”6
In the aftermath of the riots, Sadat reoriented his strategy by transforming
Egypt into a “franchise state” (Wood 1997). By strategically allowing the state’s
monopoly over public goods provision to decay while encouraging non-state
providers to flow into the gaps, Sadat- and Mubarak after him- were able to
push through cutting reform packages yet mitigate the risk that the economic
losers’ discontent would graduate into open revolt. In a speech to social service
providers in 1978, for instance, Sadat framed their work in the broader context
of his economic reforms: “social work must carry out certain national duties,” he
told the audience, “primarily the extension of services to assist production and
guide consumption” (1978, 362).
4Middle East Economic Digest, Vol. 21, No. 3 (January 21, 1977), p. 18.
5It was in these elections- which occurred in the Fall of 1976- that the Muslim Brotherhood
put forward its first post-Nasser candidates. Appendix A provides a fuller description of the
Brotherhood’s participation in these elections.
6Cited in Brownlee (2012, 25).
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Part of this plan was not only allowing the emergence of non-state social ser-
vice providers, but directly subsidizing them. One early initiative was to release
two sprawling Islamic organizations with extensive social service networks, al-
Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya and Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammediya, from their Nasser-era
purgatory (Yunus 2006, Ben Néfissa 2002, Dawoud 1992, Istiphan 1956).7 Accord-
ing to Ben Néfissa, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya would from this time on become a
“parapublic” organization because of its close relationship with the regime (2002,
155). Ansar al-Sunna would also become integrated into Egypt’s public services
provision: Badawi, for instance, found local social workers drawing salaries from
both Ansar al-Sunna and the Egyptian government (1999, 113-114).
In another case Sadat and the Coptic Patriarch Pope Shenouda jointly laid the
foundation stone for the St. Mark’s Charity Hospital in Cairo a few months af-
ter the January 1977 riots (El-Sadat 1977). Sadat had also financially supported
the endeavor to the tune of approximately 50,000 EGP (around $125,000 in con-
temporaneous U.S. dollars).8 Accompanying him in the ceremony was then-Vice
President Hosni Mubarak as well as the Prime Minister, Mamdouh Salem.9
In order to capture in broad strokes the decline in state provision and simul-
taneous rise in non-state provision, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 report national-level per
capita statistics on public health infrastructure and non-state health providers.
From the relevant volumes of the official Egyptian annual statistical abstract (al-
Kitab al-Ihsa’i al-Sanawi), Figure 2.1 charts year-to-year statistics on the number of
beds in government hospitals per thousand Egyptians from its peak shortly before
7In an attempt to tamp down Islamic dissent, Nasser had forcibly merged the two organizations
and placed an army officer at their head (al Tahir 2006, 148).
8“Sadat Faces Mounting Religious Tension,” Arab Report and Record, Vol. 19/20 (1-31 October
1977), p. 827; Middle East Economic Digest, Vol. 21, No. 39 (Sept. 30, 1977), p. 19.
9“Misr al-’Areeqa Lan Takoun Abadan Ard al-Farqa wa al-Inqisam (Honorable Egypt Will
Never be a Land of Factionalism and Division),” al-Ahram, October 12, 1977.
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the 1967 war to its 2006 low (because of the population correction, the year of each
measure reflects the year of the national census).10 Figure 2.2 charts the growth of
non-state community associations broadly focusing on healthcare-oriented social
service provision drawn from the same statistical abstracts.11


























































Sadat hoped to navigate between the Scylla of popular protest and the Charyb-
dis of economic default by encouraging the growth of non-state, non-profit providers.
This effort was broad based, encompassing Christian initiatives like the St. Mark’s
Coptic Hospital as well as Islamic organizations like al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya and
Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammediya. The next section uses a variety of original pri-
mary and secondary sources to trace how the Islamic Medical Association, founded
10There is of course the possibility that these statistics- which originate with the Ministry of
Health- deliberately understate the decline in access. Furthermore the quantitative decline in access
cannot capture the qualitative decline in the patient experience (Richards and Waterbury 2009, 107).
11I figured the number of societies registering primarily as providing either “social assistance”
(Musa’ida Ijtima’iyya), “household welfare” (Ra’aiyat Usra) or “childhood and maternity care”
(Tifoula wa Umuma), divided by 100,000 Egyptians. Societies can register as providing either one
type of care, or more than one type. Data on organizations providing multiple types of care is
more spotty, although the broad outlines mirror the trend in Figure 2.2.
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by a group of Muslim Brothers in the months after the 1977 Bread Riots, fit into
this strategy. In contrast to arguments that conceptualize the Brotherhood’s social
service provision as a strategy to escape state monitoring and foment subver-
sion, the empirical record not only shows how the IMA minutely complied with
Egypt’s stringent civil society laws, but also how Egypt’s rulers financially and
symbolically supported the growth of the IMA.
From Word to Action
Early in his term Anwar el-Sadat turned to religion as a bulwark against Nasserist
remnants and an assertive leftist student movement. Rhetorically, he styled him-
self as “the believing president” (al-ra’is al-mu’min) presiding over an Egypt of
“science and faith” (al-’ilm wal-iman) (Al-Arian 2014, 86). More concretely, he
began to release many Muslim Brothers from their Nasser-era prison sentences
and allowed them to resume their activities, including publishing their monthly
magazine al-Da’wa (The Call) (Al-Arian 2014, Baker 1990, Eissa 1977).
Among those veteran Muslim Brothers whom Sadat released was Dr. Ahmed
al-Malt (1917-1995).12 Trained as a surgeon, al-Malt had overseen the Brother-
hood’s medical efforts in the front lines of the 1948 Palestine War. He had also
been a member of the Brotherhood’s clandestine “special section” (al-Nizam al-
Khass) where his duties involved physical examination of potential recruits, in-
cluding the steadiness of their nerves and strength. Al-Malt was arrested in
1948/1949 for fomenting revolt against the British and was briefly jailed. In 1954
he was arrested again as part of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s crackdown on the Broth-
12Al-Malt died in May 1995, in the midst of a pilgrimage to Mecca. His obituary appeared in
multiple Arab newspapers, including al-Ahram (May 15, 1995, p. 22).
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erhood and sent to prison for nearly twenty years.13
As they re-entered Egyptian society not only did the Brotherhood have to re-
cover their shattered organization, they had to figure out how to reconnect with
a society saturated by decades of Nasser’s anti-Brotherhood propaganda (Abu el
Fotouh 2012, 24-25), (Habib 2012, 67-68). For al-Malt, this task crystallized af-
ter listening to a Friday sermon from Islamist scholar Mohammed al-Ghazali in
the mid 1970s. Afterwards, al-Malt approached al-Ghazali and asked him how
he could maintain the zeal for Islam he had heard in the sermon once he left
the mosque. Al-Ghazali replied “our power as preachers is through the spoken
word. As for those of you who work in the practical fields of medicine, engi-
neering, education, and the professions...you turn the word into action, the idea
into the project, and the dream into reality.”14 For al-Malt medicine was a natural
field on which to focus: “without a doubt the field of medical practice is among
the most favorable fields in which a Muslim can serve his faith,” he observed.
“The difference between serving Islam in this field and serving in another field
is huge.”15 Shortly after the discussion with al-Ghazali, al-Malt and three fellow
Muslim Brothers formed a “medical committee” to explore organized work in
13This short biography is based on a number of sources, including “al-Doctor Ahmed al-
Malt,” Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at: http://goo.gl/D0y8w. Accessed January 26,
2014; Abduh Mustapha Dessouki, “Dr. Ahmed al-Malt: Khidmat al-Deen wa al-Mujtama (Dr.
Ahmed al-Malt: Serving Religion and Society),” Ikhwanonline, May 8, 2008. Available online
at: http://goo.gl/RCDLn8. Accessed January 27, 2014; Mohi al-Deen al-Zeit, “Rajal Min al-
Khalideen bil-Amalu (An Immortal Man through His Work),” Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online
at: http://goo.gl/SNDmUv. Accessed January 27, 2014; Reda Abdel Wodood, “Safahat Khalida
min Hayat al-Tabeeb al-Mujahed Doctor Ahmed al-Malt, (Immortal Pages from the Life of the
Mujahid Doctor, Dr. Ahmed al-Malt),” al-Hikma, No. 18 (July 2012), pp. 24-29. It also includes
information from Mohammed Habib’s memoirs (2012, 437-442).
14Abdel Moneim Abu el-Fotouh briefly discusses the episode in his memoirs (2012, 36). A
more comprehensive account is available in: Mohi al-Deen al-Zeit, “Rajal Min al-Khalideen
bil-Amalu (An Immortal Man through His Work),” Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at:
http://goo.gl/SNDmUv. Accessed January 27, 2014.
15“Awwal Jam’iyya Tibiyya Islamiyya Takkawun fi Misr: La Buda min Iyjad al-Tabib al-Muslim
al-Mutamayiz bi-Shakhsiyyatu (The First Islamic Medical Association Established in Egypt: The
Exceptional Muslim Doctor Must Improve His Character),” al-Da’wa, No. 20 (January 1978), p. 60.
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the sector. This nucleus would later grow into the Islamic Medical Association
(al Malt 1993, 175-176).16
While nominally independent, the medical committee (and later the IMA) was
organically tied to the Muslim Brotherhood. In the words of one of its earliest
members and longtime chairman, the IMA is “an institution accountable to the
Muslim Brotherhood.”17 The linkage between the organizations stretches back to
al-Malt himself, one of the least known but most important figures in the Brother-
hood’s post-Nasser history. Following his 1973 release al-Malt helped to rebuild
the Brotherhood, serving as a type of liaison to Egypt’s student Islamic movement
(Al-Arian 2014). In his autobiography, Abdul Moneim Abu el-Fotouh, a student
activist who would eventually become one of the Brotherhood’s most prominent
figures as well as the president of the Islamic Medical Association, cites al-Malt
as one of the Brothers who introduced him to the movement (Abu el Fotouh 2012,
78). Al-Malt again kept the Brotherhood functioning after Sadat’s 1981 assassina-
tion. As one Muslim Brother recalls, al-Malt was “the most prominent of those
carrying the burden” of revitalizing the Brotherhood following the “Autumn of
Fury” arrests (Meligi 2009, 249).
Administratively, al-Malt wielded considerable power as the second in com-
mand (deputy General Guide) to three post-Nasser leaders of the Muslim Broth-
erhood: Umar Telmessani, Hamid Abu Nasr, and Mustapha Mashour.18 In the
16There is confusion over the precise date the IMA was actually established. I use 1977 because
that is when the organization received official recognition. Curiously, however, al-Malt claims that
the organization was founded on October 15, 1979 (1993, 175-176). And al-Malt’s biography on
the Muslim Brotherhood’s official Ikhwanwiki says that he established the IMA in the “early 1980s”
(al-Doctor Ahmed al-Malt, Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at: http://goo.gl/D0y8w. Accessed
March 10, 2015.
17Author interview, Abdul Moneim Abu el-Fotouh, January 23, 2013.
18Reda Abdel Wodood, “Safahat Khalida min Hayat al-Tabeeb al-Mujahed Doctor Ahmed al-
Malt, (Immortal Pages from the Life of the Mujahid Doctor, Dr. Ahmed al-Malt),” al-Hikma, No.
18 (July 2012), p. 29.
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Brotherhood’s internal bureaucracy, al-Malt was also responsible for the group’s
“Egypt Office” (Meligi 2009, 249). This, according to former Muslim Brother-
hood deputy General Guide Mohammed Habib, effectively gave al-Malt day-to-
day control over all Muslim Brotherhood activity in Egypt (2012, 439).
Many founding members of the IMA were also leading lights of the Muslim
Brotherhood (Masoud 2014a, 77). These included Mahmoud Ezzat (who in 2013
would become General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood) as well as Ma’moun
Ashour, Osama Raslan, AbdelFattah Ismail, Ibrahim Auf, Najib Abdel Fattah,
Sana Abu Zeid, and Ahmed Ezzat.19 Dr. Lotfi Shawan, like al-Malt a veteran of
the Brotherhood’s participation in the 1948 Palestine War, became the IMA’s first
vice-president, while his brother, Ali Shawan, was the IMA’s first secretary.20 Both
Lotfi and Ali Shawan merited statements from the Brotherhood’s General Guide,
Mohammed Mahdi Akef, when they died in September 2007 and November 2009,
respectively.21 Indeed, Ali Shahwan’s funeral in 2009 was a veritable who’s who
of the Brotherhood’s leadership, and was led by the General Guide Muhammed
Mahdi ’Akef himself.22
19Mohi al-Deen al-Zeit, “Rajal Min al-Khalideen bil-Amalu (An Immortal Man through His
Work),” Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at: http://goo.gl/SNDmUv. Accessed January 27,
2014.
20“al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Medical Association),” al-Da’wa, No. 22
(March 1978), p. 63.
21See “al-Murshid al-’Aam Yana’i al-Doctor Lutfi Shahwan (The General Guide Mourns
the Passing of Doctor Lutfi Shahwan),” Ikhwanwiki, September 8, 2007. Available online at:
http://goo.gl/ajq3Gu. Accessed June 1, 2015; Rafat al-Kanisi, “al-Murshid al-’Aam Yana’i Ila
al-’Aalim al-Tabeeb al-Fidth Ali Shahwan (The General Guide Mourns to the World the Passing
of the One-of-a-kind Doctor Ali Shahwan),” Ikhwanwiki, November 18, 2009. Available online at:
http://goo.gl/KjLMUN. Accessed June 1, 2015.
22See Mohammed Yousuf, “al-Murshid Yataqadum Janazirat al-Doctor Ali Shahwan (The Gen-
eral Guide Leads the Funeral of Doctor Ali Shahwan)," Ikhwanonline, November 9, 2009. Available
online at: http://goo.gl/5NvkfR. Accessed June 1, 2015.
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To Draw Closer to God Through Medical Work
Al-Malt and his comrades visualized the Islamic Medical Association filling both
spiritual and practical voids in modern Egypt’s health system. On the spiritual
side, they emphasized the importance of coupling technical skills and education
with Islamic values. Yet rather than an attempt to repudiate Western medical
practices, the IMA’s approach was instead an attempt to garb these practices in
Islamic raiments (Morsy 1988). For instance, in a 1978 article explaining the mis-
sion of the IMA, al-Malt offered an example of the campaign against Bilharzia
(schistosomiasis) as a way the IMA could blend western and Islamic approaches
to combating disease. As he summarized, prior campaigns against Bilharzia- a
parasite that spreads in unsanitary conditions- had failed to change Egyptians’
behavior because:
[T]hey did not situate [the campaign] in the correct context, by ref-
erencing Islam. For if you say to the farmer, Islam commands you
not to urinate in the water, which we understand from the Prophet
Muhammed’s saying (hadith) to “fear the three cursed things: urine in
water, urine under shelter, and urine in the canals,” the farmer will
respond immediately, because he is guided by nothing other than Is-
lam. But unfortunately we have left out Islam and added in technical
details, and so [the efforts] have promptly failed. Of course, this is the
natural outcome. But in the name of Islam, the religion of purity, we
ask of the farmers to avoid urinating in the water, or going down into
the water without wearing shoes as protection, and therefore the Bil-
harzia worm will of its own accord die out within just two months.23
The emphasis on Islamic values also surfaced in the specific audiences al-Malt
and his colleagues sought to serve. As al-Malt explained, the emergence of private
hospitals had encouraged Egyptian doctors to see their knowledge as a financial
23“Awwal Jam’iyya Tibiyya Islamiyya Takkawun fi Misr: La Buda min Iyjad al-Tabib al-Muslim
al-Mutamayiz bi-Shakhsiyyatu (The First Islamic Medical Association Established in Egypt: The
Exceptional Muslim Doctor Must Improve His Character),” al-Da’wa, No. 20 (January 1978), p. 61.
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commodity to be sold rather than a gift with which to alleviate human suffer-
ing. As the above sections noted, Egypt’s economic reforms had hit the country’s
middle class particularly hard, forcing them to choose between sacrificing their
dignity at overburdened and underfunded public facilities or “selling the clothes
off [their] own back” to enter a private facility (al Malt 1993, 177). As al-Malt and
his colleagues conceived it, the IMA would split the difference by offering those
caught between a hollowed out public system and an out of reach private one
“reliable care without exploiting the patient.”24 Al-Malt went on to explain:
We [the IMA] can say to the people ‘we are able to preserve the dig-
nity (literally “to preserve the water on their face”) of those who cannot
bear standing in line at a public hospital only to receive substandard
care, or who cannot go to a private hospital because they lack the abil-
ity to pay...At the IMA we have Muslim doctors who work for Allah’s
pleasure, with solid qualifications, who respect the rights of the patient
and are sensitive to that patient’s ability to pay’ (1993, 178).
Abdel Moneim Abu el-Fotouh recalled a similar justification for the organiza-
tion’s creation:
[A]t that time (1970s) we saw two paths for medical care in Egypt-
the governmental, weak, fraying system, and the investment (private)
system, which was for the rich...So the reason behind founding [the
IMA] was to offer medical service, moderately priced and decent...So
when the middle class comes for an operation, they can afford it and
they’ll have a clean place to stay. [The IMA] is not as good as a private
hospital, but it is also not humiliating like a public one.25
Notably, nowhere is there discussion of the IMA as a charity project- al-Malt
and el-Fotouh explicitly conceive of the organization as catering to middle-class,
24“Awwal Jam’iyya Tibiyya Islamiyya Takkawun fi Misr: La Buda min Iyjad al-Tabib al-Muslim
al-Mutamayiz bi-Shakhsiyyatu (The First Islamic Medical Association Established in Egypt: The
Exceptional Muslim Doctor Must Improve His Character),” al-Da’wa, No. 20 (January 1978), p. 61.
25Author interview, January 23, 2013.
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paying customers. Below, I trace the reverberations of this decision, showing how
the IMA’s middle-class character is crucial to the Brotherhood’s ability to leverage
their social service provision for political gains. As chapter one explained, one
reason the Brotherhood was able to reap such electoral success under Mubarak is
because it was able to successfully compete in middle class districts- those where
the regime was weakest. Yet the IMA’s focus on paying middle class customers
also influenced the character of these facilities. In effect, operating as a business-
rather than a charity or political machine doling out benefits without financial
recompense- allowed the IMA to leverage the quality of this provision rather than
its mere existence.
The Short Leash
By encouraging the grown of non-state providers, Anwar el-Sadat was running
the risk that they would leverage their social and civic activism to challenge his
legitimacy and political primacy. Indeed, many scholars posit that the Muslim
Brotherhood’s social services are directed precisely towards this end. Abdelrah-
man, for instance, claims that the Brotherhood aims to provide “a comprehensive
model of Islam that provided Muslims with all the services they need (including
health and education) in an Islamic framework outside the control and influence
of the State” (2004, 112). For Davis and Robinson the Brotherhood used social
services to “bypass the state” (2012). Other authors frame the Brotherhood’s ac-
tivism as an attempt to create a “state within a state” (Esposito 2003, 71) or an
“alternative” to the existing system (Ayubi 1991a, 150). If it is indeed true that the
Brotherhood attempts to operate their social and charitable initiatives “outside
the control and influence of the state” then evidence should exist that the group
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sought to keep Islamic Medical Association on informal footing, grudgingly ac-
commodate the regime, or otherwise attempt to shelter their endeavor from the
regime’s legal and bureaucratic predations.
In Egypt, the Ministry of Social Solidarity has primary responsibility for the
regulation of non-governmental organizations under the authority of Law 32 of
1964 (Law 84 of 2002 replaced, but essentially replicated, law 32 of 1964).26 This
law gave the regime tremendously powerful mechanisms with which to control
this sector. For instance, the regime could: arbitrarily dissolve an organization
(Article 12); force it to provide advance notice of both upcoming general assem-
bly and board of directors meetings and, within fifteen days provide written min-
utes of these meetings to the regime (Articles 39, 44, and 54); disband the board
of directors and place regime figures in their place (48); call a board of direc-
tors meeting, decide which members would attend, and set the agenda of that
meeting (Article 53); veto both specific candidates in internal elections and annul
elections (Article 55); and review on-demand audited financial statements and
receive notification of each financial transaction within seven days (Article 80).27
Authors unanimously criticize the stifling effect of Law 32 of 1964. Abdel-
rahman calls it “a landmark piece of corporatist legislation" (2004, 129). When
it passed into law, Berger noted that “the government had uniform and virtually
complete control over all [associations]" (1970, 96). For Saad Eddin Ibrahim, it
“clearly puts Egypt’s Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) under tight govern-
mental control and domination- administratively, substantively, and financially”
(1998, 8). Sullivan tells us that the government has “direct oversight, and in many
26The text of the law itself is available in al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, No. 37 (February 12, 1964), pp.
255-265. All citations of clauses refer to this version. See also “al-Qanun Riqm 84 Li-Sina 2002
(Law No. 84 for 2002),” al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, No. 22 (June 5, 2002), pp. 22-48.
27Ibrahim (1998), Sullivan (1994, 17-25), Clark (2004, 52-56), and Atia (2013, 44-47) all provide
excellent summaries of Law 32.
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cases control, over these nongovernmental organizations” (1994, 1-2). As Zubaida
concluded, in Egypt “civil society in the form of voluntary associations is essen-
tially dependent on the ‘law-state”’ (1992, 4).
As Wiktorowicz shows in his examination of Jordan, these civil society laws
render the activities of the sector visible to the regime, and thus facilitate the
regime’s ability to monitor and control it (2000). Early in his term el-Sadat at-
tempted to use Law 32 of 1964 to do just this. According to the Brotherhood’s
General Guide ’Umar al-Telmessani, Sadat offered the Brotherhood a chance at
full legalization and operation (the Brotherhood was still technically illegal, a
product of its Nasser-era persecution). The only catch was that the Brotherhood-
as a whole- register with the Ministry of Social Solidarity under Law 32. Telmes-
sani balked. As al-Arian summarizes the episode,
As a trained attorney, [Telmessani] understood the legal ramifications
of Sadat’s proposal. ‘I opposed it,’ he explained, ‘because under the
law of social associations [Law 32 of 1964], the Ministry of Social Af-
fairs has the right to dissolve any association at any time, as well
as to appoint its officials and subject it to managerial and budgetary
scrutiny’ (2014, 173).
The above discussion of Law 34 of 1964’s invasive and arbitrary powers would
seem to reinforce authors’ arguments that the Brotherhood would do everything
it could to keep the Islamic Medical Association outside of the regime’s clutches.
Yet the empirical record supports the opposite conclusion. Instead of operating
subversively in those interstices beyond regime control, from its founding the IMA
operated legally and completely above ground, content to submit to the regime’s




Recall that al-Malt and his colleagues first coalesced in an ad-hoc “Medical Com-
mittee.” There seems little reason why they could not remain informal in order to
escape Law 32’s strictures (indeed, by one estimate, as many as seven unregistered
associations existed for each registered one (Clark 2004, 53-54)). Instead, al-Malt
grounded the Medical Committee on a “legal foundation” (al-qaeda al-qanuniyya)
by registering it under Law 32 of 1964 as a charitable society (al Malt 1993, 175).
This required submitting extensive documentation on the IMA leadership, aims,
goals, sources of funding, and membership. The first mention of the IMA in al-
Da’wa, four months after the 1977 Bread Riots, was a summary of this paperwork,
listing nine goals of the organization as well as describing the funding they hoped
to receive, including membership fees, donations, and support from popular and
government bodies.28
In October 1977 this process came to fruition as the Ministry of Social Sol-
idarity accepted the IMA’s registration, and the IMA was written into the of-
ficial Egyptian government gazette, al-Waqa’i al-Masriyya.29 Further displaying
their commitment to legal and above-ground operation, the Brotherhood proudly
reprinted their registration documents in the December 1977 issue of al-Da’wa.30
Figure 2.3 presents and translates the IMA’s registration notification in al-Waqa’i
al-Masriyya, while Figures 2.4 and 2.5 do the same for the al-Da’wa notice.
28“Takween al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya (The Formation of the Islamic Medical Associa-
tion),” al-Da’wa, No. 12 (May 1977), pp. 37.
29See issue no. 245 (October 25, 1977), p. 12.
30al-Da’wa, December 1977, p. 76.
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Figure 2.3: IMA registration, al-Waqa’i al-Masriyya, October 1977
Directorate of Social Solidarity
West Cairo
Registration Summary
Decision Proclamation No. 2386 for 1977
Director General of the Directorate
of Social Solidarity in West Cairo, in
accordance with the judgements of
Law 32 of 1964 and the memoran-
dum of coordination;
Decision:
Publishing the Basic Regulations of
The Islamic Medical Association,
under No. 2386, realized October
12, 1977.




1. Field of Activity: Cultural, Scien-
tific, and Religious Services.
2. Composition of the Board of Di-
rectors: 7 Members, Elected by a
General Assembly of All Members.
3. Fiscal Year for the Association:
Runs from January 1 to December
31 each year.
4. Dissolution of the Association
and Disbursement of Funds: In Ac-
cordance with Article 5 of Law 32 of
1964.
5. Address: 32 El-Falaki St, Apt. 27-
Cairo.
6. Yearly Subscription Fee: 24 EGP.
7. Geographic Spread of Activities:
Cairo Governorate.
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Figure 2.4: IMA Registration Announcement, al-Da’wa, May 1977
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Figure 2.5: Translated IMA Registration Announcement, al-Da’wa, May 1977
Completed, with thanks to God
The Registration of
The Islamic Medical Association
with the Ministry of Social Solidarity
under number 20386
The IMA calls upon Muslims in the East and the West to devote a portion of
their wealth to help construct the planned Charity Hospital, (which will be)
built as a first step (sic) in the IMA’s activities.
(Behold, ye are those invited to spend (of your substance) in the Way of Al-
lah) (A portion of Quran 47:38 (Yusuf Ali Trans.)
Cairo Governorate
Social Solidarity Directorate of Western Cairo
Administration of NGO Activities
Decision
No. 44, October 12, 1977
The Director General of the Western Cairo Office for the Ministry of Social
Solidarity, in accordance with Law 32 of 1964 and appropriate regulations,
and the memorandum of administration for NGO activities, (approves): “The
Islamic Medical Association (handwritten)” subject to the provisions of Law
32 of 1964.
Decision
First: To authorize the Islamic Medical Association in accordance with Law 32
of 1964, under registration no. 2386, of October 12, 1977.





To justify the decision to register, al-Malt emphasized that the IMA had noth-
ing to hide- it was a non-profit, apolitical organization designed to serve Egyp-
tians of all stripes. The work, he continued, “speaks for itself” (al Malt 1993,
175). There were no hidden agendas, al-Malt explained in an interview towards
the end of his life, and accusations that the Brotherhood was using its services to
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“undermine the state” (taqweed al-dawla) were baseless (1998, 134-135).
Other Brotherhood sources concur that IMA was a fully above-ground and
legal organization. There was inside the Brotherhood at this time a debate over
how to effect social transformation, with some prioritizing long-term and above-
ground social engagement while others advocating more clandestine and con-
frontational methods (Zollner 2007). el-Fotouh uses the specific example of al-
Malt and the IMA to point to the importance of a legal and gradualist approach
to social change, what he calls “the trend of building and not of coups” (2012,
98-99).31 In his memoirs, former member of the Muslim Brotherhood Sayyid Ab-
del Sittar reproduces a series of internal memos that he sent to the Brotherhood’s
leaders. In one, he uses the example of the IMA to make a point about how the
Brotherhood operates their social enterprises:
In fairness, we must recognize that all of the [social] activities of the
Muslim Brotherhood are organized according to the law, and the state
encourages and approves of them (shaja’atuha al-dawla wa waafaqat ’aleyha).
The clearest example of this is the Islamic Medical Association, which
Dr. Ahmed al-Malt founded and which today operates dozens of clin-
ics and hospitals that operate completely normally and are not tar-
geted by the state, unless they are used as sites for something other
than medical activity (2009, 360).
As one of the IMA’s current leaders explained: “We [the IMA] aren’t the enemy
of the state, we’re part of it, despite the fact that we might disagree with its
policies.”32 This fidelity to a legalist, accomodationist approach to the state- in
both word and deed- is difficult to square with claims that the Brotherhood sought
to use their social service networks to foment revolutionary discontent in those
31See also Ahmed al-Malt’s argument against violence as a means of change in Salah Abdel
Maqsoud, “‘Ashara Ihtihamat Mowaja illa al-Jamaa’a (Ten Charges Facing the Brotherhood),”
Liwa’ al-Islam, No. 11 (February 7, 1989), pp. 12-15.
32Author Interview, IMA Executive A, Jan. 17, 2014.
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spaces where the state was weakest. Instead, by consciously subjugating their
activism to state control, the Brotherhood was tacitly, if not openly, signaling
their acquiescence to the regime’s political legitimacy and primacy (Simmons and
Hopkins 2005, Fearon 1997).
It was not just the regime that recognized the importance of the Brotherhood’s
signal. Egypt’s more radical elements perceived the Brotherhood’s legalist ap-
proach an unnecessary- and indeed counterproductive- compromise with a fun-
damentally illegitimate regime. For instance, in his famous pamphlet The Ne-
glected Duty (al-Farida al-Gha’iba) that would justify the assassination of Anwar
el-Sadat in 1981, Abdelsalam Faraj walked readers through a series of argu-
ments justifying his decision to use violence. Along the way he harshly criti-
cized Brotherhood-style sociopolitical activism, arguing that the regime’s ability
to monitor the civil sector made such a strategy meaningless. As he wrote:
There are those who say that we should establish societies that are
subject to the state and that urge people to perform their prayers and
to pay their zakat (charity) tax and to do (other) good works. Prayer,
zakat and good works are (all equally) commands of God- Exalted and
Majestic He is- which we should not at all neglect. However when we
ask ourselves: “Do these works, and acts of devotion, bring about the
establishment of an Islamic State?” then the immediate answer with-
out any further consideration must be “No.” Moreover, these societies
would in principle be subject to the State, be registered in its files, and
they would have to follow (the State’s) instructions (1986, 184).
It was not just jihadist groups that found fault with the Brotherhood’s decision
to submit to Law 32 of 1964. Some human rights and activist groups operated un-
officially in an attempt to escape the regime’s monitoring efforts. Another strategy
was to register as a business, in effect conceding that it was easier to operate under
Egypt’s tax code than the draconian civil society laws (Clark 2004, 177n57). Saad
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Eddin Ibrahim’s “Ibn Khaldun Center for Development” pioneered the strategy
in 1988. Then, according to Mustafa, “nearly every human rights group followed
the lead of the Ibn Khaldun Center and registered as civil companies (instead of
under Law 32 of 1964)” (2007, 152). The reason these activists pursued this strat-
egy, Pratt concludes, stemmed from their “belief in the illegitimacy of the regime”
and their “hostility or suspicion to existing political parties and to state institu-
tions”(2005, 124, 131, 133). The Brotherhood, on the other hand, remained within
the boundaries of Law 32 (and its successors) through the end of the Mubarak
regime.33
The Brotherhood’s willingness to submit to the regime’s regulation, as well
as the regime’s willingness to countenance the Brotherhood’s activism refutes ar-
guments that the group strove to situate its activism in those spaces outside of
regime control. The next section reveals the story of the IMA’s first major project,
the Islamic Charity Hospital, to extend this argument and show how simply ex-
amining the legal context of the IMA’s founding actually risks understating the
extent to which the Egyptian regime supported the Muslim Brotherhood’s social
service activism.
The Islamic Charity Hospital
Concurrent with their registration with the Ministry of Social Solidarity, the IMA
began to advertise their latest project, the Islamic Charity Hospital (al-Mistashfa
al-Khairi al-Islami).34 As al-Malt described it, the Islamic Charity Hospital would
33Following the July 2013 military coup, the Brotherhood’s decision to register their social
services- medical facilities, schools, and community associations- facilitated the regime’s cam-
paign to dismember the group’s network (Brooke Forthcoming).
34“Takween al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya (The Formation of the Islamic Medical Associa-
tion),” al-Da’wa, No. 12 (May 1977), p. 37.
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be “an Islamic landmark at an important entrance to Islamic Cairo, the city of a
thousand muezzin (those who perform the call to prayer).”35 This 350-bed, four
story flagship facility would be built by the prominent Arab Contractors company,
run by Anwar el-Sadat’s close friend Uthman Ahmed Uthman (Uthman’s oldest
son married Sadat’s youngest daughter).36
The Egyptian military ensured that the hospital project would get off to a run-
ning start. Following the Islamic Medical Association’s registration, the Egyptian
Ministry of Defense gifted a plot of land 20 km2 on the outskirts of Cairo on
which to build the hospital.37 Notwithstanding the Egyptian government’s gen-
erous gift of land, realizing the project would still require a considerable amount
of resources. To this end, al-Malt began to appeal for donations in the pages of al-
Da’wa, telling readers that “the treasury of the Islamic Medical Association...is the
pockets of charitable Muslims.”38 To handle donations in multiple currencies, the
IMA set up accounts in the state-owned Banque Misr and Bank Ahli, as well as
in the Faisal Islamic Bank.39 Figure 2.6 reproduces and translates an August 1979
fundraising appeal for the Islamic Charity Hospital from the pages of al-Da’wa.
35Ahmed al-Malt, “Nidaa’ Illa al-Muslimeen: Mashrou’ al-Mistashfa al-Islami (Call to the Mus-
lims: The Islamic Hospital Project),” al-Da’wa, No. 47 (March 1980), p. 63; Ahmed al-Malt,
“al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya: al-Mistashfa al-Islami al-Markazi (The Islamic Medical As-
sociation: The Islamic Central Hospital),” al-Da’wa No. 57 (January 1981), p. 56.
36Ahmed al-Malt, “al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya: al-Mistashfa al-Islami al-Markazi (The
Islamic Medical Association: The Islamic Central Hospital),” al-Da’wa No. 57 (January 1981), p.
57. Uthman also served as a type of intermediary between Sadat and the Muslim Brotherhood’s
leadership, including Ahmed al-Malt. See Reda Abdel Wodood, “Safahat Khalida min Hayat al-
Tabeeb al-Mujahed Doctor Ahmed al-Malt, (Immortal Pages from the Life of the Mujahid Doctor,
Dr. Ahmed al-Malt),” al-Hikma, No. 18 (July 2012), p. 28.
37Ahmed al-Malt, “al-Mistashfa al-Islami al-Markazi (Islamic Central Hospital),” al-Da’wa, No.
62 (June 1981), p. 28
38Ahmed al-Malt, “Nidaa’ Illa al-Muslimeen: Mashrou’ al-Mistashfa al-Islami (Call to the Mus-
lims: The Islamic Hospital Project),” al-Da’wa, No. 47 (March 1980), p. 63; Ahmed al-Malt, “Nida’
Min al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya bil-Qahira: Ya Muslimun! (A Call From the Islamic Med-
ical Association in Cairo: O Muslims!),” (al-Da’wa, No. 21 (February 1978), p. 56.
39Advertisement in al-Da’wa, August 1979, p. 23; Ahmed al-Malt, “al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-
Islamiyya: al-Mistashfa al-Islami al-Markazi (The Islamic Medical Association: The Islamic Central
Hospital),” al-Da’wa No. 57 (January 1981), p. 57.
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Figure 2.6: Central Hospital Fundraising Appeal, al-Da’wa, August 1979
In the Name of God, the Benevolent, the Merciful
Project
The Islamic Charity Hospital
We have begun, thanks be to God, the work of establishing the 300-bed Is-
lamic Charitable Hospital in New Cairo. The IMA and and its capital are the
pockets of those who have helped encourage the attention of good people of
charity and virtue in donating toward this tremendous work. The IMA ac-
cepts monetary and in-kind donations, and the IMA has bank accounts:
1. For Local Currency: Banque Misr (Garden City branch), Account No. 4615.
2. In Any Currency: Bank al-Ahli (Main Branch, Sharif St.), Account 14/95/065
Establishing this charity hospital is among the [legiti-
mate] expenditures of zakat, as Muslim legal scholars
have decreed. Therefore the IMA will accept cash do-
nations (zakat) from the Muslims. May God compensate








As the inset on the funding appeal in Figure 2.6 intimates, key to the enterprise
was securing religious approval for the IMA to receive zakat donations.40 To this
end, al-Malt secured a fatwa (religious opinion) from prominent Islamist scholar
Yusuf al-Qaradawi that paying zakat to the hospital project was a legitimate reli-
gious expenditure. In the fatwa, reprinted in al-Da’wa, Qaradawi explained that
the Islamic Charity Hospital:
represents a citadel among citadels defending Islam, preserving the
doctrines of its sons against the onslaught of missionary and evangel-
ical hospitals and foundations. Every aid to it, physical or moral, is
considered an act among the acts of jihad in the cause of God. For
jihad is not only by the sword, and not only limited to military service,
as many think. But it is an act toward the triumph of Islam, enabling it
and defending it in every arena, and by every means. For this reason
I think that counting the zakat toward the erecting of this charitable
hospital is ‘in the cause of God and for the triumph of Islam.’41
With backing from the unlikely bedfellows of Egypt’s military and Islamist lu-
minary Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Islamic Charity Hospital’s fundraising campaign
quickly achieved tangible successes. A January 1981 article in al-Da’wa charted
the progress of the construction. Not only had walls around the property been
constructed, but a 40,000 square meter foundation had been dug at a cost of ap-
proximately 80,000 EGP (roughly $204,000 in contemporaneous U.S. dollars).42
By June of that year work on the foundation had been completed.43
40One of the five pillars of Islam is donating a portion of one’s income to charity (zakat), thus
many charitable enterprises will seek religious certification that Muslims may discharge their
religious obligations by donating to the charity.
41al-Da’wa, No. 62 (June 1981), p. 29. Another issue, of course, was that al-Malt and his
colleagues had envisioned the facility operating more or less as a business catering to paying,
middle class Egyptians. Qaradawi, however, reasoned that because 20% of the bed space would
be reserved for the poor, this qualified the facility to receive zakat donations.
42Ahmed al-Malt, “al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya: al-Mistashfa al-Islami al-Markazi (The
Islamic Medical Association: The Islamic Central Hospital),” al-Da’wa No. 57 (January 1981), p.
57.
43Ahmed al-Malt, “al-Mistashfa al-Islami al-Markazi (Islamic Central Hospital),” al-Da’wa, No.
62 (June 1981), p. 28
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The relationship between the regime and the Islamic Medical Association was
literally set in stone when Egyptian president Anwar el-Sadat himself laid the hos-
pital’s cornerstone. Accompanying him during the ceremony were other regime
luminaries, including then-Vice President Hosni Mubarak as well as the country’s
Defense Minister.44
The empirical record of the IMA’s founding and its first major project chal-
lenges arguments that Islamist groups’ social service provision is a bottom-up and
organic challenge to a feeble state. Instead, the state was a key actor in the IMA’s
emergence and operation: it granted the group legal approval and supported it
both financially and symbolically. In return, the regime expected the organization
to comply with legal and bureaucratic mechanisms that significantly curtailed the
organization’s ability to operate. The remainder of the chapter examines how this
bargain shifted throughout the 1990s and 2000s before collapsing on the eve of
Mubarak’s own fall from power in early 2011.
A Bargain Stressed
As he subcontracted social welfare provision, Sadat’s eyes were firmly fixed on
alleviating the short term consequences of economic reform- specifically to pre-
vent a redux of the 1977 Bread Riots. Over the long run, however, Sadat’s strategy
to empower Islamists entailed, in the words of then-U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
Herman Eilts, “playing with fire.”45 Indeed, Sadat’s willingness to bargain the
future for the present neatly dovetailed with the Brotherhood’s long game. For
44al-Mistashfa al-Khairi al-Markazi, Advertising Brochure, N.D. I appreciate Tarek Masoud shar-
ing this document with me. He discusses the event briefly in his book (2014a, 77).
45“Muslim Resurgence: Fanatic and Mainstream,” U.S. Embassy Cairo, Ca-
ble No. 1976CAIRO16440_b, November 26, 1976. Available online at:
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976CAIRO16440_b.html. Accessed July 12, 2015.
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years the equilibrium persisted but, as Sadat’s future became Mubarak’s present,
the tacit bargain began to break down.
The regime’s relative acquiescence to the Brotherhood’s social service provi-
sion was contingent on two factors: the need to backstop economic reforms and
the regime’s confidence that the group would not challenge the regime’s political
primacy. The first of these conditions obtained through the end of the Mubarak
era. If anything, the need to preserve social stability grew in importance as
new economic reforms accelerated the process the infitah had begun years before
(Bayat 2006, Tadros 2006, Momani 2005). The Economic Reform and Structural
Adjustment Program (ERSAP) in the early 1990s introduced further burdens on
Egypt’s citizens, particularly by pushing further privatization and introducing
mechanisms such as “cost recovery” which took more money out of citizens’
pockets (The World Bank 1993, 1991, Akin, Birdsall and deFerranti 1987). As
these programs began to bite, the network of non-state providers- the Brother-
hood included- became more important to social stability. To some extent this
protected the group. As an official from state security reportedly told the admin-
istrator of a Brotherhood hospital during an inspection in the mid-1990s,“if you
weren’t helping us carry the load, we’d haul all you into prison.”46
A brief glance at the IMA’s dialysis centers highlights the organization’s in-
tegration into Egypt’s public health infrastructure. Three dialysis sessions per
month cost around 220EGP (approx. $25). Although in theory the Egyptian gov-
ernment covers these three sessions per month, in practice they can only reim-
burse providers (including the IMA) two thirds of that. Many providers- both
public and private- cut corners to avoid a shortfall in their own budgets. For
instance, some restrict patients to only two monthly sessions, ask the patients to
46Author Interview, IMA Facility Manager A, May 11, 2013.
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pay for the third out-of-pocket, or even reuse disposable equipment such as filters
and tubing. In contrast, the IMA subsidizes the remaining third. This has put the
IMA in a bit of a bind. For while the IMA’s four existing kidney centers carry
out approximately 27,200 dialysis sessions per year, they remain unable to meet
existing high demand. Yet the IMA is reluctant to open more dialysis centers
simply because they cause the IMA to run in the red: picking up the tab for one
third of their 27,200 sessions costs the IMA around a quarter of a million dollars
annually.47
Yet as the declining quality of public services drove up demand for non-state
providers, the Brotherhood also began to press its political advantage. This cul-
minated in the unprecedented victory of 89 Muslim Brotherhood deputies in the
2005 parliamentary elections. In response the regime began to recalibrate its ap-
proach to the Brotherhood, relying more and more on coercion where co-optation
and bureaucratic manipulation had once been sufficient. In the civic and social
realm, the security services increasingly took charge of dealing with NGOs, el-
bowing out the Ministry of Social Solidarity (which was the point-of-contact for
non-state providers as defined in Laws 32 of 1964 and 84 of 2002) (Tadros 2011).
As the security services moved to the forefront, the regime became less and less
willing to countenance the activities of the IMA.
Some of the first salvos were fired shortly after the 2005 elections. The IMA’s
first clinic was in the lower-middle class Cairo district of Sayyida Zeinab. The
47Author Interview, IMA Executive A, January 7, 2014. Author Interview, IMA Facility Manager
B, November 8, 2012. See also Gad al-Mawli Mohammed, “Marakiz al-Kali bil-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya
al-Islamiyya... Khidmat Insaniyya bi-Hajat lil-Dam (Dialysis Centers of the Islamic Medical Asso-
ciation...Humanitarian Services in Need of Support),” al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya, January 2,
2014. Available online at: http://ima-egy.net/2013-09-24-14-31-06/269-2014-01-19-14-34-44. Ac-
cessed February 1, 2015; Ahmed Hasan, “Markaz Na’ima Lil-Ghasil al-Kelawi Yu’alij 3500 Marid
Sanawiyyan (Mercy Center for Dialysis Cares for 3500 Patients Yearly),” al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-
Islamiyya, November 2, 2014. Available online at: http://ima-egy.net/programs/578-3500. Ac-
cessed February 1, 2015.
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clinic began when a group of Muslim Brotherhood doctors cleaned out a room
used to store trash behind the Sayyida Zeinab mosque and started operating a
small clinic a few nights a week.48 In the 1990 elections a talented lawyer and
National Democratic Party functionary, Fathi Surour was elected from the district.
He would later become the chairman of the People’s Assembly, a position he
would hold until 2011. During those two decades Surour became legendary for
his ability to funnel services to his constituents. As one columnist in the state
paper described it, “throughout the past 20 years Dr. Surour has succeeded in
building his reputation through providing so many services to the district that it
is usually described as ‘the capital of capitals’.”49 Following the 2005 elections,
Surour expropriated the Muslim Brotherhood’s Sayyida Zeinab clinic for himself,
in order to “to prevent the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood, and to prevent their
communication with the people” according to an IMA official (who had himself
started with the organization by working in the Sayyida Zeinab facility).50
The regime also began to simply deny the IMA permission to open new fa-
cilities. In late 2005/early 2006 the IMA began to prepare plans for a modest
new medical facility in the Delta town of Itay al-Baroud, situated around 125 KM
northwest of Cairo. After years of planning and working with the regime and
the town’s citizens to get the plans approved, the IMA began converting a two-
story building downtown into a clinic that would eventually hold 15 beds and
48The clinic plays a small but critical role in the history of modern Islamic militancy. In his
memoirs, current al-Qa’ida leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri recounts how he was volunteering in
the Sayyida Zeinab clinic in 1980 when the director convinced him to go to Afghanistan as part of
a medical relief effort. It was in Afghanistan where he met Osama Bin Laden and joined al-Qa’ida
(2001, 59).
49Mohammed Abdel Salam, “Surour Yuhasim al-Fi’at...wa Thala ’ala Maqaid al-
’Umal fi al-Sayyida (Surour Clinches the Professional’s Seat, while Three Contest the
Worker’s Seat in Sayyida Zeinab),” al-Ahram, September 21, 2010. Available online at:
http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=266470&eid=2555. Accessed October 12, 2014.
50Author Interview, IMA Executive A, January 15, 2013.
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two examination rooms, in addition to an on-premises pharmacy. At that point
State Security stepped in and stopped the process. “You already have the Dar
al-Salam hospital in (nearby) Damanhour,” the agents told the IMA, “and you’ll
have to erect this one over our dead bodies.” After freezing the process, State
Security eventually allowed the project to proceed after the IMA agreed to hand
the entire enterprise off to the less politically-active al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya. Now,
the facility serves as one of that organization’s medical centers treating premature
infants.51
Beyond seizing current facilities and denying permission to construct new
ones, the regime resorted to simply destroying existing facilities. Despite Sadat’s
high-profile inauguration of the Islamic Charity Hospital, the facility did not last
a decade. In 1986 Hosni Mubarak confiscated the facility, reportedly because he
was incensed by the hospital’s high profile location on a main artery into Cairo’s
downtown.52 The military took control of the facility and transformed it into
what is now the Military Evacuation Hospital.53
In compensation for the seizure, in 1991 the regime gave the IMA a much
smaller plot of land (two Km2) a short ways south, near the current City Stars
complex.54 After building up a small outpatient clinic, in 1993 the group began to
work on an ambitious new expansion. Figure 2.7 shows Ahmed al-Malt laying the
foundation stone of this new facility in 1993. Alongside him is Sheikh Mohammed
al-Ghazali, whose sermon two decades prior had ignited in al-Malt the idea of the
51Author interview, IMA Executive B, May 16, 2013.
52Author Interview, IMA Facility Manager C, January 19, 2013.
53Mubarak returned to the site in 1992 to lay a second foundation stone, although if anyone
noticed the irony it did not make it into the newspaper coverage of the event. See “Mubarak
Yaftatah Ihdath Mistashfa ’Askari wa Yazour Darihi al-Sadat wa al-Jundi al-Maghoul fi ’Eid Tahrir
al-Sinai (Mubarak Inaugurates the Latest Military Hospital and Visits the Tombs of Anwar el-Sadat
and the Unknown Soldiers on the Occasion of Sinai Liberation Day),” al-Ahram, April 24, 1992.
54“al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Medical Association), Dar al-Salaam Hospital
Website, N.D. Available online at http://goo.gl/qpNVni. Accessed May 12, 2014.
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Figure 2.7: Ahmed al-Malt (L) and Mohammed al-Ghazali, August 1993
(Ikhwanwiki)
Islamic Medical Association.
Yet even then the Central Hospital was not out of the woods. During the 2000
parliamentary elections, for instance, permitting slowed up while inspections and
general harassment increased (Shamakh 2011, 86).55 The IMA pushed ahead, and
in 2006 they launched a new expansion scheduled to cost over $7.3 million and
be completed in time for the 2010 parliamentary elections.56 Even as the group
began to construct new floors and purchase new equipment, the regime stepped
55“al-Hasouma al-Fajira: Hadm Mistashfa Kheiri Dakhm ala Ras al-Marid wa al-Atiba’ Lianu
Muhasib ‘ala al-Ikhwan, (The Ridiculous Rivalry: Destroying a Charity Hospital Over the Head of
Patients and Doctors because of its Relationship to the Brotherhood),” Nafidthat Misr, December
7, 2009. Available online at: http://www.egyptwindow.net/news_Details.aspx?News_ID=5941.
Accessed January 3, 2015.
56“al-Ikhwan: al-Mushawarat al-Mukathifa Tamhidan li-Aqid Intikhabat Ra’isiyya Mis-
riyya (The Brotherhood: Intense Discussions in Advance of the Upcoming Egyp-
tian Presidential Elections),” Islamonline, December 11, 2009. Available online at:
http://islamonline.com/news/articles/25/vdi582b8ueuknyvi.html. Accessed January 3, 2015.
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in to destroy the building, allegedly for violating zoning restrictions on the height
of the facility. In December of 2009 workers armed with picks, sledgehammers,
and heavy equipment descended on the facility to destroy it from the inside out.57
Although a sit-in of doctors and patients opposed the regime, the workers began
around-the-clock demolition efforts that eventually stretched over a week.
The Brotherhood and the IMA scrambled to stop the demolition. In addi-
tion to filing emergency appeals with the Cairo courts, the group also tried to
appeal to Hosni Mubarak through his wife, Suzanne, and place advertisements
in the media (they claim the newspapers rejected the ads). As one senior figure
in the IMA claimed, “we told Mubarak ‘please, if you don’t want us to have it,
take it for yourself! There’s no need to destroy it!”’58 The Brotherhood’s parlia-
mentary deputy from the district, Essam Mukhtar, led a delegation to plead the
case with the Cairo governorate, but was ignored. Afterwards, he exasperatedly
told the press “it seems this is a new strategy by the regime...to pull the rug out
from under the Brotherhood’s feet in advance of the upcoming parliamentary and
presidential elections, despite the damage it will do to the ordinary Egyptian.”59
This is “a political case” claimed Brotherhood parliamentarian Mohammed el-
Beltagy.60 Eventually the IMA’s lawyers were able to stop the destruction, but
not before two floors had been wrecked and a number of sensitive machines had
57Video clips of the demolition attempts in the author’s possession, both dated December 14,
2009.
58Author interview, IMA Executive B, May 16, 2013.
59“al-Hasouma al-Fajira: Hadm Mistashfa Kheiri Dakhm ala Ras al-Marid wa al-Atiba’ Lianu
Muhasib ‘ala al-Ikhwan, (The Ridiculous Rivalry: Destroying a Charity Hospital Over the Head of
Patients and Doctors because of its Relationship to the Brotherhood),” Nafidthat Misr, December
7, 2009. Available online at: http://www.egyptwindow.net/news_Details.aspx?News_ID=5941.
Accessed January 3, 2015.
60Video clip: “al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya: Qidaya Mukhalifat Idariyya am Qidaya
Siyasiyya? (The Islamic Medical Association: An Administrative Case or a Political One?),” Up-
loaded October 10, 2011. Available online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0zHrB39r1o.
Accessed January 4, 2015.
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been rendered unusable.61 As late as 2013 the top floors remained closed amidst
exposed rebar concrete and blown out portions of walls, scars from the attempted
destruction.
A Bargain Broken
The scope of the repression widened even further as parliamentary elections ap-
proached in the autumn of 2010. In effect, the regime was caught in a pincer
movement. Institutionally, the Brotherhood was entering the electoral cycle poised
to build on its electoral success in 2005. And in Egypt’s streets and squares, the
regime was busy fending off precisely the type of unsanctioned mobilization it
most feared: industrial towns were experiencing a series of wildcat strikes (Beinin
and El-Hamalawy 2007), while a liberal protest movement was mobilizing a new
generation of activists (El-Mahdi 2009) in Egypt’s public spaces. In the face of
such widespread opposition from all corners and social sectors, the regime dou-
bled down on their repressive capabilities.
Surprise visits from the authorities and nitpicking inspections had been a fact
of life for the IMA for years. In addition to the overall oversight role of the Min-
istry of Social Solidarity, the IMA also fell under other bureaucratic purviews.
For instance, the Central Accounting Agency (al-Jihaz al-Markazi lil-Muhasibat) has
authority to inspect the accounts of the organization and monitor financial irreg-
ularities. The Ministry of Health constantly inspected all facilities for cleanliness
and sanitation. Finally, particularly for those medical facilities that rent property
61“Hukm Tarikhi Did Wazir Bi-Mna’a Hadm Mistashfa al-Gam’iyya al-Tibiyya Ba’d Hadmiha
bi-Shekl Hamji, (Historic Judgement Against the Governor Forbidding the Destruction of the (Is-
lamic) Medical Association’s Hospital following its Brutal Destruction)” Nafidthat Misr, December
18, 2009. http://www.egyptwindow.net/news_Details.aspx?News_ID=6126. Accessed January 4,
2015.
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from religious endowments, (for instance renting space in a mosque complex),
both the Ministry of Awqaf and the Administrative Control Authority (Hi’at al-
Riqaba al-Idariyya) also have oversight jurisdiction (Sullivan 1994, 17).62
But according to hospital staffers these inspections and interventions increased
dramatically around the 2010 parliamentary elections. The punishments also es-
calated as the regime used the smallest infractions to close facilities. For instance,
the security services showed up at the Sharabiyya Hospital in October 2010 and
shut the facility down over a leaky faucet.63 Shortly thereafter, regime agents
visited the Tawba Hospital, in Hadaiq al-Kobba and forced it to close because the
fire suppression system was judged to be deficient. The facility remained closed
for the duration of the parliamentary elections, and in fact only reopened after
Mubarak stepped down in February 2011.64 Similarly, the Hadi Hospital, in Hel-
wan, was forced to close because an employee left a dirty uniform on the floor,
and other facilities reported similar nitpicking violations.65 The Mowasah Hospital
in Shibin al-Kom was also closed during the 2010 elections.66 Not only that, but
the hospital’s parent association (the Mowasah association) came under tremen-
dous pressure for campaigning on behalf of Brotherhood candidates, to the point
that the district governor even demanded the association be dissolved.67
62Author Interview, IMA Employee A, February 2, 2013.
63Author Interview, IMA Employee A, February 2, 2013. See also “Taqrir Mistashfa al-
Sharabiyya (Report on the Sharabiyya Hospital), Moraselon, N.D. (Uploaded October 31, 2010).
Available online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BB9Ef5KXtmI. Accessed January 12, 2013.
64Author Interview, IMA Employee B, May 1, 2013.
65Author Interview, lMA Facility Manager A, May 11, 2013; Author interview, IMA Employee
C, May 9, 2013; Author Interview, IMA Employee D, May 11, 2013; Author interview, IMA Facility
Manager C, January 19, 2013.
66Author Interview, IMA Employee E, November 11, 2012.
67Ahmed al-Sukkari, “al-Sadat Yatarid ’ala Hal Gam’iyyat ’al-Mowasa’ (Sadat Disagrees with
the Dissolution of the Mowasah Association),” al-Wafd, December 22, 2010. Available online at:
http://goo.gl/rpkTv9. Accessed January 10, 2015; Mohammed Essawy, “260 Mowazifan wa Mari-
dan bi-Mistashfa al-Mowasah bil-Menoufiyya Yatathahiroun Ihtijajan ’ala Qarar Hal al-Gam’iyya
(260 Employees and Patients of the Mowasah Hospital in Menoufiyya Rally to Protest the Deci-
sion to Dissolve the (Mowasah) Association),” al-Ahram, December 21, 2010. Available online at:
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The harassment against the Brotherhood’s medical network got so bad that
the group felt the need to address it as part of a larger formal statement explain-
ing their participation in the 2010 elections (the Brotherhood would withdraw
their candidates after unprecedented fraud in the first round). The Brotherhood
demanded that the regime:
desist in mobilizing the state’s institutions against its opponents, es-
pecially the unjustified use of security services which have carried out
dozens of arrest campaigns against the Muslim Brotherhood around
the country, in addition to raiding dozens of offices, as well as branches
and hospitals of the Islamic Medical Association around the country,
which is all an illegal attempt to cripple the candidates of the Muslim
Brotherhood...68
In retrospect, the late 2010 collapse of the bargain that allowed the Brother-
hood a relatively free hand to proliferate social services was a harbinger of the
end of the regime itself. In the 1970s the Brotherhood was willing to bet that,
in the long term, the benefits of their above-ground and legal provision of social
services would outweigh the costs of submitting to regime supervision. In con-
trast, the regime’s future discount rate was very low: Sadat was willing to risk the
possibility that he was nurturing a long-term challenge to his regime in exchange
for staving off what was then a more imminent threat of popular mobilization. In
the end, Hosni Mubarak found himself facing the worst of both worlds: while the
Brotherhood attempted to leverage their electoral power to secure a permanent
place in the regime as it stood, protestors in Tahrir Square were attempting to
tear the entire edifice down.
http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=379034&eid=715. Accessed January 10, 2015.
68“Limatha al-Musharika fi al-Intikhabat (Why Participate in the Elections)?” Ikhwanon-
line, October 10, 2013. Available online at: http://goo.gl/13a6SU. Accessed Jan-
uary 20, 2015. See also “al-Jihaz al-Khidmi lil-Jama’a Yahtiz (The (Brotherhood’s)
Service Organization is Shaken),” al-Mal, October 26, 2010. Available online at:
http://www.almalnews.com/Pages/StoryDetails.aspx?ID=13708. Accessed January 9, 2015.
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Conclusion
For many, the Muslim Brotherhood’s provision of social services is a phenomenon
that exists, through either design or happenstance, at the edges of regime power.
Using interviews and memoirs of key members, coverage in Islamist periodicals
such as al-Da’wa, and government documents this chapter shows the opposite.
Egypt’s authoritarian regime played a key role in the IMA’s establishment: en-
couraging its growth, providing financial and symbolic support, and allowing it a
legal space in which to operate. In return, these services helped millions of Egyp-
tians cope with Egypt’s shrinking social safety net. So long as the Brotherhood
submitted to the regime’s legal, administrative, and bureaucratic mechanisms of
control, the group’s threat to the regime’s political primacy was minimal. Yet
as the Brotherhood’s political challenge to the regime crested following the 2005
parliamentary elections, the regime turned away from bureaucratic and adminis-
trative regulation and towards brute force.
This historical record provides a wealth of material with which to evaluate the
predictions of alternative theories of the Brotherhood’s social service provision.
First, the close relationship between the regime and the IMA does not support
predictions that Islamist groups will situate their activism in the spaces beyond
regime control. Second, the IMA’s founders never envisioned the organization
as a charitable venture- from the outset, they crafted the organization to provide
Egypt’s middle class with decent and caring medical service at a modest cost.
Finally, the regime was not blind to the political risks of empowering the Brother-
hood’s social service networks, although they gambled that the short term benefit
of channeling opposition off the streets and into institutional, easily controlled






With the history of the IMA in mind, we can now consider the theoretical ques-
tions that motivate this project: under what conditions does the Muslim Brother-
hood distribute social services? What purpose do these services serve? Chapter
one argued that Egypt’s authoritarian political institutions funneled this provi-
sion into competitive, middle-class electoral districts. This chapter tests the the-
ory’s spatial implications, analyzing the spatial distribution of the Brotherhood’s
brick-and-mortar medical services against the predictions of alternative theories
focusing on charity, revolutionary activism, and recruitment.
As the first chapter noted, it has historically been difficult to assess these hy-
potheses due to the simple dearth of empirical information about the Brother-
hood’s social service network: where these facilities exist, whom they serve, their
size and scope, and how they are run. This chapter relies on an array of original
spatial and qualitative data, including a geolocated set of dozens of Brotherhood
medical facilities across Egypt, a complete record of the Brotherhood’s political
participation from 1976-2010, and interviews with Brotherhood service providers
in order to systematically assess where these hypotheses stand out and where
they fall short. Throughout, the goal is to gain explanatory leverage by blending
quantitative and spatial tests with close analysis of Arabic-language primary and
secondary sources, maximizing generalizability without sacrificing causal infer-
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ence.
Picking up the theme from chapter one, the chapter also reveals how Egypt’s
authoritarian political economy established a series of constraints and incentives
that set the bounds of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political activism. In particu-
lar, robust pro-regime clientelist networks locked-in the support of Egypt’s poor,
disincentivizing the regime’s opponents from attempting to mobilize that sector.
As the theory predicts, and the sections below show, the spatial distribution of
the Brotherhood’s medical facilities follows this logic, mapping closely onto those
middle-class areas where the group contested seats for parliament. Other mea-
sures related to need, state capacity, or membership density fail to explain the
observed variation. Furthermore, an analysis of these facilities’ internal orga-
nization and functioning confirms that the middle class emphasis of the IMA’s
founders echoes into the present day.
The Level of Analysis
Recall the variation in the opening anecdote: The residents of Ma’adi, an upper-
class Cairo suburb, benefitted from the Brotherhood’s social service networks.
The residents of ’Elwan, a poor village in southern (upper) Egypt, had “never”
benefitted from the Brotherhood’s social services. This puzzle repeats itself in
towns and neighborhoods all over Egypt: in some places the Brotherhood’s brick-
and mortar social service enterprises are dense, in others they are quite sparse.
This concrete example both highlights and specifies the variation: why do some
areas, like Ma’adi, host social service networks while others, like ’Elwan, do not?
This dissertation considers why the Brotherhood’s social services appeared, or
did not appear, in particular districts across Egypt. I do not attempt to explain
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why a social service facility appeared on one particular street corner, or why the
group took up residence in a particular building in Ma’adi. The micro-level pro-
cess by which a facility comes to exist at a specific address is the result of an
almost endless number of often contingent factors: land or a preexisting property
exists, someone can help obtain permits, building materials or workers are readily
available, et cetera (Clark 2004). In fact, nearly every one of the Islamic Medical
Association’s hospitals or medical centers is housed in a building owned by a
local community association. Al-Farouq hospital, in Maadi, operates in a building
the “Association for Developing West Ma’adi” owns, and the IMA pays rent to
that association.1 The Jam’iyat al-Sharif (The Sharif Association) owns the building
housing the ’Adel hospital in Shubra, and the IMA pays rent to the Sharif Asso-
ciation. At both the al-Sharabiyya and al-Tana’im hospitals in Shubra and Basatin,
respectively, the IMA rents the premises from the sprawling Islamic charity net-
work al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya.2 The IMA’s Ibn Sina hospital in Banha had been a
pre-existing and independent medical facility until the IMA took it over in 2006.
When I visited the hospital in 2013, the original owner still lived on the top floor
and received monthly rent from the Islamic Medical Association.3
Instead of a micro-level ethnographic study, the focus here is on providing a
relatively parsimonious theory to explain macro-level variation in service provi-
sion. Specifically, I am interested in “scaling up” to ask why facilities tend to
appear in some areas (like Ma’adi) but not others (like ’Elwan). This lifts the in-
quiry beyond the contingent interaction of highly specific variables and instead
makes the problem more amenable to building nomothetic theory. Waldner offers
1Author Interview, IMA Employee D, May 11, 2013.
2Author Interview, IMA Executive B, November 8, 2012; Author Interview, IMA Employee A,
February 2, 2013.
3Author Interview, IMA Employee C, May 9, 2013.
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an analogy:
the correspondence between microstates and any given macrostate de-
pends on the level of abstraction with which we define the specified
macrostate. Consider the proverbial ton of bricks. We bring the bricks
up in a helicopter to a height of one thousand feet and drop them on
an empty field. Will the bricks form an exact replica of Thomas Jef-
ferson’s rotunda which graces the lawn of the University of Virginia?
While statistically possible, the answer is no, because only one of the
astonishingly huge number of microstates comprisable from a ton of
bricks exactly corresponds to Mr. Jefferson’s rotunda. In fact, we can
say with virtually complete certainty that the bricks will form noth-
ing but a pile, because the class of microstates mk corresponding to
macrostate M1 “pile of bricks” is an overwhelmingly huge proportion
of the total number of microstates mi to mj. We would not be able
to predict which microstate would result, but we could predict quite
easily which macrostate would result: that described as a random pile
of bricks (2002, 95-96).
As Waldner’s example intimates, how the study is framed has important ram-
ifications for the explanatory variables. This project examines the variation in
outcomes at a certain level of abstraction: Egypt’s 222 Mubarak-era election dis-
tricts. This decision shifts the causal focus away from the highly idiographic fac-
tors mentioned above to larger structural and institutional factors based around
resource maximization and strategic interaction.
Setting the level of analysis at the electoral district is also useful in other ways.
Prior studies are notable for their explicit focus on the capital city, the Cairo-Giza
metropolis. While these studies have yielded significant detail on how Islamic
social institutions operate and interact with specific audiences, there is the distinct
possibility that the authors’ respective findings are not generalizable to the rest of
the country (Fandy 1998).
More importantly, expanding the analytical focus to encompass both districts
where the Brotherhood’s social service networks are present and where they are is
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absent guards against a no-variance design (Collier and Mahoney 1996, King, Keo-
hane and Verba 1994). Consider how two prominent studies have approached the
question of Islamic social service activism in Egypt. Both Wickham’s and Clark’s
signal studies of Islamic social activism conclude, broadly, that social service in-
stitutions help to introduce or otherwise acclimate individuals to participation in
Islamic activism. Yet consider how their respective research designs artificially
truncate the universe of cases:
In order to investigate Islamic strategies of outreach, I conducted field-
work in three sha’bi (middle/lower class) neighborhoods in Greater
Cairo known for their moderate to high levels of Islamic activism
(Wickham 2002, 124).
I randomly chose clinics of all sizes and from both the most populous
areas of Cairo and the city’s newer outlying areas by literally choosing
a geographical district, driving to it, and interviewing the first clinic
spotted (Clark 2004, xiii).
Wickham limits her causal leverage by excluding areas without much Islamic
activism, while Clark could have stopped to investigate neighborhoods without
Islamic clinics. While this dissertation builds on both of these studies, it also
extends them by considering not only why Islamic social service facilities exist in
one area, but why they do not exist in others.
The analysis below begins with a macro-level view of the variation in Muslim
Brotherhood social service provision across Egypt. To do so, this chapter builds
on an original geolocated dataset of brick-and-mortar Muslim Brotherhood med-
ical institutions. Mapping the coordinates of these facilities across Egypt’s po-
litical and socioeconomic geography highlights the underlying sociopolitical re-
lationships, revealing the logic behind the Brotherhood’s decision to provide or
withhold social services.
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Localizing the Brotherhood’s Social Service Networks
During the period 1990-2011 IMA operated 31 facilities across Egypt. These con-
sisted of hospitals, dialysis and eye centers, an institution for Egyptians with
special needs, and a fertility clinic. A circa 2012 listing of facilities is available
both on the group’s website, as well as in the IMA’s in-house (uncirculated) jour-
nal al-Hikma.4 Through fieldwork I also identified additional facilities that had
been opened during the Mubarak era, but had been closed or seized prior to 2011
(as the Sayyida Zeinab clinic referenced in chapter two).
From these lists I used a combination of open-source research methods to
identify the precise latitude and longitude of each facility. As a first stage, I
cross-referenced the facility name with the results of an internet search. This usu-
ally turned up a directory listing, Facebook page, or website for the facility in
question that provided the precise address or, more likely, a nearby landmark.
Occasionally these facilities or nearby landmarks were also tagged in Wikimapia,
a crowd-sourced georeferencing website.5 In other cases satellite maps identified
prominent landmarks and intersections. In many cases, the above methods lo-
cated accurately the latitude and longitude of these facilities. However in some
particularly difficult cases the on-line information was not sufficient to pinpoint
the location of the facility with any confidence. In these cases, I physically trav-
elled to the facilities and, while there, used my smartphone to hand-log the GPS
coordinates. Later I correlated these measures with a satellite overview of the area
to confirm the location. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present the locations of these facilities,
first on a nationwide scale, and then zooming in to focus on the especially dense
concentration around the Cairo metropolis.
4Available online at: http://www.imaegy.com/l3.php?id=36.
5Available at http://http://wikimapia.org/.
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Figure 3.1: Spatial Distribution of Brotherhood Medical Facilities (Nationwide)
The locations of these facilities furnish the dependent variable which enables
empirical tests of the macro-level theory outlined earlier. Before proceeding to
the empirical tests, the following section sorts and highlights those alternative
independent variables that prior scholars have theorized exert influence over the
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Figure 3.2: Spatial Distribution of Brotherhood Medical Facilities (Cairo
Metropolis)
Brotherhood’s distribution of social services.
Alternative Hypotheses
While media reports often link the Brotherhood’s social service provision to elec-
toral success, most scholars who have studied the phenomenon in Egypt and else-
where have actually concluded that these facilities’ connection to electoral politics
is ephemeral at best. Instead, they implicate these facilities in mobilization strate-
gies that are precisely the opposite of the institutionalized, mundane channels of
electoral politics. Specifically, they argue that Islamist social service provision
is part of a strategy to express the ideals of Islam through charitable provision,
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attract recruits and build organizational cohesion, or mount a revolutionary chal-
lenge to the state. The following section draws out the spatial implications of each
theory in order to predict the evidence we should expect to find if it were true.
• Social Service Provision as Islamic Injunction
For many authors, asking why Islamists act in a given fashion is tautological.
The term itself, “Islamist,” suggests that any attempt to explain behavior should
begin (and probably end) with reference to the dictates of the Islamic canon. In a
famous essay Bernard Lewis cautioned those studying the Islamic world to keep
“two essential points” in mind: “the universality of religion as a factor in the lives
of the Muslim peoples...and its centrality” (1976, 40). Gellner specified how Islam
“inhibits the handing over of some sphere of life to non-religious authorities”
which, in turn, renders it difficult for Muslims to propose alternative structures
of social organization (1983, 2). But if an “Islamic impulse” (Stowasser 1987)
drives Muslims or, even more specifically, Islamists, then what does that mean for
arguments regarding social service provision?
As authors have noted, there is an Islamic “injunction” to provide charity
based on the concept of zakat (Benthall 1999, Heyneman 2004). The Quran spec-
ifies eight categories of people eligible to receive charity: the impoverished (al-
Fuqara’), the completely destitute (al-Masakin), those who administrate and dis-
tribute the charity (al-’Amileen), those whom charity might incline towards con-
version to Islam (al-Mu’alifat Quaylubuhum), freed slaves (al-Riqaab), the indebted
or insolvent (al-Gharimeen), those engaged in religious tasks (fi sabil Allah), and the
stranded traveller (Ibn al-Sabil).6 When translating these “injunctions” to behavior,
authors overwhelmingly focus on the first two categories (the poor).
6Sura al-Tawbah (9), Verse 60.
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Hammad, for instance, argues that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood:
paid special attention to the work of charity and good deeds and
viewed it as one of the basic principles of the Muhammadan mis-
sion. Voluntary work in Jordan is a product of this Islamic culture
and the values and ethics that are derived from the Islamic Sharia and
the Arab-Islamic heritage (1997, 187).
Likewise, Hamzeh tells us that “the activities of (Lebanese) Hizbullah’s Social
Unit emanate from a strong ideological commitment because social service is a
fundamental tenet of the faith” (2004, 53). The authors of a study of the Pales-
tinian Hamas go further, and explicitly connect the religious motivation to on-
the-ground implications: “the Brotherhood’s traditional practice of applying the
Islamic duty of charity to the poor” is a reason why that sector tends to support
the group (Mishal and Sela 2006, 20).
A group dedicated to providing aid to the poor could do much good in Egypt.
World Bank statistics show that around one-quarter of the population lives under
the poverty line, and unofficial estimates suggest that the true number is much
higher (Sabry 2010). As chapter two described, the structural economic reforms
the Sadat and Mubarak governments undertook essentially dismantled Egypt’s
Nasser-era social safety net. The business sector did indeed take off, enrich-
ing a new capitalist class increasingly congealing around heir apparent Gamal
Mubarak. On the other hand, poverty rates shot up. Apparently missing the
irony, a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Cairo summarized the situation for a
visiting delegation thusly: “Economic reform has been a success story, although
Egypt still suffers from widespread and so far irremediable poverty affecting up-
wards of 35-40% of the population.”7 If Islamist groups relied upon social service
7Cable, US Embassy to Secretary of State,“Scenesetter for General Petraeus’ Visit to Egypt,” De-
cember 21, 2008, 08CAIRO2543, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08CAIRO2543.html. Cited
in Brownlee (2012, 130-131).
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provision to target their less affluent countrymen and women, then these facilities
should exist in Egypt’s poorer neighborhoods and villages.
• Social Service Provision as Recruitment
Scholars have also contextualized Islamists’ social service provision not as the
mere discharge of a religious obligation, but as a purposeful activity embedded
in wider strategies of sociopolitical activism. A number have posited a link be-
tween the strength of the Islamic movement (and the Brotherhood in particular)
and the operation of social service facilities. Rubin, for instance, charges that the
Brotherhood’s “medical clinics in mosques...[are] used to recruit people” (1990,
26). Similarly, Saad Eddin Ibrahim asserts that these institutions “have provided
a convenient infra-structure for recruiting both militant and non-militant Islamic
activists (1997, 52). Trager tells us that the Muslim Brotherhood works to “Is-
lamize the society by dispatching its members to recruit new Muslim Brothers
through social services.”8
More theoretical work in this cluster draws from the literature on social move-
ments. Wickham’s intricate Mobilizing Islam spells out the logic particularly well.
Most social movement literature, she notes, is set in contexts where movement
participants confront very little risk. Not so for Islamic activists in Mubarak’s
Egypt, who faced harassment, imprisonment, torture, and death for affiliating
with the Islamic movement. In order to overcome these aversions, Islamist ac-
tivists consciously re-formulated and re-interpreted Islam to embed a more ac-
tivist conception of religious practice in the population. Through interaction with
the “parallel Islamic sector” composed of schools, clinics, mosques, study circles,
8Eric Trager, “Why Egyptians Don’t Want Another Revolution,” Politico, January 26, 2015.
Available online at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/why-egyptians-
dont-want-another-revolution. Accessed January 27, 2015.
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community associations and the like, individuals encountered a new version of
Islam. These interpretations, Wickham continues:
challenged the dominant trend of noninvolvement in public life. Against
the ‘rational’ idea that voting and other forms of political action were a
waste of time, the Brotherhood da’wa asserted that every Muslim must
contribute to the task of Islamic social and political reform...the da’wa
helped convert a passive political stance to an active one (2002, 171).
Conditioned to accept higher risks by their new interpretation of Islam, these
Egyptians were more apt to join the movement. Although Clark (2004) lacks the
explicit focus on mobilization that marks Wickham’s study, her characterization of
Islamic social institutions as nodes on a dense network of middle class Islamic ac-
tivism to some extent overlaps with Wickham’s mechanism of ideological change.
Specifically, while prosaic needs to find property, obtain permits, and hire staff
dominates the story, Islamic facilities also diffuse Islamic ideologies among those
middle class individuals who work or are otherwise involved in the enterprise
(see also Wiktorowicz (2004, 11)).
While they start from the same puzzle (high-risk activism), another group of
scholars study the role of social services in Islamist mobilization more instrumen-
tally. Specifically, they ask how the Brotherhood has been able to build a high-
quality membership and prevent free-riding, where individuals enjoy the benefits
of participation without contributing (Olson 1965/2009, 72). In this telling, Is-
lamists’ social service facilities provide exclusive material benefits, so-called “se-
lective incentives,” which entice potential members to join or remain members of
the organization (Oliver 1980). In their careful spatial study of non-state service
provision in Lebanon, Cammett and Issar noted how organizations that prioritize
more dangerous extra-institutional competition- strikes, demonstrations, even vi-
olence (such as Hezbollah) tend to limit provision to members (2010, 2014). In
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his study of the Muslim Brotherhood’s early years, Munson found that social
service provision “played an important role in rapidly attracting new members...
They helped overcome potential free-rider problems within the organization, as
resources such as schools and clinics served as selective incentives for Muslim
Brotherhood members and potential recruits” (2001, 501).9 Eli Berman uses in-
sights from economics and the sociology of religion to suggest that the Broth-
erhood’s provision of these services may help it maintain cohesion and prevent
defection (2011, 2008). Indeed, there is a longstanding practice in the Brother-
hood, as in other Islamic groups, for the organization to step in and provide for
the families of members killed or imprisoned.10
While the ideological and material variants of the mobilization theories above
rely on different causal mechanisms, a spatial implication that they share is that
there should exist a correlation between clusters of Brotherhood membership and
the facilities’ locations. This is because these facilities must positively discriminate
in favor of those inside the movement (in other words, to give Muslim Brother-
hood activists priority). If everyone received the same care, then these facilities
would actually exacerbate the free-rider problem they supposedly solve, by al-
lowing non-members to enjoy the benefits of these facilities without making the
commitment to the broader movement. While spatial data cannot speak to some
types of discrimination- for instance free or reduced priced care for members- it
can test others, particularly spatial discrimination. One implication may be that
these facilities are more prevalent in the Brotherhood’s neighborhoods, effectively
reducing the distance members have to travel to receive care. This is not trivial, as
9While mainly focusing on the ideational role of the services, Wickham too allows that more
traditional selective incentive explanations may also apply (2002, 153).
10Author Interview, Mohammed Soudan, Foreign Relations Secretary, Freedom and Justice
Party, November 6, 2012.
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proximity to medical facilities constitutes a significant barrier to equitable health
care provision in the developing world (Akin et al. 1985).
• Islamisation
Others argue that these facilities are part of the Brotherhood’s general strategy
to Islamize Egyptian society. For instance, in her work on everyday life in Cairo,
Salwa Ismail discusses the role of what she calls the “moral subject” in Islamic
provision of charity. As she tells us, “to qualify for assistance, the subject must
produce herself not only as supplicant but as a deserving one in both material
and moral senses” (2006, 77). Atia similarly examines the ability of these facilities
to shape individual-level religious belief: “direct aid comes with an obligation to
attend religious and disciplinary lessons, inextricably linking Islamic charity to
da’wa” (2013, 75). And Tal claims that “acceptance into the Brotherhood’s institu-
tions required the pupil’s mother to wear a veil and recite certain chapters from
the Qu’ran by heart” (2005, 47). If this argument were true of the Brotherhood,
one piece of evidence would be a correlation between the location of these facil-
ities and concentrations of individuals with conservative Islamic beliefs, though
not necessarily members of the Muslim Brotherhood.
• Social Service Provision as State Subversion
As noted in chapters one and two, a common way to describe the Islamist
project is as an “alternative” or a “state within a state.” Sheri Berman (2003)
provides the most elaborate argument. The Brotherhood’s provision of social ser-
vices, she argues, substitutes for the state by stepping in where the state is unable,
or unwilling, to provide. In so doing, the Islamists win citizens loyalty while si-
multaneously sapping the legitimacy of the current government (Al-Awadi 2005,
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2004). Not only does this Islamize the society, it paves the way for revolution by
weakening existing institutions of governance and alienating citizens from tradi-
tional political activism.
While Berman draws on Huntington’s classic work linking political institu-
tions to stable governance (1968), other scholars have made essentially the same
argument but drawn from different theoretical antecedents. For these authors,
Islamist social service provision is a classic example of a Gramscian “war of po-
sition,” of fighting against the state in those arenas where it is weakest (Bayat
2007a, 136). Being unable to contest the state in the formal realm of politics, the
Islamists “bypassed the state” (Davis and Robinson 2012) and reoriented their
struggle towards civil society. Wiktorowicz and Taji-Farouki studied Islamist so-
cial activism in Jordan and found that “rather than directly confronting the state
or participating in formal politics, Islamic NGOs are engaged in social struggle at
the level of cultural discourse and values” (2000, 686). One spatial implication of
these argument is that the Brotherhood’s social service institutions should cluster
in those neighborhoods and hamlets where the state is weakest.
Political Islam without Politics?
Despite their varying empirical predictions, the above theories generally align on
one point- that the institutional characteristics of Egypt’s authoritarian electoral
system had little influence over how Islamists distributed of social services. Of
course, each theoretical cluster leaves room for electoral effects- for instance, all
would potentially agree that these social services can drive electoral support for
the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet in each case, these electoral effects would be a more-
or-less auxiliary consequence of a deeper strategy of delegitimizing the regime,
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recruiting activists, or serving the poor.
I argue that what many categorize as ancillary by-products are instead pro-
found causes. The Brotherhood’s network of social service provision did not
develop in isolation from the regime, nor can it be divorced from the ways that
Egypt’s authoritarian political economy inscribed particular patterns of mobiliza-
tion across the country’s uneven terrain. The socioeconomic cleavage chapter one
highlighted is particularly important: while Egypt’s regime relied heavily on the
support of poor voters, the Islamist opposition mobilized in those middle class
constituencies where the NDP was comparatively weaker.
To explore how the interaction between Egypt’s socioeconomic realities and
political competition shaped the Brotherhood’s distribution of social services, the
next section briefly describes a complete and original dataset of Muslim Broth-
erhood candidates in each election cycle for Egypt’s lower house of parliament.
This dataset draws together the above threads to empirically test the argument
that the Brotherhood’s social services are part of a strategy of electoral mobiliza-
tion, while at the same time examining how well the alternative hypotheses hold
up. As these tests show, the patterns of political competition combine with un-
derlying socioeconomic variables to strongly predict how and where the Muslim
Brotherhood distributes of social services.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Record, 1976-2010
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has put forward candidates for every parlia-
mentary election since 1976. The only exception was the 1990 elections when the
group, in conjunction with nearly every other opposition political party, boycotted
the elections in protest of a change in electoral rules. Yet despite the prominence
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of the Brotherhood’s involvement in Egyptian life and politics during this period,
pre-existing accurate statistics on the group’s participation in these elections are
limited. While there are lists of parliamentarians (i.e. winners)- for instance the di-
rectories produced by the al-Ahram Center- relying purely on this information for
hypothesis testing is potentially problematic. Not only is some of the information
conflicting, but the potential for manipulation of electoral outcomes could very
likely produce sharply-distorted findings. For instance, areas of strong Brother-
hood local networks may be more likely to trigger outcome-altering interference
from the regime. Thus coding on candidate success may actually reveal not where
the Brotherhood’s political influence was strongest (because the regime expected
a strong challenge there and thus pre-arranged rigging efforts), but those compar-
atively weaker districts where an under-the-radar surge in Brotherhood turnout
caught the regime by surprise.
My original dataset, which includes ex-ante details of Muslim Brotherhood
candidate entry in addition to ex-post win/loss outcomes allows a specific test of
how well the Brotherhood’s provision of social services converges with or diverges
from those electoral districts in which the group felt themselves able, and the
underlying structural conditions propitious, to mount a political challenge against
the regime.11
To explicitly measure the Brotherhood’s record of political contestation, I com-
pute the percentage of times a candidate from the Muslim Brotherhood competed
in the electoral district in the four election years between 1995-2010. My theory
linking the Brotherhood’s provision of social services to their electoral ambitions
yields the following hypothesis:
11The dataset notes each candidate’s name, their electoral district, and whether they won or lost
their race. All told, for the years 1976- 2010 the dataset includes 578 candidates, of which 154
advanced to parliament. Appendix A more fully discusses the dataset.
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• Hypothesis: Districts in which the Brotherhood has competed will be more likely to
host Brotherhood social service initiatives.
Measuring Alternative Hypotheses
In the below analysis the electoral district serves as the unit of analysis. The
borders of each electoral district were rendered by reference to the relevant por-
tion of Egypt’s electoral law, specifically Law 206 of 1990 (Majls al-Sha’b 1990),
using a pre-existing shapefile of Egypt’s third-tier administrative subdivisions
(shiyakha).12
I produce the variables to test the aforementioned explanations by using the
large-scale Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) carried out among Egyptian
women over the last 25 years. From 1998 onward these survey responses were
geocoded (latitude and longitude), making them ideal for capturing micro-level
variation in socioeconomic measures across Egypt’s towns and cities. For these
tests, I draw from the 2008 iteration of the DHS survey, which surveyed 16,527
Egyptian women of childbearing age (15-49) on various health and lifestyle char-
acteristics. After the geocoded response clusters were displayed across the elec-
toral district map above, I used ArcGIS to link each response cluster to the elec-
toral district. Specifically, ArcGIS’s “spatial join” function automatically assigns
each point (in this case the response cluster) to the polygon (the electoral district)
to which it is closest (those responses inside a polygon are given the value of that
polygon).13 I used the DHS surveys to construct direct and proxy variables to
12In Appendix B I discuss the over-time changes to these laws and provide references to the
source documents over the period 1976 to 2012. I gratefully acknowledge Hala Bayoumi at CEDEJ
in Cairo for her assistance with constructing the electoral maps.
13Due to privacy concerns, DHS aggregated multiple nearby respondents into a single “response
cluster” (mean=13.07 respondents per cluster ) and assigned each respondent the same latitude
and longitude. Further, they displaced the exact location of each latitude and longitude cluster be-
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measure wealth, state capacity, and Islamic conservatism. I also compiled an spa-
tial dataset of the Brotherhood’s protest activity as a proxy measurement of the
group’s membership density. Each discussion of the specific variables also high-
lights the associated theory’s prediction of the relationship that should appear in
the spatial analysis.
Wealth
To capture wealth levels, the DHS administrators produced a multi-component
index of household wealth based on a variety of household goods for each re-
spondent. The index was divided into quintiles, with one being the poorest and
five being the wealthiest (this measure produced the scatterplot of district wealth
in chapter one). The above theories focusing on how Islamic precepts of charity
drive social service provision make the following prediction:
• Hypothesis: There should exist a correlation between poor areas and the locations of
Brotherhood social service initiatives
State Capacity
As a proxy measure of state capacity, I rely on the above-mentioned DHS to gen-
erate a statistic of the percentage of unattended births in the district (i.e. those
in which a medical professional was not present). The basic premise of the the-
ories, especially the explicitly Gramscian version, suggest that the Brotherhood
should concentrate their activism where state infrastructure is weak, and avoid
areas where the state is strong:
tween 2km (urban clusters) and 5km (rural clusters) to further ensure respondents’ confidentiality.
Because this was done randomly (by DHS), there is little evidence of systematic bias.
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• Hypothesis: There should exist a correlation between areas with a high percentage
of unattended births and the locations of Brotherhood social service initiatives
Religiosity
To capture the prevalence of conservative beliefs among Muslims, I identify all
Muslim female respondents in the DHS survey who agree that female genital
mutilation is a religious obligation (this measure produced the scatterplot of reli-
giosity in chapter one). While this measure is imperfect, it must be judged against
the lack of comparably-useful subnational data on religiosity.14 If these facilities
do produce a potent ideological shift among their clientele, this should be de-
tectable in the data:
• Hypothesis: There should exist a correlation between areas with a high percentage
of conservative Muslims and the locations of Brotherhood social service initiatives
Membership Density
In addition to data drawn from DHS, I also assemble a new proxy measure of
subnational variation in Brotherhood membership density. Specifically, following
the July 3, 2013 military coup the Muslim Brotherhood embarked on a strategy
of sustained street protest (demonstrations, human chains, and sit-ins) (Ketch-
ley 2013). I geocoded a list of 1067 Friday anti-coup/pro-Brotherhood protests
across Egypt from July to December 2014 collected by the www.coupmonitor.com
14Clark (2004, 46) argues that Islamic clinics appear in areas with a high percentage of Chris-
tians. Using a district-level measure of sectarian balance (percentage of Muslim respondents) I
find no support for this argument. I do not include these results in Table 3.1 because this measure
and the above-described measure of Islamic conservatism are highly collinear. For these results,
please contact me directly.
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website.15 If theories linking Islamist social service provision to recruitment and
high-risk activism are correct, this variable should capture the relationship.
• Hypothesis: There should exist a correlation between areas with a high density of
pro-Brotherhood protests and the locations of Brotherhood social service initiatives
Table 3.1 includes three models. For all, the dependent variable is the presence
(1) or absence (0) of a medical facility in the electoral district.16 This measure
was constructed by using each facility’s specific latitudes and longitudes to locate
each facility across the map of Egypt’s electoral districts. With the coordinates
in hand, ArcGIS’s “spatial join” function again automatically assigned each point
(the facility) to the polygon (electoral district) in which it was located.
Model one includes basic socioeconomic variables, excluding a measure of the
group’s political contestation. Model two introduces additional variables measur-
ing the density of Islamic activist networks in the district (protest activity) as well
as the Brotherhood’s electoral history there (percentage of time a Brotherhood
candidate contested the district). The third model adds a log-transformed vari-
able of registered voters per district to proxy for district size (Rabie and ’Azbawi
2006). Note that the parliamentary directory did not supply voter information
for six districts, dropping the number of observations from 222 to 216 in model
three.17
15Coupmonitor draws the data from Egyptian Arabic-language traditional and social media.
They also supply the links to the source documents.
16Neither a linear regression model with a log-transformed count variable (medical facilities per
district) nor a rare events logit (Tomz, King and Zeng 2003) yields substantively different results.
17Including this measure in model one has no substantive effect.
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Table 3.1: Regression Results, Distribution of Brotherhood Medical Facilities
Presence/Absence of an IMA Facility
(1) (2) (3)
Islamic Conservatism -1.136 -1.966 -1.992
(-0.81) (-1.30) (-1.31)
Wealth 1.397∗∗ 1.133∗ 1.230∗
(3.12) (2.31) (2.40)
Percent Births Unattended 2.771 2.201 2.082
(1.33) (0.98) (0.93)
Brotherhood Political Contestation 3.172∗ 3.040∗
(2.43) (2.26)




Constant -7.041∗∗ -6.633∗∗ -13.59
(-3.20) (-2.92) (-1.32)
Pseudo R2 .1985 .2009 .2069
N 222 222 216
t statistics in parentheses
∗ (p < 0.05), ∗∗ (p < 0.01)
Interpretation
The strongest support for this dissertation’s theory emerges from the positive
correlation between the location of a medical facility and those districts where
the Brotherhood most frequently put forward candidates for Parliament. This
is strong evidence that the group’s political ambitions and social service efforts
ran in tandem. In contrast, the results of these statistical tests yield little sup-
port for alternative hypotheses. The placement of Muslim Brotherhood medical
facilities does not spatially correlate with patterns of Brotherhood recruitment
(measured by pro-Brotherhood protest activity), Islamic conservatism (measured
by religious-based support for female genital mutilation), or areas where the state
is weak (measured by percentage of unattended births).
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Figure 3.3: Predicted Probabilities, Existence of a Brotherhood Medical Facility
We can further interpret the relationship between political contestation and
social service provision by examining the predicted possibilities. Figure 3.3 plots
how an increase in political contestation (specifically the percentage of time a
Brotherhood candidate contests the district) changes the probability that a medical
facility will appear in that district. According to the dataset, the mean percentage
of times a Brotherhood candidate stood for election in a district during the years
1995 - 2010 was 29.79% (min = 0%, max = 100%). As this curve shows, moving
one standard deviation (22.09) around this mean produces an over 300% increase
in the probability of a medical facility appearing in a district, from 3.6% to 12%.
The positive correlation between district wealth and the locations of facilities
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is notable for a number of reasons. Primarily, it confirms the qualitative evidence
from the prior chapter: that the IMA’s founders explicitly designed the organiza-
tion to target those who could pay for the care. The finding also supports Clark’s
conclusion based on a study of Islamic clinics in Cairo, that “Islamic social institu-
tions are run by and for the middle class- this process not only neglects the poor,
it often comes at the expense of the poor” (2004, 4). Yet the correlation with the
Brotherhood’s electoral ambitions adds a critical piece to Clark’s argument: it is
not simply middle class locales, but ones with a history of Brotherhood electoral
contestation that host these facilities.
In terms of hypothesis testing, the positive correlation between wealth and
presence of a facility is “doubly decisive” in the sense that as it confirms one hy-
pothesis it falsifies another (Van Evera 1997, 32). The finding that the wealthier the
district, the more likely it is to host a facility is powerful spatial evidence against
the charitable/ideological hypothesis, which predicts these facilities should serve
the poor. At the same time, the positive correlation supports chapter one’s argu-
ment that Egypt’s authoritarian political economy squeezed political competition
into middle class areas, and that this powerfully influenced the Brotherhood’s
strategy of social service provision.
In addition to testing theories of charity, a further consideration of these facili-
ties’ demonstrated spatial bias towards middle class areas also shows that theories
connecting the Brotherhood’s social service provision to electoral support through
simple clientelism are misguided.18 In other words, a reputation-based theory of
18Ed Husain, “Is The Muslim Brotherhood Bribing Voters in Egypt?” The Arab Street Blog,
November 9, 2011. Available online at: http://blogs.cfr.org/husain/2011/11/09/is-the-muslim-
brotherhood-bribing-voters-in-egypt/. Accessed December 1, 2014; Eric Trager, “The Muslim
Brotherhood Won an Election, but is it Really Democratic?” The New Republic, June 26, 2012. Avail-
able online at: http://www.newrepublic.com/article/104412/eric-trager-muslim-brotherhood-
won-election-it-really-democratic. Accessed December 1, 2014.
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electoral mobilization and an alternative theory of exchange-based clientelistic
linkages would both predict the observed spatial correlation between the social
service facilities and districts with intense Brotherhood political contestation. Yet
they offer opposing predictions about the socioeconomic profile of these locales.
Specifically, clientelist appeals should most strongly target the poor because that
audience offers the greatest “bang for the buck” to a resource-maximizing ma-
chine (Calvo and Murillo 2004, Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast 2006). In-
deed, as chapter one showed, the National Democratic Party was so effective at
executing this very strategy that they forced their competitors to abandon it. The re-
sults in Table 3.1 results refute the clientelist argument by showing how the Broth-
erhood facilities tend to exist in areas that are not normally bastions of clientelist
mobilization.
In contrast, the middle-class emphasis supports the reputational argument. A
number of scholars have discussed how, in less-than-democratic settings, the eco-
nomic security of the middle class effectively allows them to opt-out of clientelist
voting and instead follow their ideological preferences (Masoud 2014a, Chandra
2007, Greene 2007, Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast 2006, Magaloni 2006).
To preview the findings of chapter five, the power of these facilities to drive elec-
toral support for the Brotherhood comes from their ability to signal Brotherhood
candidates’ honesty, competency, and approachability. Put differently, the Broth-
erhood’s social services generate a powerful electoral effect because they work
by changing the preferences of middle class voters, convincing them that the at-
mosphere in the Brotherhood’s social services portends the group’s approach to
governance.
An additional divergence between the charity or clientelism hypotheses and
the theorized reputational mechanism concerns the internal operation of these
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facilities. Simply, if these facilities are engaged in something like charitable provi-
sion, clientelist outreach, or risky participation in movement activism they should
also exhibit some mechanism to discriminate amongst users.
The Business of Islamist Social Service Provision
The risk of an ecological fallacy cautions against drawing conclusions about who
visits these facilities from the above data on where these facilities exist. To help
mitigate this risk, this section introduces interviews with IMA managers and em-
ployees, as well as internal managerial documents, to test additional and finer-
grained empirical implications of the above theories.
Many theories about Islamist groups’ social service provision, from charity, to
clientelism, to recruitment, predict the existence of substantial outside funding,
such as wealthy donors, extensive fundraising, or party-based resources. These
would, in effect, subsidize these facilities and allow them to distribute their ser-
vices without requiring monetary payment. These same theories predict that the
facilities should actively discriminate, either against those who do not support the
Brotherhood politically (as in clientelism), or in favor of those who are part of the
Muslim Brotherhood (as in recruitment). I found little evidence to support either
of these implications. Instead these facilities operate essentially as businesses,
where the vast majority of beneficiaries pay, in cash, for the services they receive
and discrimination is absent.
The prior chapter showed how the IMA is registered as a non-governmental
association under Law 32 of 1964. Yet these facilities essentially function as
for-profit businesses (although the organization does not make a profit from its
facilities- any end-of-the-year surplus is re-invested into the network). The only
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considerable episode of donation-based funding was the campaign to establish
the Islamic Hospital. This was the exception rather than the rule. The vast major-
ity of visitors to IMA facilities pay, in cash, for the services they receive.19 Indeed,
according to an IMA executive, patient fees account for approximately 98% of the
organization’s total budget.20
At IMA facilities common services are not prohibitively expensive: to see ei-
ther a general practitioner or a specialist individuals purchase a ticket upon en-
tering the facility. The prices of these tickets fluctuate somewhat depending on
the socioeconomic area of the hospital, but usually average around three or four
dollars for a generalist. More extensive care, however, entails additional expense.
In these situations, the patient will usually split the outlay between the doctor
and the facility. For instance, for surgeries around 1/2 of the patient’s fee goes to
the hospital while 1/2 goes to the doctor themselves.21 Nearly all facilities also
include an associated pharmacy where commonly prescribed drugs are for sale
at competitive prices.22
As the emphasis on paying customers suggests, the IMA operates cautiously,
ensuring that the area can support a clinic and only later expanding the facility,
purchasing new equipment, or hiring new doctors as the financial means become
available.23 The facilities do provide a degree of charity care, although the poor
must navigate a relatively extensive bureaucracy in order to access it. Most of the
poor patients come pre-referred through an existing mosque, charity organiza-
tion, or wealthy person in the area known for their sponsorship of the poor (Ahl
19All donations are tracked, and individuals who donate receive numbered receipts. Author
interview, IMA Employee G, October 31, 2012.
20Author Interview, IMA Executive A, January 15, 2013.
21Author Interview, IMA Facility Manager A, May 11, 2013; Author Interview, IMA Employee
C, May 9, 2013.
22Author Interview, IMA Employee F, October 31, 2012.
23Author Interview, IMA Employee G, October 31, 2012.
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al-Khayr, lit. “Person of Good”).24 If the poor patient is a walk-in they are still
eligible for reduced prices, but they are first investigated by the specific hospital’s
“public relations” committee to determine whether or not they are truly needy.25
IMA balance sheets for the period 2005- 2011 show how these facilities over-
whelmingly cater to a middle class, paying clientele. For each facility these docu-
ments provide the raw number of “poor” patients who received care. As Figure
3.4 shows, during this period, never more than 5% of patients at the IMA’s medi-
cal facilities fell into this category.
Figure 3.4: Annual Percentage of Poor Patients, 2005-2011

































24Author Interview, IMA Facility Manager D, February 2, 2013; Author Interview, IMA Em-
ployee A, February 2, 2013.
25Author Interview, IMA Employee C, May 9, 2013. Some hospitals reported consistent prob-
lems with patients selling free or subsidized medicine on the black market.
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The IMA’s emphasis on fiscal sustainability is an important antecedent con-
dition to the ability of these facilities to generate such a powerful reputational
effect. The IMA’s solid customer base allows them to pay their staff competi-
tive salaries rather than relying on volunteers (in fact, there are no volunteers in
the IMA network).26 However, as with most other NGO or charitable facilities,
nearly all doctors in the IMA network have “day jobs” in government or private
hospitals. Nurses and technical staff are full-time, however their salaries do tend
to be lower than in private sector facilities.27 Particularly for doctors, these rela-
tively generous salaries generate a high demand for work at the Islamic Medical
Association’s facilities, allowing the IMA to be relatively selective and hire those
medical professionals with the requisite blend of technical and interpersonal skills
to maximize the patient experience.28
Care For All
The IMA’s businesslike operation is not only at odds with the empirical predic-
tions of charity-based theories, it also casts doubt upon clientelist and recruitment-
based arguments. Specifically, if these facilities were engaged some form of clien-
telism, then the Brotherhood should be able to withdraw access if beneficiaries
defect at the ballot box. Likewise, if these facilities were a form of selective
incentives designed to recruit or retain members, then the Brotherhood should
discriminate against non-members (otherwise these facilities exacerbate the free-
rider problem they supposedly solve). The proposed reputational mechanism, in
26Author interview, IMA Executive A, January 23, 2013.
27Ahmed Hasan, “Azza Musa: Uqadim Mumarida Tahki Tajribataha ma’a al-Gam’iyya al-
Tibiyya al-Islamiyya (Azza Musa: A Nurse Discusses her Experiences with the Islamic Medical
Association),” al-Hikma, December 2012, p. 21.
28Author Interview, IMA Employee D, May 11 2013.
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contrast, generates precisely the opposite prediction: discrimination of any type
would directly contradict the ability of these facilities to signal compassion and
approachability.
While it is possible that managers, doctors, and staff were able to conceal their
discrimination either in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood or against the group’s
political opponents, I found no evidence of these practices at the Islamic Med-
ical Association facilities. In the historical record, IMA founder al-Malt repeat-
edly noted that the IMA would never discriminate. In one interview, he drew
parallels between the IMA’s mission and that of the Brotherhood’s treatment of
Jews wounded in fighting at Ramla and Ramallah during the 1948 Palestine War
(al Malt 1993, 178).29 The Islamic Charity Hospital, he told readers of al-Da’wa,
“is open to every sick person regardless of color, nationality, or denomination.”30
The IMA’s credo was prominently posted in each facility I visited: “To draw
closer to God the Almighty through medical work...with compassion for the pa-
tient without respect to his ability to pay, social status, type of disease, without
discriminating on the basis of color, nationality, or religion (Shamakh 2011, 86).”31
In interviews, doctors and managers not only rejected the idea of discrimination,
but visibly bristled when asked about it. As one of the IMA’s executives claimed,
“we give care to all the people, the services of the Islamic Medical Association are
for all. Its not about whether you are a Christian or Muslim; a Muslim Brother
29For al-Malt’s personal history in this conflict, see Reda Abdel Wodood, “Safahat Khalida min
Hayat al-Tabeeb al-Mujahed Doctor Ahmed al-Malt, (Immortal Pages from the Life of the Mujahid
Doctor, Dr. Ahmed al-Malt),” al-Hikma, No. 18 (July 2012), p. 26.
30Ahmed al-Malt, “Nidaa’ Illa al-Muslimeen: Mashrou’ al-Mistashfa al-Islami (Call to the Mus-
lims: The Islamic Hospital Project),” al-Da’wa, No. 47 (March 1980), p. 63. See also ‘Tassawulat
Hawal: al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya (Questions about the Islamic Medical Association),”
al-Da’wa, No. 29 (October 1978), p. 42.
31See also the short video, “Muqaddimat al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya (Introduc-
ing the Islamic Medical Association),” N.D. (Uploaded February 3, 2013). Available online
at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6PKj51Kgt-I&feature=youtube_gdata. Accessed May 1,
2013.
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or not a Muslim Brother.”32 Mohi al-Din al-Zeit, director of the Central Charity
Hospital, explained that “yes we are Muslim Brothers, but here I am a physician.
I remove any political affiliation...the patient here is a human being, and I am a
physician. There is no political orientation or social class.”33
The IMA’s internal promotional materials drive home this theme. The car-
toon reproduced in Figure 3.5 is from the Islamic Medical Association’s pamphlet
series, this one discussing the idea of justice or fairness (’adl) in a medical setting.
Figure 3.5: Cartoon, Islamic Medical Association Pamphlet
The text at the top reproduces the organization’s credo of non-discrimination:
“providing medical services at a high level, without discriminating agains the
patient based on creed, nationality, race, or (social, economic, or cultural) class,
this is the mission of the IMA.” The cartoon itself drives home the point. The
32Author Interview, IMA Executive A, January 15, 2013.
33Author Interview, January 19, 2013.
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patient is heartily thanking the medical staff (“thanks a million!”), while the nurse
asks the doctor “what’s with all the attention you’ve paid to Mr. George (Girgis)
the bawwab (doorman)? Is he a friend of someone important?” The ostensibly
Muslim doctor replies “This is what Islam means by justice.” The cartoon is
making the point that the Mr. George is an unlikely character to receive such
attention from the doctor: he is both poor (judging by his profession and his
patched clothes) and Christian (judging by his name and the fact that his wife’s
hair is uncovered). This explains the nurse’s suspicion that the doctor treated the
man only because someone important called in a favor.
In fact, the only data that potentially supports the discrimination hypothesis
came from examining copies of the Muslim Brotherhood’s newspapers from the
pre-World War II period. In some issues from the mid-1930’s a doctor (“Ibrahim
Abu Sunnah”) advertised a 50% discount for members of the Brotherhood at his
clinic.34 Even in these cases it is not clear that the effort is anything more than
one doctor’s marketing strategy. Dessouki and al-Abadi open their discussion
of the founding of the Brotherhood’s medical section in 1944 by mentioning that
“therefore the Brotherhood decided to establish a general charity clinic, opening
their doors to all trends of society (kul tawa’if al-sha’b) (2013, 19). Likewise, in his
valuable account of the Brotherhood’s social service activity during the pre-war
period, Zaki specifically dispels the rumor that these facilities discriminate: “It
is worth mentioning that every one of these facilities is for all, Egyptians and
foreigners, Muslim and non-Muslim. One should not think that these are services
for the Brotherhood only” (1980, 216).
The above section’s interviews, observations, and administrative documents
34See, for instance, Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, February 28, 1935, p. 15 and Jaridat al-Ikhwan
al-Muslimeen, May 21, 1935, p. 39.
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all contradict arguments that the Brotherhood’s social service provision is a strat-
egy of charity, ideological transformation, clientelist mobilization, or recruitment.
Instead, balance sheets from the facilities and interviews with staff establish that
these facilities function primarily on a business model, in which nearly all bene-
ficiaries pay, in cash, for the services they receive. Cash payment allows the facil-
ities to offer competitive salaries that attract technically competent and dedicated
employees. It also incentivizes the IMA to provide high-quality care to remain
competitive against alternative for-profit providers. Second, as the focus on fiscal
sustainability suggests, there is no evidence of discrimination at these facilities.
Instead, the IMA keeps these facilities open to all, ensuring the widest possible
exposure to the Brotherhood’s politically potent message of honesty, capability,
and approachability.
Conclusion
Under Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian regime, the Brotherhood’s extension or
withholding of social service provision was embedded in broader strategies of
electoral contestation. Original spatial data, including a comprehensive nation-
wide dataset of IMA facilities, demonstrates that the Muslim Brotherhood’s facil-
ities were most likely to exist in those middle class districts where Brotherhood
candidates competed in elections for Egypt’s lower house of parliament. In con-
trast, these data do not support alternative theories positing that motivations of
charity, recruitment and mobilization, Islamization, or revolutionary subversion
drives the Muslim Brotherhood’s provision of social services.
Qualitative evidence, including interviews with managers and internal docu-
ments reveal how these facilities effectively function as businesses. In fact, for the
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years 2005-2011, less than 5% of the visitors to these facilities were poor. Not only
does these facilities’ middle class bias refute hypotheses of charitable provision,
the emphasis on providing non-discriminatory services for paying customers re-
pudiates theories of both clientelist exchange and recruitment. Instead, these
facilities’ prioritization of a middle class customer base incentivizes them to pro-
vide consistent, capable, and technically adept care- a politically powerful image
that redounds to the Brotherhood’s benefit at election time.
Although these facilities operate on a business model, as the spatial correla-
tion with electoral districts shows how they are far more than simple for-profit
ventures. The next chapter examines how the Muslim Brotherhood integrated
these facilities into their strategies of electoral outreach, and how these facilities
produced notable on-the-ground effects on patterns of political mobilization. In
other words, this chapter has demonstrated that the Brotherhood’s deployment of
social services is a political strategy. The next chapter reveals how this provision




Two empirical implications follow from the finding that the spatial distribution
of the Muslim Brotherhood’s social services is consistent with a logic of electoral
mobilization. First, linkages should exist between candidates and the facilities in
these districts. As the chapter’s first sections show, during periods of both autoc-
racy and democracy, many of the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidates in districts
with IMA facilities were linked to those facilities- as manager, employee, funder,
or founder. Second, if these facilities contribute to the Muslim Brotherhood’s
electoral success, then neighborhoods with an IMA facility should support Broth-
erhood candidates at higher rates than neighborhoods without. By overlaying
geolocated ballot-box data for the 2012 presidential election between Mohammed
Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq with the location of IMA facilities, the chapter’s final
sections reveal the local effect of social service provision on the Muslim Brother-
hood’s political fortunes.
Whereas the preceding chapter explicitly tested the theory against alternatives,
this chapter is focused on satisfying empirical implications that follow from the
finding that the Brotherhood’s social services emerge in electorally-competitive
districts. Put differently, the chapter is a “plausibility probe," an “attempt to
establish that a theoretical construct is worth considering at all, that is, that an ap-
parent empirical instance of it can be found" (Eckstein 1992, 148), (King, Keohane
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and Verba 1994, 17-18). While the chapter does not, on its own, rule out alter-
native explanations for the Brotherhood’s social service provision, in the context
of the prior chapter’s analysis it increases confidence in the argument connecting
the Brotherhood’s provision of social services to a broader strategy of electoral
mobilization.
Linkages Between Candidates and Medical Facilities
From Anwar El-Sadat’s re-establishment of limited multiparty political competi-
tion in 1976 to the February 2011 fall of Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood
fielded nearly six hundred candidates for Egypt’s lower house parliamentary elec-
tions.1 While these candidates won (or lost) for a variety of reasons, one implica-
tion of the prior chapter’s finding that social service provision is connected to po-
litical mobilization is that there should exist linkages between the Brotherhood’s
candidates and the IMA facilities in the districts which they contested.
In the 1980s a number of Muslim Brotherhood candidates played critical roles
in the IMA. For instance, the Imam of the Sayyida Zeinab mosque in Cairo, Mo-
hammed Metrawi, helped establish the IMA’s clinic at that mosque, and would
later emerge as a powerful member of the Brotherhood’s parliamentary bloc (Hilal
1987, 172).2 Former IMA president Lutfi Shahwan ran in Sharqiyya’s first district
in the 1987 elections at the top of the Islamic Alliance’s list.3 Essam el-Erian and
Helmi el-Gazar, prominent early members of the IMA, ran for seats in Giza in the
1Appendix A covers this history in detail.
2Mohi al-Deen al-Zeit, “Rajal Min al-Khalideen bil-Amalu (An Immortal Man through His
Work),” Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at: http://goo.gl/SNDmUv. Accessed January 27,
2014.
3“al-Murshid al-’Aam Ya’ani Dr. Lutfi Shahwan (The General Guide Mourns
Dr. Lutfi Shahwan),” Ikhwanonline, August 7, 2008. Available online at:
http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?ArtID=30863&SecID=0. Accessed June 1,
2015. See also Masoud (2014a, 77).
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Figure 4.1: Establishment of the Salaheddine Hospital, 1983 (Ikhwanwiki)
1987 elections.4 Figure 4.1 shows the 1983 founding of the Salaheddine Hospital
in Khanka, in Qaloubiyya governorate. Pictured is the IMA’s founder, Ahmed al-
Malt (sitting in the middle, leaning forward) and, seated to his left is Ezz al-Arab
Fouad, who would in 1987 would be elected to parliament from the district in
which the Salaheddine Hospital was being built.5
Turning to the period 1995-2010, many of the Muslim Brotherhood’s candi-
dates for office were prominently linked to IMA facilities. In the Delta they in-
cluded Gamal Heshmat, the longtime Brotherhood parliamentarian from Beheira,
who not only served on the IMA’s national board of directors, he also presided
over the board of directors of the IMA’s Dar El-Salaam hospital in his district.6
Four-time Muslim Brotherhood candidate Ashraf Badr al-Din, from Menoufiyya,
4El-Erian won, el-Gazar lost. See “Isma’ al-Murashaheen ’ala Qawaim Hizb al-Amal, (Names
of Candidates on the Labor Party’s List),” al-Sha’b, March 10, 1987, pg. 7.
5Picture from Ikhwanwiki, available online at: http://goo.gl/YEbxlp. Accessed July 12, 2015.
Other Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarians in the picture include Gamal Heshmat, who would
be elected multiple times from Beheira (the speaker, standing) and AbdelMoneim Abu El-Fotouh,
who ran in Cairo in 1995 (sitting to Malt’s immediate right).
6Campaign Biography of Mohammed Gamal Heshmat, 2000 elections. Available online at:
http://albehira2000.faithweb.com/Pages/heshmat.htm. Accessed October 23, 2014.
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was founder, member of the board of directors, and past president of the Mowasah
Association, in addition to being the “founder of the Mowasah hospital."7 Mo-
hammed Ali Bishr, who ran for parliament in 2005, had also been president of the
Mowasah Association.8 Abdelfattah Hassan Mahmoud, the Brotherhood’s deputy
for 2005-2010 from the Qaloubiyya district of Shibin al-Qanatir, noted how he
“offered a week of free medical care for the needy in collaboration with Rahma
Hospital (located in that district)."9 In 1995 (and again after the fall of Mubarak)
Hesham al-Souli contested elections for the Brotherhood in Ismailiyya, where he
worked as director of the al-Amal charity hospital.10 In the upper Egyptian gover-
norate of Assiut, Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Abdel Raziq touted his role
as “one of the founders the Abu al-Nasr Charity Hospital."11
The linkages were also dense in the Cairo-Giza metropolis. Abdel Moneim
Dahrouj helped establish the IMA’s Tawba Hospital in the same Cairo district
where he ran in 2005.12 Longtime Brotherhood candidate Hazem Farouq, from
the central Cairo district of al-Sahel, is a member of the board of directors of
the Gamiyat Sharif (Sharif Association). The Sharif Association owns the building
7"Muhandis Ashraf Badr al-Din: Faris Lagnat al-Mowazanah bi al-Barliman al-Masri (Engineer
Ashraf Badr al-Din, A Knight of the Budget Committee in the Egyptian Parliament), Facebook,
October 5, 2010. Available online at: https://goo.gl/u3Y1UK. Accessed October 23, 2014.
8Campaign biography available at: http://www.ikhwanonline.net/data/baralman2005/
ikhwan3.htm. Accessed March 22, 2014. Bishr was also the group’s candidate in 1987 (Siyam 2006,
106).
9An archived copy of the announcement is available here: http://goo.gl/OyhXU1. Accessed
October 22, 2014.
10“Ta’aruf ’ala Dr. Hisham al-Souli, Murash al-Hurriya wa al’Adala Fardi
(Get to Know Dr. Hisham al-Souli, Freedom and Justice Party Candidate for
the Individual Seat),” Ismailiyya Online, November 19, 2011. Available online at:
https://www.facebook.com/freedom.justice.ismailia/posts/319474861414439. Accessed Oc-
tober 22, 2014.
11“al-Marhala al-Ula (Stage One),” Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at http://goo.gl/sDqMbe.
Accessed March 23, 2014.
12“al-Marhala al-Ula (Stage One),” Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at http://goo.gl/sDqMbe.
Accessed March 23, 2014.
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housing the Adel hospital in his district.13 As one IMA employee put it, “Adel
Hospital is affiliated to both the IMA and the Gamiyat Sharif."14 Mohammed Man-
sour al-Sayyid, who ran in the Cairo district of Ma’adi, noted how he “helps
poor patients through an agreement with al-Farouq hospital."15 In the south Cairo
district of Helwan, al-Mohammedi Abdel Maqsoud was also president of the as-
sociation “that established the Hadi Charitable hospital."16 Across the Nile in Giza,
Abu Eila Qarni stood for parliament in al-Hawamdiyya in 1995 and 2000, during
which time he was the director of the IMA’s hospital in that district (he was also
that hospital’s founder).17
Other Muslim Brotherhood candidates highlighted their ties to the IMA in
their campaign biographies. Mohammed el-Beltagy, the high-profile Brotherhood
parliamentarian from Shubra al-Kheima in Qaloubiyya, is a former manager of
13“al-Marhala al-Ula (Stage One),” Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at http://goo.gl/sDqMbe.
Accessed March 23, 2014.
14Author interview, IMA Facility Manager D, Feb. 2, 2013.
15“al-Marhala al-Ula (Stage One),” Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at http://goo.gl/sDqMbe.
Accessed March 23, 2014.
16“al-Marhala al-Ula (Stage One),” Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at http://goo.gl/sDqMbe.
Accessed March 23, 2014.
17Ahmed Hasan, “al-Doctor Abu Eila Qarni...Rihla ’Ataa’ ma’a Mistashfa al-Hawamdiyya (Doc-
tor Abu Eila Qarni...A Voyage of Giving with the Hawamdiyya Hospital)," al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya
al-Islamiyya, December 27, 2014. Available online at: http://ima-egy.net/media-assembly/596-
2014-12-27-00-15-09. Accessed October 21, 2014. Another member of the Qarni family, Jamal,
won the 2005 elections as the Brotherhood’s candidate in that district, helped along by Abu
Eila’s campaigning on his behalf (Jamal would contest, but lose, the 2010 elections). See Yasir
Hadi, “Abu Eila Qarni Yida’u li-Intikhab Dr. Jamal bil-Hawamdiyya (Abu Eila Qarni Campaigns
for the Election of Dr. Jamal (Qarni) in Hawamdiyya),” Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at:
http://goo.gl/qmo6cF. Accessed October 21, 2014; Shaima Galal, “al-Na’ib Jamal Qarni...Khidmat
ma’a al-Dawr al-Riqabi wa al-Tashre’ae (Parliamentary Deputy Jamal Qarni...Services along
with a Legislative and Oversight Role),” Ikhwanonline, October 24, 2010. Available online at:
http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?ArtID=72655&SecID=0. Accessed October 21,
2014.
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one of the IMA’s hospitals.18 Likewise, candidates in Alexandria,19 Dakhiliyya,20
Sharqiyya,21 and Cairo22 prominently mentioned in their campaign biographies
ties to the IMA.
The collapse of Mubarak’s regime in February 2011 further opened Egypt’s
political spaces to the IMA. Not only did many of the hospitals which had re-
mained closed since the late 2010 wave of repression finally re-open, the IMA
quickly signed a roughly one million EGP contract to advertise the organization’s
facilities on billboards, newspapers, and placards.23 As parliamentary elections
approached in the fall of 2011, more Brotherhood candidates began to adver-
tise their linkages with the IMA. These included Mubarak-era politicians such as
Hazem Farouq, Gamal Heshmat, Mohammed el-Beltagy, Hesham al-Souli, and
Amir Bassem. Brotherhood politicians-cum-IMA figures who had cut their teeth
in the 1980s also re-entered electoral politics, including Essam El-Erian in Giza’s
first district24 and Helmi al-Gazar in Giza’s second. Gazar’s campaign biogra-
phy specifically trumpeted his role as “one of the pillars of the Islamic Medical
18Information Page, Official Facebook page of Mohamed Elbeltagy. Available online at:
https://www.facebook.com/dr.mohamed.albeltagy/info?tab=page_info. Accessed October 20,
2014.
19Hamdi Hassan- see “Ta’aruf ’ala Murashahi Hizb al-Huriya wa al-’Adala bil-Iskandariyya-
al-Maqaid al-Fardi (Get to Know the Freedom and Justice Party’s Candidiates in
Alexandria- the Individual Seats),” Amal al-Umma, October 19, 2011. Available online at:
http://amlalommah.net/new/index.php?mod=article&id=21780. Accessed October 21, 2014.
20Khaled al-Deeb- see“Murashahu Hizb al-Hurriya wa al-’Adala al-Maqaid al-Fardiyya
bi-Muhafizat al-Dakhiliyya (The Freedom and Justice Party’s Candidates for Individ-
ual Seats in the Dakhiliyya Governorate),” Dakhalia Ikhwan, N.D. Available online at:
http://www.dakahliaikhwan.com/viewarticle.php?id=10921. Accessed October 21, 2014.
21Amir Bassem- see the Official Facebook Page of the Freedom and Jus-
tice Party in Sharqiyya Governorate, Nov. 15, 2011. Available online at:
https://www.facebook.com/fjpartysharkia/posts/201539526590883. Accessed October 23,
2014.
22Gamal Abdelsalem- see“al-Marhala al-Ula (Stage One),” Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at
http://goo.gl/sDqMbe. Accessed March 23, 2014.
23Author interview, IMA Executive A, May 14, 2013.
24http://www.imaegy.com/l3.php?id=29. Accessed October 23, 2014.
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Association in Giza.”25 Ali Ezz al-Deen topped the Brotherhood’s lists in Assiut
district one, where his biography identified him as the founder of IMA operations
in Assiut (home to the Abu al-Nasr Hospital).26 During the campaign the Broth-
erhood and the IMA also combined to host campaign events, and co-sponsored
“medical caravans" set up shop at IMA facilities across the country, including in
Giza,27 Ismailiyya,28 and Helwan.29
The politicization reached its apex during the Brotherhood’s massive “To-
gether we Build Egypt" social service campaign in early 2013.30 During the six-
month long campaign, IMA hospitals and specialized clinics in Giza,31 Helwan,32
25“Murashihi Shamal Giza: Qa’ima, Ramz al-Mizan (List Candidates for Northern Giza, Symbol
Scale),” Official Facebook Page of the Freedom and Justice Party in Northern Giza, Available on-
line at: https://www.facebook.com/fjpartynorthgiza/app_137783739663564. Accessed October
23, 2014.
26“Ali Ezz al-Deen,” Official Facebook Page of Mu’ataqil Hurriya- Assiut, September 13, 2014.
Available online at: http://goo.gl/ZdzqlK. Accessed October 20, 2014.
27Image available online at: http://goo.gl/Eu2Cd0. Accessed October 22, 2014.
28“Ikhwan al-Ismailiyya Yunazimun al-Qafela al-Tibiyya al-Ashira al-Juma’a al-Qadim bi-
Masjid al-Salaam (The Muslim Brotherhood in Ismailiyya Organizes a Medical Caravan the
Coming Friday at the Salam Mosque)," Ismailiyyaonline, May 23, 2011. Available online at:
http://www.ikhwanismailia.com/ismailia/13971.html. Accessed October 22, 2014.
29Announcement on Facebook at: https://goo.gl/KDYd40. Accessed October 22, 2014.
30Nouran El-Behairy, “Brotherhood Launches National Campaign," Daily News Egypt, Jan-
uary 22, 2013. Available online at: http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/01/22/brotherhood-
launches-national-campaign/. Accessed November 29, 2013.
31Syed Atef al-Jiyar, “Qafela Tibiyya Li-Hurriya wa al-’Adala bil-Badrashin bil-Ta’awun ma’a
al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya (Freedom and Justice Party Medical Caravan in Badrashin in
Collaboration with the Islamic Medical Association)," al-Badrashin al-Youm, N.D. (2013), Available
online at: http://www.albadrashinalyoum.com/details-2273.html. Accessed November 29, 2013.
32See Mohammed Salim, “Markaz ’al-Shahid’ Yualij 400 Marid wa 75 Yatim bi-Qafela Arab
Ghoneim wa al-Manshia bi-Helwan (The Shahid Center Treats 400 Illnesses and 75 Needy Patients
in a Caravan in Arab Ghoneim and the Settlements in Helwan)," al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya,
June 11, 2013. Available online at http://www.imaegy.com/l3.php?id=341. Accessed November
28, 2013.; Mohammed Amin, “Faelat Wasia li-Hamlat ’Ma’an Nabni Misr’ bi Janoub al-Qahira, (A
Wide Range of Together We Build Egypt Activities in South Cairo)," Ikhwanonline, February 2, 2013.
Available online at: http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.aspx?ArtID=137132&SecID=230. Ac-
cessed November 29, 2013.
122
Menoufiyya,33 and elsewhere34 organized open treatment days and awareness-
raising campaigns. And just as in the earlier parliamentary election campaign it
was difficult to disentangle whether or not the medical care was being offered
by a social service organization or a political party. In Qaloubiyya the IMA and
the Brotherhood provided a joint medical caravan under the auspices of Ezzat al-
Melihi, “a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the founders of the Freedom
and Justice Party in Qalubiyya Governorate, and Director of the Islamic Medical
Association in Shibin al-Kom."35 The Brotherhood set up a similar caravan at the
Salaheddine hospital, where the director of that facility moonlighted as a member
of the Brotherhood’s elections committee in the district.36 As Figure 4.2 shows,
there was very little effort to distance (both literally and figuratively) the IMA’s
facilities from the Muslim Brotherhood’s political ambitions. The large yellow
sign identifies the hospital, while the smaller blue banner underneath announces
a joint Muslim Brotherhood- Freedom and Justice Party medical caravan.
33Reda Abdel Wudud, “Mistashfa al-Mowasah bi Shibin al-Kom Yunazim Qafela Tibiyya fi
Itar Hamlat ’Ma’an Nabni Misr’ (The Mowasah Hospital in Shibin al-Kom Organizes a Medical
Caravan Under the Auspices of the ’Together we Build Egypt’ Campaign)," al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-
Islamiyya, March 12, 2013. Available online at: http://www.imaegy.com/l3.php?id=164. Accessed
November 30, 2013.
34Coverage on Facebook at: http://goo.gl/ABzi8b. Accessed November 29, 2013; Syed Zaki,
“Rabitat ’al-Anf wa al-Izn’ Tunazim Qafela Tukhassusa bi-Samnoud (The Ear and Nose Section
Organizes a Specialized Caravan in Samnoud)," al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya, May 13, 2013.
Available online at: http://www.imaegy.com/l3.php?id=307. Accessed December 1, 2013.
35Mahmoud Shanqir, “1200 Halat Kushif wa 44 ’Amaliyat fi Qafela al-Hurriya wa al-Adala
bi Shibin al-Qanatir (1200 Cases Examined and 44 Surgeries in a FJP Caravan in Shibin al-
Qanatir)," Hizb al-Hurriya wa al-’Adala, June 24, 2013. Available online at: http://www.fj-
p.com/ar_print.aspx?print_ID=16161. Accessed November 29, 2013. See also Syed Zaki, “Qafela
’al-Rahma’ Tualij 600 Marid wa Tajri 8 ’Amaliyyat bil-Qaloubiyya (Caravan at al-Rahma Heals 600
Sick Patients and Carries Out 8 Operations)," al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya, April 23, 2013.
Available online at http://ima-egy.net/branche/197-600-8. Accessed November 29, 2013.
36See the event flyer at https://www.facebook.com/FJParty.AbuZaabal/posts/148660765315439
and https://goo.gl/gtobKg. Accessed December 5, 2013. See also “Ikhwan al-Qaloubiyya Yu-
nazemoun Hamlat Tawaiya wa Qawafel Tibiyya bi Anwan ’Ma’an Nabni Misr (The Brotherhood
in Qaloubiyya (governorate) Organize Awareness Campaigns and Medical Caravans Under the
Slogan ’Together We Build Egypt)’, al-Youm al-Sabea’, January 25, 2013. Available online at:
http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=921114&#.U3tkZ1hdXlo. Accessed November 28,
2013.
123
Figure 4.2: Tawba Hospital, Cairo (Hospital Photo)
In some places the politicization became extreme, as facilities veered from pas-
sively displaying campaign materials to actively conditioning services on visitors’
political allegiances. From the IMA’s point of view, this was dangerous not only
because it put their legal status as an NGO in jeopardy, but also for the way it
could quickly erode the goodwill the organization had spent decades amassing.
Officials at the headquarters in Cairo tried to keep their subordinates in line. In
one letter they reprimanded the director of one of their hospitals in the Delta for
excessive campaigning on the job. “We do not provide any support to any party
or trend or person” it reads, “and we deal respectfully with all of them.”37
In the abstract, it may be unsurprising that candidates for political office would
trumpet their affiliations and achievements, or that a political party would use its
social activities to gain an edge over its competitors. Yet certain alternative hy-
37Letter dated April 26, 2012. Copy in author’s possession.
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potheses would not predict this finding. Bayat, for example, tells us that “Islamic
associations were not places for Islamist political mobilization; they simply acted
as service organizations” (2007a, 44). Similarly, it becomes difficult to square argu-
ments that these facilities serve as a type of Gramscian strategy to alienate citizens
from state institutions with the evidence that the Brotherhood uses these facilities
to encourage participation in existing electoral institutions.
Instead, the multitude of ties between these facilities and the Brotherhood’s
candidates shows how thin and porous was the membrane separating the Broth-
erhood’s political ambitions from their efforts to deliver social services. As for-
mer Muslim Brotherhood leader and past IMA president Abdul Moneim Abu
el-Fotouh explained, “in the end, the man who is offering the (charity) service
for the Muslim Brotherhood...he is the same person who comes through with the
election propaganda to ask for votes. This is what happens, whether (the politi-
cization) its intended or not."38 Or, as another ex-member of the Brotherhood put
it, “in my hometown, when the Brotherhood wants to transport people from their
houses to the polling stations, they are going through the people who know (the
neighborhood) from their charity work."39
Social Service Provision in Egypt’s 2012 Presidential Elections
Campaigning for Egypt’s first competitive presidential election began in the spring
of 2012 with a crowded field of competitors. Following two days of voting the
Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohammed Morsi, led with 24.78% of the vote. Ahmed
Shafiq, Mubarak’s last Prime Minister, was close on his heels with 23.66% support.
Because no candidate had obtained 50% of the vote, Morsi and Shafiq headed to
38Author interview, January 23, 2013.
39Author interview, Abdelrahman Ayyash, September 12, 2012.
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a two-man nationwide runoff. On June 16th and 17th Egyptians again headed to
the polls, sending Mohammed Morsi to the Presidential Palace by a slight 51.7%
to 48.3% margin.
The politicization of the IMA’s facilities continued during the presidential cam-
paign. During my own fieldwork (which began a few months after the election’s
second round concluded) I repeatedly noted posters and other campaign mate-
rials for Mohammed Morsi displayed prominently both inside and outside the
facilities. For instance, at the Tawba hospital, located in the Northern Cairo dis-
trict of Kobri al-’Ubbah, layers of campaign posters advertising the Freedom and
Justice party’s candidates in recent elections covered the facility’s walls. Avoid-
ing the campaign materials inside the hospital was literally impossible: an almost
full-sized sticker or Mohammed Morsi’s face was affixed to the ticket booth’s
window at eye level. The impression was as if patients were buying tickets to the
hospital from Mohammed Morsi himself.
The effect was similar at other facilities. Around the al-’Adel Hospital in North-
ern Cairo, fliers advertising the Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party’s
charitable initiatives were available. In the mosque physically connected to the
hospital a banner advertising a “charity fair" draped over the entrance, and inside
was a bustling market selling discounted food and household appliances.40 As
at the Tawba hospital, it was particularly common to see campaign signs promi-
nently placed around the entrance to the facility, evident to whomever walked
inside. For instance, Figure 4.3 shows twin Mohammed Morsi posters flanking
the entrance of the Abu Nasr hospital in Southern Egypt, while Figure 4.4 shows
40Additionally, posters with the Brotherhood’s logo and slogans plastered the neighborhood’s
walls, including “bina’ la hadm (building, not destroying)," “Uqayyim salatak, tana’eem bil-hayatak
(say your prayers and your life will be blessed)," and “siyam ’ashara ayyam dhu al-hijja (Fast for
ten days during the month of Dhu al-Hijja, an especially auspicious stretch during Ramadan for
performing good deeds and charity.
126
Mohammed Morsi posters adorning the ticket booth of the al-’Adel hospital in
Cairo.
Figure 4.3: Abu Nasr Hospital, Assiut (IMA Photo)
Figure 4.4: al-’Adel Hospital, Cairo (Author Photo)
The way that the Brotherhood enrolled the IMA in their campaigns during
and after the reign of Hosni Mubarak invites questions of the actual impact of
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these facilities on patterns of electoral mobilization. The next section uses micro-
level electoral results from the aforementioned Morsi-Shafiq presidential contest
of 2012 to isolate this effect.
The Electoral Impact of Social Service Provision
Prior studies have relied upon either highly aggregated geographic or highly
disaggregated survey evidence to evaluate the effect of social service provision
on Islamists’ electoral fortunes. For instance, Siyam finds that the three gover-
norates with the highest concentrations of Islamic associations (Cairo, Alexan-
dria, and Giza) sent the majority of Brotherhood members to parliament in the
1984 elections. For the 1987 elections he turns to voting statistics and finds
that the top eight governorates in terms of the largest share of Islamic asso-
ciations (Cairo, Alexandria, Giza, Menoufiyya, Sharqiyya, Minya, Aswan, and
Qaloubiyya) yielded the most seats for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic Al-
liance. From this, he concludes that Islamic associations constitute the Brother-
hood’s “base of support" and that there is a “clear link" between Islamic associa-
tions and the political success of the Islamic trend (2006, 95).
At the individual level, Masoud adduces survey evidence showing that those
who report visiting Islamic associations also find Islamists’ position on economic
redistribution closer to their own. As he puts it, “instead of converting grateful
recipients to the Islamist’s religious agenda, such provision may serve as a com-
municative channel through which Islamists convince voters of their proximity to
their own ideal points on issues of direct, material concern" (2014b, 17-18).
While these studies provide important indicators that social service provision
can drive electoral support, they also leave notable gaps. In Siyam’s case, study-
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ing the outcomes at such a high level of abstraction (Governorates contain mul-
tiple electoral districts, akin to American states) makes it difficult to discern the
causal pathway (and direction) he suggests underlies the correlation. Masoud’s
survey evidence suggests a novel causal pathway connecting service provision to
electoral mobilization, but it is limited in its ability to tell us if this effect actually
produces tangible results at the ballot box. In Counting Islam, Masoud finds mixed
support for the hypothesis connecting Islamists’ organizational density to politi-
cal success and, notably, no evidence that this network helped Mohammed Morsi
(2014a, 168-176). Finally, both Masoud and Siyam rely on Islamic associations to
proxy for Muslim Brotherhood associations, raising the possibility of measurement
error.
The remainder of this chapter navigates between Siyam’s aggregate and Ma-
soud’s individual-level approaches. A neighborhood-level proximity analysis
captures the local effects of Muslim Brotherhood social service provision on elec-
toral mobilization during Egypt’s summer 2012 presidential elections, revealing
the powerful and subtle way that the Brotherhood’s social service networks gen-
erated support for Mohammed Morsi.
Proximity Analysis
This second round contest between Mohammed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq fur-
nishes the data at the core of this analysis. Official voting data for these elections
was released down to the qism, pl. aqsam level, although even these divisions
are highly aggregated.41 I obtained geolocated and voting data for all 1323 ballot
41Cairo governorate, for instance, includes 43 Qism.
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boxes in the Cairo governorate, displayed in Figure 4.5.42 Along with latitude and
longitude data, included with each ballot box are the total number of registered
voters, the total number of votes cast, the number of spoilt (invalid) ballots, and
the respective vote totals for Mohammed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq.
Figure 4.5: Spatial Distribution of Ballot Boxes, Cairo Governorate
Cairo governorate is a particularly prominent case. Not only is it Egypt’s
42Data for four boxes is missing. I greatly appreciate the efforts of Bernard Rougier and Hala
Bayoumi at CEDEJ in Cairo in this task. While the availability of data rather than a disciplined
process of case selection drove the choice of both the geographic unit (Cairo Governorate) and the
specific election (the second round Presidential elections), the potential pitfalls must be judged
against the potential insights to be gained. Primarily, given the difficulty of obtaining data on
Egyptian elections- and the consequent lack of empirically grounded studies of Egyptian political
behavior- this effort proves a notable step forward.
130
largest city and center of political, economic, and cultural influence, but the ma-
jority of the IMA’s medical facilities are located there. Further, it encompasses
neighborhoods of both ostentatious wealth and strikingly poverty, as well as areas
of Islamist political power and historic strongholds of antipathy towards Islamists
(overall, Mohammed Morsi lost Cairo to Ahmed Shafiq by over 11 percentage
points (44.3% to 55.7%).
As an initial inquiry, I overlaid the above maps of ballot boxes in the Cairo
governorate with a map of all 13 Cairo-based IMA facilities that were open dur-
ing the second round runoff between Mohammed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq. The
ArcGIS software package then generated four “buffers" around each medical in-
stitution: at 500, 1000, 2000, and 3000 meters. Figure 4.6 illustrates the process
in the Cairo governorate. In each case, a dark green dot represents the particular
Islamic Medical Association facility, while the dark red dots represent the ballot
boxes. The concentric circles around each dark green dot represent the 500, 1000,
2000, and 3000-meter buffers.
The buffers allow a more precise measurement of how proximity to the Broth-
erhood’s social service institutions affects electoral support for the group. For
each of the four buffer zones I created a dummy variable. If a ballot box fell
within that buffer zone, it received a one. If not, it received a zero. Recall that
each ballot box included information on total registered voters, total ballots cast,
and the totals for Mohammed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq, respectively. This facil-
itate the calculation of three ballot-box level statistics: raw margin (Shafiq total
minus Morsi total) Pro-Mohammed Morsi voteshare (Morsi votes divided by to-
tal cast ballots), and pro-Morsi turnout (Morsi votes divided by total registered
voters).
Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 report the results of t-tests for these statistics- based on
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Figure 4.6: 500, 1000, 2000 and 3000 Meter Buffers, Cairo Governorate
each of the four buffers- for the Cairo governorate.43 One important neighborhood-
level implication of the argument linking these facilities to electoral mobilization
is that ballot boxes in the vicinity of Muslim Brotherhood social service institu-
tions will support Mohammed Morsi to a higher degree than those boxes distal
to the group’s social services.
43Note that the differing number of ballot boxes across the three statistics is due to four ballot
boxes missing statistics on correct ballots.
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Table 4.1: Difference of Means Test: Morsi Margin (Raw Votes), Cairo Governorate
Polling Stations Morsi Margin (Raw Votes) Std. Error.
Inside 500m buffer 108 -56.71 *** 60.53
Outside 500m buffer 1220 -313.75 16.09
Inside 1000m buffer 327 -239.26 † 33.71
Outside 100m buffer 1001 -310.36 17.65
Inside 2000m buffer 628 -300.38 24.43
Outside 2000m buffer 700 -286.09 20.17
Inside 3000m buffer 872 -315.51 20.09
Outside 3000m buffer 456 -249.52 * 24.68
† = t < .10, * = t < .05, ** = t < .01, *** = t < .001
Table 4.2: Difference of Means Test: Pro-Morsi Voteshare (%), Cairo Governorate
Polling Stations Morsi Voteshare Std. Error.
Inside 500m buffer 108 .489 *** .012
Outside 500m buffer 1216 .44 .003
Inside 1000m buffer 326 .453 † .007
Outside 100m buffer 998 .44 1 .003
Inside 2000m buffer 625 .446 .005
Outside 2000m buffer 699 .442 .004
Inside 3000m buffer 869 .442 .004
Outside 3000m buffer 455 .447 .005
† = t < .10, * = t < .05, ** = t < .01, *** = t < .001
Table 4.3: Difference of Means Test: Pro-Morsi Turnout (%), Cairo Governorate
Polling Stations Pro-Morsi Turnout Std. Error.
Inside 500m buffer 108 .259 *** .006
Outside 500m buffer 1220 .228 .002
Inside 1000m buffer 327 .235 † .004
Outside 100m buffer 1001 .229 .002
Inside 2000m buffer 628 .232 .002
Outside 2000m buffer 700 .229 .002
Inside 3000m buffer 872 .23 .002
Outside 3000m buffer 456 .231 .003
† = t < .10, * = t < .05, ** = t < .01, *** = t < .001
The above results indicate that, in the second round presidential run-offs,
neighborhoods hosting one of the IMA’s medical facilities offered electoral sup-
port to Mohammed Morsi at higher levels than neighborhoods without. Although
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Morsi lost Cairo governorate overall, the margin was much tighter the closer one
moved to a Brotherhood social service institution. For instance, moving inside
the 500m buffer dropped Ahmed Shafiq’s margin of victory an average of 257
votes, an over 80% jump for Mohammed Morsi. Other measures of turnout and
voteshare produced similar results.
There is also strong support for a corollary to the above hypothesis: that the
rate of electoral support is spatially contingent. In all three measures of electoral
support (raw margin, voteshare, and turnout) the strength of the relationship
decays the further one moves away from the Brotherhood’s social service institu-
tions. For all three statistics, the relationship drops from positive and exception-
ally strong to statistically insignificant.
The Brotherhood’s social service provision generates a considerable effect at
the polls on election day. In fact, it is likely that the above analysis of Egypt’s
second-round presidential voting underestimates the electoral effect of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood’s social service network. The Morsi-Shafiq contest was highly
ideological and particularly polarized, framed as a choice between the secular
remnants of the old regime and the Brotherhood’s new Islamic order. In con-
trast, local and parliamentary elections usually turn on relatively more mundane
concerns such as service delivery or personal relationships with the candidates.
That the Brotherhood’s social service provision was able to produce an effect even
when conditions were most difficult speaks to this network’s power to affect electoral
outcomes.
The fact that proximity to the Brotherhood’s social services increased the Mo-
hammed Morsi’s voteshare by around 5% may seem trivial. Yet in a presidential
election where Morsi won by a mere 3.4% margin nationally, it may not be a
stretch to say that the Brotherhood’s social services- of which the IMA are but
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a part- were the deciding factor that put Mohammed Morsi, rather than Ahmed
Shafiq, in Egypt’s presidential palace.
Conclusion
During the Mubarak era and afterwards the Muslim Brotherhood reaped political
gains by serving local communities. And rather than a passive accumulation of
goodwill, the campaign materials of the Brotherhood’s candidates vividly demon-
strated how thin was the membrane separating the Brotherhood’s social service
efforts from their political ambitions. Not only did the Brotherhood put forward
candidates in districts where they had social service enterprises, those candidates
frequently highlighted their ties with these facilities, either as manager, employee,
founder, or member.
During Egypt’s first democratic presidential election many of these facilities
posted campaign materials supporting Mohammed Morsi both inside and outside
the facilities. Further, an analysis of local voting in this election showed how
proximity to these facilities was a powerful predictor of vote share, turnout, and
margin of victory in favor of Mohammed Morsi. On its own, the inability to
control for potentially confounding variables would caution against reading too
far into the results of the proximity analysis. Yet in conjunction with the prior
chapter, this is notable evidence that these facilities are producing the electoral
effect that the macro-level theory predicts.
Further, the empirical support for a local implication of the macro-level theory
helps mitigate concerns that an ecological fallacy is driving the results. In other
words, the visible ties between candidates and facilities, as well as the fact that
ballot boxes proximate to the Brotherhood’s social service facilities supported the
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group’s candidates at higher levels than distal ones is an expected implication
of the argument established in the prior chapter. In contrast, if these facilities
were not politicized, or they did not generate local support for the Muslim Broth-
erhood’s candidates, then sustaining the argument that these facilities were in-
volved in electoral mobilization would be more difficult.
Taken together, the prior two chapters provide a convincing picture of the
political advantage produced by the Brotherhood’s social service network. Yet
they say little about the nature of the linkages these facilities create between party
and voter. The next chapter uses an survey experiment of over 2400 Egyptians to
examine the causal mechanism linking social service provision to vote choice. As
it shows, these facilities produce electoral support for the Muslim Brotherhood not
through the contingent exchange of clientelism, the loyalty-based mechanism of
recruitment, or an ideology-transforming process of Islamization. Instead, these
facilities send a powerful signal that the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidates for
political office are honest, capable, and approachable.
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Chapter 5
From Medicine to Mobilization
Mohammed Galal, from the Delta town of al-Qanater al-Khayriyya, was very
sick. To fix his failing coronary artery, his doctor recommended that he go to
the Islamic Medical Association’s Talibiyya hospital in Giza. The surgery there
was successful, and after a few days in recovery Mohammed could go home.
Before he left, however, he effusively praised the hospital and its staff. “Words
cannot describe them,” he claimed “they are very good, they are excellent, and
they care about me.” The whole experience made him feel like he was in a “five
star hospital...in terms of their continuous care, their promptness, the cleanliness,
and their organization...every section performs their jobs in an excellent fashion
without begrudging me.”1
This chapter not only shows how the IMA was able to produce the effect that
so delighted Mohammed Galal, but how this atmosphere generates a political
advantage on election day. Qualitative data, including interviews with IMA exec-
utives, managers, and employees shows how the Brotherhood’s high-quality and
compassionate care stems as much from exacting professional standards, com-
1All quotes and information comes from Mohammed Galal’s testimony here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHi4ciTzyr8. N.D. (posted May 29, 2014). Ac-
cessed September 17, 2014. Note that the video is an official release from the Is-
lamic Medical Association and thus should be considered in that light, although there
is no evidence he was falsifying or exaggerating his experience. See also the pa-
tient testimonials here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_dazTLBjQCE and here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wd8m1oSSkqk.
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petent managers, and invested employees as it does from religious devotion or
organizational cohesion. The chapter then presents the results of an original, na-
tionwide survey experiment of over 2400 Egyptians. The results strongly support
the hypothesized reputational mechanism whereby patients use the high quality
and compassionate care they receive in the Brotherhood’s hospitals to make in-
ferences about the character of the group’s candidates for elected office. Yet this
effect is uneven, as the middle class bias identified in the historical and spatial
analysis reappears in this individual-level data. While middle class Egyptians
react strongly to the experimental manipulation, the treatment barely sways the
opinions of their lower-income counterparts.
Finally, the survey experiment offers the chance to test alternative predictions
about how exposure to the Muslim Brotherhood’s social services change individ-
ual attitudes. Just as prior chapters found little historical and spatial evidence
supporting alternative hypotheses, this chapter shows that these facilities pro-
duce neither political alienation nor Islamization. Instead, Egyptians walk out of
these facilities prepared to map the honest, competent, and compassionate care
they have just received onto the Brotherhood’s candidates for elected office.
The Reputational Effect
The IMA generates such a powerful reputational effect because the organization’s
founders emphasized the interpersonal aspect of care as much as technical issues
of cleanliness and competence. In a February 1978 article in al-Da’wa, Ahmed
al-Malt outlined his vision of the IMA’s staff and surroundings:
The elite of the Muslim doctors, both ethically and in terms of skill,
shall work in these clinics, presenting [to the people] the clear image
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of a Muslim who denies himself in order to work solely for God. The
other image is the hospital interior: the service, the treatment, the qual-
ity of the reception and beyond. These will have the same [reputation]
as the [employee], with a compassionate touch on every level, from the
doctor, to the nurse, to the staff, to the administrator, all of them the
[perfect] image of the Muslim in both essence and appearance.2
Al-Malt specified that new members needed to not only be of good character,
devout, and dedicated to social and civic improvement, but they must also be
willing challenge themselves, learn, and become a better doctor (al Malt 1993,
176). The emphasis endures today. One IMA executive aimed to hire employees
who “present a good image to the people, are well-trained, understand how to
deal with the patients and the people, and they must be honest...Our employees
have to smile, have to be able to sympathize with the patient’s pain, and things
like that.”3 “The most important person in our hospitals is not the director, or the
employees, but the patient,” another executive summarized. “We all exist to serve
the patient.”4 This patient-centric attitude, as the manager of a clinic in southern
Cairo explained, was why a number of very wealthy Egyptians preferred to travel
to his clinic rather than visit private clinics much closer to their homes.5
The IMA’s twin emphasis on interpersonal care and technical expertise is foun-
dational. It overshadows nearly every stage of the organization’s operation, from
hiring staff, to monitoring facilities’ operations, to troubleshooting and fixing
problems. At the hiring stage, the IMA uses social networks of current employees
to find potential new hires, although they also place ads in their internal pub-
2Ahmed al-Malt, “Nida’ Min al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya bil-Qahira: Ya Muslimun! (A
Call From the Islamic Medical Association in Cairo: O Muslims!),” al-Da’wa, No. 21 (February
1978), pp. 56.
3Author Interview, IMA Executive A, January 15, 2013.
4Author Interview, IMA Executive B, November 8, 2012.
5Author Interview, IMA Facility Manager B, November 8, 2012.
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lication al-Hikma.6 This allows a good degree of pre-screening for attitude and
demeanor, ensuring that only those medical professionals in tune with the IMA
apply.7 For instance, one employee explained her decision to join the IMA by
contrasting the experience with her prior job, at a public hospital. “I left because
there we treated patients like cattle, not like people.” 8 In fact, the formal hiring
process begins by assessing the extent to which the applicant is in tune with the
organization’s general mission, and only then does the hospital manager assess
the employee’s technical skill.9 The manager of one dialysis center even claimed
that if he found someone of good character but lacking experience, he was willing
to hire the person and train them himself.10
Once hired, a flat management style personally invests the employees in the
success of the facility. As one manager described, encouraging employees to bring
problems and suggest improvements to their superiors creates a “family like” at-
mosphere.11 According to one young doctor, there is a “familiarity between em-
ployees, everyone is in good spirits, and the facility is well-organized.”12 A lab
manager explained the type of ethos he brought to his job: “we should not just
work here for the money, we should belong to it, feel like we have to make it
better- to take ownership of it.”13 This is what Mohammed Galal meant when
he said that the staff at the Talibiyya hospital performed their work “without be-
grudging him.” There was no heavy-handed supervisor looming over the staff to
6Even this limits the search to those in the IMA’s orbit- because Al-Hikma is not approved by
the national press council, it can only be distributed for free (for instance at the IMA’s hospitals).
7Author Interview, IMA Employee A, February 2, 2013; Author Interview, IMA Facility Man-
ager D, February 2, 2013.
8Author Interview, IMA Employee B, May 1, 2013.
9Author Interview, IMA Employee A, February 2, 2013.
10Author Interview, IMA Facility Manager B, November 8, 2012.
11Author Interview, IMA Employee B, May 1, 2013.
12Author interview, IMA Employee C, May 9, 2013.
13Author Interview, IMA Employee E, November 11, 2012.
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prevent them from shirking their responsibilities, nor a wave of employees try-
ing to chisel a bribe from someone at their most vulnerable. The “tyranny of
corruption” (El-Naggar 2009, 44) that infests so many aspects of life in Egypt is
absent from the IMA’s facilities. Instead, everyone knew their responsibilities and
carried them out because they sensed that they were appreciated and personally
responsible for the facility’s ultimate success or failure.
As the employees invest in the IMA, the IMA also invests in them. One com-
mon way was to encourage talented and dedicated staff to apply for management
positions, even if they start at lower or mid-level positions in the facilities. For in-
stance, the assistant manager in one facility had joined as a nurse and had worked
her way up.14 A doctor had started out of medical school in the emergency de-
partment, was promoted to assistant manager, and then to manager.15 Another
explicitly compared the IMA’s willingness to cultivate talent against government
hospitals’ sclerotic bureaucracy. There, he argued, age (he was in his early thir-
ties) would essentially determine his position in the organization’s hierarchy. In
contrast, the IMA managers “do not discriminate against us because of our age,
only if we are skillful, good with patients, good managers.”16 A doctor in an
IMA facility in the Delta concurred, noting how his salary and the scope of his
responsibilities “is based on skill.”17
In line with its founding mission to train doctors (al Malt 1993, 177) the IMA
makes available continual training for employees. Early articles in al-Da’wa sum-
marized the IMA’s early efforts in this field, including organizing study groups
for medical students, providing grants for medical students, opening a library of
14Author Interview, IMA Employee B, May 1, 2013.
15Author Interview, IMA Facility Manager B, May 9, 2013.
16Author Interview, IMA Employee E, November 11, 2012.
17Author interview, IMA Employee C, May 9, 2013.
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medical books (generously supported by a donation of $13,000 from the Kuwaiti
government) and opening a copying and printing center for these books.18 As
Abdel Moneim Abu El-Fotouh, one of the IMA’s earliest members, described the
motivation:
At that time (the late 1970s) the medical doctor lacked a way to con-
tinue his training and education. There is nothing that forces him to
be re-accredited or study, only if he takes the initiative on his own to
get a master’s or diploma. There is nothing that’s required, and he
can stay a general doctor all his life and there is nothing else that he is
required to learn or do. Likewise, once he becomes a specialist, he can
stay like this for his entire career. There are no opportunities to add
to his knowledge or experience, he’ll just stay at the same place for 40
years.19
In addition to Fotouh, a number of other young doctors and medical students who
benefitted from the IMA’s outreach would go on to become prominent figures in
the Brotherhood, including Helmi al-Gazar, Essam el-Erian, and Sana Abu Zeid
(Abu el Fotouh 2012, 49, 93).
The emphasis on continuing education endures today. The IMA offers fre-
quent lectures for their staff on germane topics, such as infection control, surgical
techniques, and emerging diseases.20 The flagship Central Charity Hospital actu-
ally has classrooms purpose-built into the facility. Figure 5.1 shows a copy of the
floorplan for the 7th floor of the Central Charity Hospital. The entire left wing is
designated as a nursing school, while the right wing includes dormitories for the
18“Tassawulat Hawal: al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya (Questions about the Islamic Medical
Association),” al-Da’wa, No. 29 (October 1978), pp. 42; Ahmed al-Malt, “al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya
al-Islamiyya: al-Mistashfa al-Islami al-Markazi (The Islamic Medical Association: The Islamic
Central Hospital),” al-Da’wa, No. 62 (June 1981).
19Author Interview, Abdel Moneim Abu El-Fotouh, January 23, 2013. El-Fotouh also makes a
similar argument in his memoirs (2012, 98).
20“Muhadirat Turuq Mukafahat al-Adwa bi Mistashfa al-Rahma (Lecture on Methods of Com-
bating Infection at the Rahma Hospital),” N.D. (posted May 28, 2014). Available online at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qHiBeetaAD4. Accessed September 15, 2014.
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nursing students.
Figure 5.1: Central Charity Hospital Floorplan (7th Floor)
Although there is a parallel emphasis on moral education, as mentioned ear-
lier, it essentially frames common practices in Islamic terminology.21 For instance,
inside the IMA’s facilities are brochures discussing the relevancy of certain Islamic
character traits to the practice of medicine (from these brochures the cartoon in
chapter three was drawn).22 These traits include dabt al-mawa’id (promptness), al-
21Note, for instance, the title of the article introducing the IMA to readers of al-Da’wa:
“Awwal Jam’iyya Tibiyya Islamiyya Takkawun fi Misr: La Buda min Iyjad al-Tabib al-Muslim
al-Mutamayiz bi-Shakhsiyyatu (The First Islamic Medical Association Established in Egypt: The
Exceptional Muslim Doctor Must Improve His Character),” al-Da’wa, No. 20 (January 1978).
22See also IMA leader ’Amr Ayyat’s lecture on Islam and medical work, available online at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdKQxQv-5To. N.D. (Posted September 13, 2014). Ac-
cessed September 17, 2014.
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kifaa’a (competency), hafiz al-sirr (discretion), al-nizafa (cleanliness), al-hikma (wis-
dom), and al-nizam (organization) (Abu Zeid 2006).23
Yet even the highest quality facilities are prone to dissatisfactory results. To
identify and fix any issue that goes awry, the Islamic Medical Association relies
on a series of internal mechanisms to monitor the atmosphere in their facilities.
First, there is a practice of frequently shuttling doctors and managers around to
different hospitals in the IMA network. One employee worked three simultaneous
jobs for the IMA, managing diagnostic labs in Helwan, Giza, and Ma’adi. Another
managed both an IMA hospital and dialysis center, in addition to working a
day job in a government hospital (his day, he claimed, began at 4:30 AM). On a
number of occasions I encountered a manager at one facility I had met earlier at
a different facility. Not only does this acquaint the employees with each facility
and their respective clienteles, but also identifies and teaches best practices across
the network. One employee related how he developed a procedure for tracking
lab chemicals in one facility and, after monitoring its success, implemented it in
other facilities.24 In another instance, the IMA was piloting a digitized system to
track patient health records at two facilities in Cairo before extending the project
to the rest of the network.25
Another innovative way in which the group ensures consistent high-quality
care is by encouraging friendly competition among the staff at these facilities.
Officials from the IMA’s headquarters in Cairo constantly assess the individual
facilities and rank them based on 25 criteria for things like cleanliness, service,
23The Islamic Medical Association’s series of brochures on the principles of medical ethics,
Qaym fi Sawr al-Tibeeb (Those Values Reflected in a Doctor) were apparently written by Dr. Sana
Abu Zeid, a notable member of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Shura Council until his death in early
2008. See “Doctor Sana Abu Zeid,” Ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at http://goo.gl/0w9I8e.
Accessed January 27, 2014.
24Author Interview, IMA Employee E, November 11, 2012.
25Author Interview, IMA Hospital Manager A, May 11, 2013.
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staffing, fiscal health, and patient satisfaction.26 Facilities are sorted into three
categories, exceptional, satisfactory, and below average, and the facilities at the
top are recognized and the staff are rewarded for their efforts.27 Those facilities
at the lower end of the spectrum are not punished, but instead singled out for
extra attention by the organization. In cases where the facility is plagued by
consistently low rankings, a specialist team of experienced managers is brought
in to check for deeper problems and make the necessary changes to bring the
facility’s rating back up.28
The above mechanisms combined to produce the technologically advanced
and compassionate care that stood out to Mohammed Galal. We might recognize
many of these mechanisms at any successful business: a focus on hiring talent, ap-
plying consistent standards, and empowering managers and employees. But the
IMA is more than just a business. The honest, capable, and compassionate care
that patients experience elevates the relationship between recipient and service
provider beyond the transactional relationship of commerce and into a more en-
during bond between the recipient and the Muslim Brotherhood. The remainder
of this chapter uses an original nationwide survey- and embedded experimental
manipulation- to illustrate how this care powerfully reverberates into the realm
of politics, to the benefit of the Brotherhood’s candidates on election day.
26These are different- and independent from- Ministry of Health ratings.
27”Al-Farouq Takrim 18 Ama Mithaliyya Min al-’Amilat bil-Mistashfa (al-Farouq (Hospital)
Recognizes 18 as Exemplary (Female) Hospital Employees),” al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya,
November 2, 2013. Available online at: http://ima-egy.net/branche/183-18. Accessed July 14,
2015; “Al-Hadi Yukrim Ibna’ al-’Amileen al-Mutafawiqeen (al-Hadi (Hospital) Honors the Out-
standing Children of Employees,)” al-Jam’iyya al-Tibiyya al-Islamiyya, February 21, 2014. Available
online at: http://ima-egy.net/message/312-2014-02-21-02-27-15. Accessed July 14, 2015.
28Author Interview, IMA Executive B, November 8, 2012.
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The Footprint of Brotherhood Medical Provision
One critical assumption underlying this dissertation’s argument about Islamist
social services and electoral mobilization is that these facilities actually accom-
modate enough people to produce an electoral (or any other type of) effect. To
satisfy this assumption, this section introduces data drawn both from internal
IMA documents and an original, nationwide n=2483 telephone survey of adult
Egyptians to provide important empirical detail about the size and scope of the
Brotherhood’s medical provision.
During my fieldwork I obtained from the Islamic Medical Association a series
of balance sheets for the network’s hospitals for the years 2004- 2011, inclusive.
Chapter three included information on the percentage of “poor” patients at each
facility. Figure 5.2 reports the total number of patient visits to IMA facilities in
order to show the scope of this provision.
As these documents show, nearly one and a half million Egyptians annually
benefit from the Brotherhood’s brick-and-mortar medical provision efforts. To
buttress this information, in May of 2014 I contracted the Cairo-based Egyptian
Center for Public Opinion Research (Baseera) to carry out a nationwide telephone
survey of Egyptians.29 This is the first survey to examine the phenomenon, mak-
ing it valuable not only for its ability to clarify Egyptians’ knowledge of and ex-
perience with the Muslim Brotherhood’s medical networks, but also to map how
these networks lay across Egypt’s underlying sociopolitical terrain. In order to in-
dependently assess the reach of these facilities, the survey form asked a random
subsample of 1220 respondents “have you heard about the Muslim Brotherhood’s
provision of medical services before?” and “have you used the Brotherhood’s
29In addition to the material below, appendix C contains a larger methodological discussion.
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Figure 5.2: Visitors to Brotherhood Medical Facilities, 2004-2011


























medical facilities before?” if a respondent answered in the negative, they were
coded “0.” If they answered “yes” they received a “1.” Table 5.1 reports respon-
dents’ answers.
Especially coupled with the information from the IMA’s own balance sheets,
the survey results help to provide an important piece of supporting evidence for
the theory advanced in Chapter one. While balance sheets show that around 1.5
million Egyptians directly benefit from these facilities annually, almost 8% of the
survey sample self-reports visiting the Brotherhood’s medical facilities at one time
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Table 5.1: Self-reported Experience with the Brotherhood’s Medical Facilities
Total Respondents Raw and Percent “Yes”
Have you heard of the Muslim
Brotherhood’s medical facilities? 1220 438 (%35.9)
Have you used the Muslim
Brotherhood’s medical facilities? 1215 93 (%7.65)
or another.30
Recall also the discussions in chapters two and three of the middle class bias
at these facilities. The survey’s descriptive statistics buttress these findings by
grouping responses to these questions by respondents’ socioeconomic status.31
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 report these results, where a negative answer to the question
of whether or not the respondent knew of or had experienced the Brotherhood’s
facilities was coded “0” while an affirmative response received a “1.”
Table 5.2: Poor and Non-Poor Knowledge of Brotherhood Facilities
n Mean Knowledge Standard Deviation
Poor 500 .292 .455
Non-Poor 720 .406 .491
t = 4.1, p < .00001
Table 5.3: Poor and Non-Poor Experience with Brotherhood Facilities
n Mean Experience Standard Deviation
Poor 500 .056 .23
Non-Poor 715 .091 .288
t = 2.255, p < .05
Spatial, qualitative, and survey evidence all indicate that Egypt’s poor have
relatively little experience with the Brotherhood’s network of social services. As
30The pervasive anti-Brotherhood attitude at the time this survey was conducted actually makes
it likely this number underreports the actual value.
31Multiple measures of SES were considered and piloted. An asset index, in which poor re-
spondents owned neither a washing machine or a car, was chosen based on a combination of
these pilot results, the survey company’s experience with the Egyptian case, and the available
literature (Filmer and Pritchett 2001, Sahn and Stifel 2003).
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the remainder of the chapter shows, this socioeconomic cleavage predictably in-
fluences how respondents’ react to the experimental stimulus. On one hand, less
affluent respondents do not exhibit a measurable shift in attitudes when being
told about the Brotherhood’s medical provision. Their better off countrymen and
women, on the other hand, report themselves more likely to both vote for the
Brotherhood and view the group’s candidates more favorably.
Experimental Manipulation
The survey also contained a randomized experimental component designed to
explicitly probe the causal relationship between social service provision and elec-
toral support. An experimental manipulation- in this case slightly altering a basic,
factual prime about healthcare provision in Egypt- is a particularly appropriate
research design given the presence of potentially endogenous relationships and
hidden variables that lurk underneath the proposed causal relationship.
Consider the causal mechanism embedded in the above theory: exposure to
these facilities causes an individual to update their beliefs of traits of the Broth-
erhood’s candidates, which then leads that individual to support the group on
election day. In a traditional survey it would be difficult to account for the possi-
bility that a respondent may have sought out these facilities precisely because she
has had some prior positive, non-social service based interaction with the Muslim
Brotherhood. Thus causal claims would be exceedingly difficult to support.
A survey experiment’s use of random assignment to maximize internal valid-
ity mitigates concerns of endogeneity. Put differently, randomization distributes
potentially confounding variables equally across the treatment and control groups.
This increases confidence that any observed variation in outcome is due to the
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experimental manipulation rather than some underlying variable. At the same
time, the on-location sample ensures that these tight causal inferences are appli-
cable to the broader population (Mutz 2011, Druckman et al. 2011, Shadish, Cook
and Campbell 2002). In this case, the theory’s prediction that the Brotherhood’s
social service provision produces an shift in recipient attitudes makes a survey
experiment a sensible tool with which to assess these predictions.
To provoke and capture the effect of the Brotherhood’s provision of medical
services on political attitudes, I look to experimental designs developed in Amer-
ican politics. In their landmark study of race and affirmative action, Sniderman
and Piazza sought an unobtrusive way to stimulate and measure attitudes that
may otherwise remain latent. They settled on a “mere mention” design, which
subtly varied the content of an informational prime in order to examine the sub-
sequent changes in attitude. As they explained, their “mere mention” experiment
was designed to:
simulate the kinds of conversations that ordinary people undoubtedly
have about affirmative action and the characteristics of blacks. The
basic idea is to determine whether references to affirmative action can,
in and of themselves, excite negative reactions to blacks (1995, 110).
The present study borrows this logic. Specifically, the theory outlined above
predicts that receiving basic, factual information about the Brotherhood’s medical
provision will cause respondents to view more positively the character traits of
Muslim Brotherhood candidates. This attitudinal change will then make respon-
dents more likely to vote for those candidates in elections. Yet while all survey
respondents heard factual information about medical provision in Egypt, the con-
tent of the information subtly differed based on the survey form to which the in-
dividual had been randomly assigned. Specifically, the control version contained
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information about the Ministry of Health’s medical facilities. The treatment ver-
sion contained the same text, except that respondents received information about
the Muslim Brotherhood instead. Both primes are presented below, in which the
manipulated text appears in italics.
Treatment
Now I would like to ask you some
questions about The Muslim Brother-
hood and their activities in the field
of medical provision in Egypt. The
Muslim Brotherhood operates many
hospitals and clinics in all parts of the
country, and these facilities provide a
wide range of medical services to mil-
lions of Egyptians every year, among
them the poor and destitute. Have
you heard about these facilities before?
Control
Now I would like to ask you some
questions about The Ministry of Health
and their activities in the field of med-
ical provision in Egypt. The Ministry
of Health operates many hospitals and
clinics in all parts of the country, and
these facilities provide a wide range of
medical services to millions of Egyp-
tians every year, among them the poor
and destitute. Have you heard about
these facilities before?
The survey experiment only approximates what is a more complex and vivid
“real world” process. Yet if a “mere mention” of the Brotherhood’s social service
provision can stimulate pro-Brotherhood political attitudes- and I show below
how it can- this augurs a stronger effect for a more intense, longer-term exposure.
For example, if simply hearing about these facilities in this type of “everyday con-
versation” can positively shift an individual’s opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood,
consider how the mechanism would work if one of these facilities was responsible
for alleviating a relative’s kidney disease, curing a elderly parent’s glaucoma, or
setting a child’s broken arm.
Contemporary conditions in Egypt offer a “least likely” case to support the
theory connecting social service provision to political support (George and Ben-
nett 2005, Levy 2002). Since the July 3rd 2013 military coup the Egyptian govern-
ment has harassed and violently repressed the Muslim Brotherhood, while both
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state and private media have demonized it. Theoretically, this atmosphere es-
tablishes strong incentives for respondents to strategically deflate their opinion of
the Brotherhood. Thus the treatment must work twice as hard: not only must it
produce a positive effect for the Brotherhood, but it must countervail forces push-
ing respondents to answer in the opposite direction. If the treatment produces
a positive change in attitudes towards the Brotherhood under these particularly
difficult conditions, then confidence in the theory should be bolstered.
Political Attitudes
Following the treatment battery, respondents answered questions assessing their
political attitudes towards the Muslim Brotherhood and their perception of traits
of the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidates. To evaluate alternative hypotheses (on
which more below), respondents were also queried on their religious beliefs and
practice, as well as their opinions about the Egyptian political system and electoral
activism in general.
The immediate post-manipulation questions probe the general relationship
between social service provision and political support. It may well be the case that
recipients simply do not connect the two realms, or relate to facilities purely on
the more mundane criteria of cost, proximity, social networks, or something else.
For instance, summarizing her findings in a lower class Cairene neighborhood,
Tadros suggests how:
[A] woman from (the neighborhood of) Bulaq el Dakrour might have
her blood pressure taken in the nearby pharmacy; her glasses done at
the Wafd (political) Party Health Centre, her blood tests taken at a pri-
vate clinic, dental care sought at a government teaching hospital while
sending her daughter to the female doctor at a Muslim association (a
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registered service-providing NGO) for gynecological treatment (2006,
248).
To gauge the effect of social service provision on political support, respon-
dents were asked, “if the Brotherhood participated in the upcoming elections, how
likely would you be to vote for their candidates?” Then, in order to test the theory
that the Brotherhood’s social service provision causes recipients to view the char-
acter of the Brotherhood’s candidates more positively, respondents were asked to
rate the Muslim Brotherhood’s “candidates and (parliamentary) deputies” across
three traits: trustworthiness, capability, and approachability.32 Because a princi-
pal component factor analysis reveals that all three questions load on a common
factor (α = .8296), the results of this question are compiled into a single index,
“likability.”33
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 summarize the results of the experimental manipulation on
the entire sample as well as the posited differential effects. Each question includes
the overall results (total control versus total treatment), as well as the comparisons
of specific subgroups. Whiskers indicate plus/minus one standard error. T-tests
provide simple difference-of-means checks, and p values for each comparison are
reported. In all figures, asterix denote a relationship that remains statistically
significant after adjusting α post-hoc via a modified (Holm) Bonferroni correction
(Jaccard and Wan 1996, Holm 1979).34 For presentation purposes the scales here
are truncated.35
32The questions did not list specific candidates by name. In the most recent parliamentary
elections (November 2011- January 2012), the Brotherhood fielded candidates in every electoral
district.
33Cases with missing values are dropped.
34This procedure minimizes the risk of false positives, which are more likely when making
repeated draws from the same sample.
35Although the original scales ran from 0 to 3, the results for these three questions were at
the bottom end of that range (hostile to the Brotherhood). For this reason, the scales here are
presented from the range 0 - 1.5.
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Figure 5.3: Propensity to Vote for Brotherhood Candidates
“If the Muslim Brotherhood participates in the upcoming parlia-
mentary elections, how likely are you to vote for their candidates?”
(0= Very Unlikely, 3= Very Likely)
1.50
Full




(nt = 447, nc = 449) (p = .4541)
Non-Poor
(nt = 653, nc = 675) (p = .0062)∗
Non-Opponents
(nt = 871, nc = 908) (p = .0201)
Brotherhood
Opponents
(nt = 229, nc = 216) (p = .0748)
= treatment (Muslim Brotherhood)
= control (Ministry of Health)
The results of the experimental manipulation strongly support the theory that
the Brotherhood’s medical provision increases political support for the group.
Specifically, receiving the treatment renders individuals more willing to vote for
the Brotherhood. Notably, the effect among the full and non-poor sample remains
robust to the application of the correction.
Figure 5.4 reports the results of the experimental manipulation on the three
question battery assessing respondents’ opinions about the Brotherhood’s candi-
dates and parliamentary deputies (as a reminder, Figure 5.4 reports the group
means of an index compiling answers to three separate questions).
These results vividly demonstrate how exposure to basic information about
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Figure 5.4: Assessment of Brotherhood Candidates’ Likability
“I am going to read you a list of terms that some people have used
to describe candidates and deputies from the Muslim Brotherhood.
Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each word.”
(0= Strongly Disagree, 3= Strongly Agree)
1.50
Full
(nt = 941, nc = 980) (p = .0008)
∗
Poor
(nt = 381, nc = 367) (p = .0581)
Non-Poor
(nt = 560, nc = 613) (p = .0059)∗
Brotherhood
Opponents
(nt = 210, nc = 198) (p = .0026)∗
Non-Opponents
(nt = 731, nc = 782) (p = .0061)
∗
= treatment (Muslim Brotherhood)
= control (Ministry of Health)
the Brotherhood’s medical provision causes an increase in respondents’ assess-
ment of Brotherhood candidates’ and deputies’ likability (a composite of three
specific questions assessing their competence, honesty, and modesty). That the
treatment failed to produce a shift in opinion amongst the poor is not surprising
in light of the above-assembled historical, spatial, qualitative, and survey evi-
dence of these facilities’ middle class bias. Taken together, the results support
the reputational theory articulated earlier, in which middle-class Egyptians map
the effective and compassionate care they receive at the Brotherhood’s medical
facilities onto the group’s candidates for elected office.
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The fact that these results hail from the uncommonly anti-Brotherhood en-
vironment of post July 2013 Egypt offers an even sturdier basis from which to
extrapolate causes of the Brotherhood’s uncommon successes during earlier peri-
ods. The significant and positive shifts in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 occurred even as re-
spondents were required to swim against the prevailing anti-Brotherhood current.
Had this survey experiment been executed in the calmer waters of the Mubarak
era, one would logically expect an even more pronounced pro-Brotherhood effect.
The army’s repression of the Brotherhood over the last two years- not to mention
the Brotherhood’s own missteps- likely combine to make the environment much
more hostile to those expressing pro-Brotherhood attitudes.
Causal Mediation Analysis
The mediation package for Stata allows a direct test of the causal relationship be-
tween the treatment and outcome variables by generating two models (Hicks and
Tingley 2011). In this case, the first model produces predictions for the likability
index as a function of the treatment/control condition. A second model generates
estimates for the propensity to vote for the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidates as
a function of both the treatment/control and the likability index. Model one’s
estimation of the values for “likability” under both the treatment and control feed
into model two’s estimates of the propensity to vote for the Brotherhood’s can-
didates. Averaging the differences in the predicted values of this propensity as
the predictions for “likability” shift under the treatment and control yields the
average causal mediation affect (ACME) (Imai et al. 2011). Table 5.4 presents the
results of the causal mediation analysis.
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Table 5.4: Mediation Results, Effect of “Likability” on Propensity to Vote for
Brotherhood Candidates
Mean 95% Confidence Intervals
Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) .08275 .02953 .13299
Direct Effect .00458 -.05832 .06252
Total Effect .08733 .00561 .16346
Over ninety-three percent (93.16%) of the observed effect of the treatment on
propensity to vote for the Brotherhood operates through the likability index.36
Figure 5.5 presents the results of the causal mediation analysis graphically, show-
ing the effect sizes that passed through the mediation variable (“likability”) and
a direct pathway, respectively.
Figure 5.5: Causal Pathway
Mediated Effect= .08275
“Likability"




The next section uses additional evidence from the survey instrument to estab-
lish an antecedent condition of the above causal chain: that survey respondents
perceive that the Brotherhood’s medical facilities offer honest and compassionate
care (that they later transfer to the group’s candidates for elected office).
36Importantly, the results here are valid so long as the sequential ignorability assumption ob-
tains. Appendix C reports the results of an analysis testing how sensitive the above process is to
sequentially larger and larger violations of this assumption.
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The Islamist Advantage, Illustrated
The chapter’s opening section described Mohammed Galal’s satisfaction with the
Talibiyya Hospital in Giza, which aligns with anecdotal evidence of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood’s facilities’ overall quality. To test the generalizability of Mr.
Galal’s experience, the above-described survey also gathered fine-grained data
on individuals’ subjective and self-reported experiences with these facilities. Re-
spondents were asked if they had visited the facility operated by the group to
which they were assigned (Ministry of Health/control or the Muslim Brother-
hood/treatment). Those responding in the affirmative were then asked to use
up to “five words or short phrases to describe your experience there.” Survey
enumerators recorded these responses verbatim in Egyptian colloquial Arabic.
Prior to translation, each response (either a word or a short phrase) was coded
as a dichotomous variable. Responses connoting a positive experience received a
“1” while those connoting a negative experience were coded “0.” Average and its
analogues, i.e. “Mixed,” or “Sometimes Good, Sometimes Bad” were not coded.
The responses were aggregated for each group (Ministry of Health versus Muslim
Brotherhood) to generate an average rating of each facility. Table 5.5 presents the
results of a t-test.
Table 5.5: Difference of Means Test: Respondents’ Satisfaction
Respondents Descriptors Mean Std. Dev.
Muslim Brotherhood Facilities 91 230 .861 .347
Health Ministry Facilities 774 1841 .307 .461
t = -17.599, p < .00001
To provide a more qualitative picture of the difference between the two organi-
zations, I also translated each Arabic phrase or word into a rough English equiv-
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alent then aggregated into word clouds the terms respondents used to describe
each organization’s respective facilities.37 In Figures 5.6 and 5.7, the size of the
text indicates the frequency with which respondents used that word. For presen-
tation purposes, those descriptive terms mentioned less than five times (Muslim
Brotherhood subgroup) and less than ten times (Ministry of Health subgroup) are
not included in the word clouds.38
Figure 5.6: Ministry of Health Descriptions
37The word clouds were created by wordle, www.wordle.net.
38the different cut-points reflect the fact that more people had visited the Ministry of Health’s
facilities, and therefore offered more terms to describe the experience.
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Figure 5.7: Muslim Brotherhood Descriptions
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 reveal that many Egyptians share Mr. Galal’s satisfaction
with the Brotherhood’s medical efforts. Primarily, this is important because it
suggests that those earlier findings are not the process of a selection bias (only
visiting hospitals in wealthy areas, for instance) or of the Brotherhood’s cunning
attempt to direct public scrutiny towards attractive but unrepresentative selec-
tions.39 Rather, the results here suggest that the Brotherhood’s medical provision
is universally high-quality, or at least perceived as such by those who have relied
on it in the past.
The overall positive impressions that the Brotherhood’s facilities produce, as
well as the specific terms that respondents used to describe this atmosphere,
also provide an important link in the proposed causal process (Brady and Col-
lier 2010). The t-tests and associated word clouds demonstrate that respondents
did absorb and focus on the quality of care. Not only that, respondents’ percep-
tions of the Brotherhood candidates as competent, honest, and modest echo many
of the characteristics individuals reported in their open-ended descriptions of the
39As a robustness check, the results of the t-test and a word cloud for only those opposed to the




The chapter’s final sections use the same experimental manipulation to revisit
and assess two alternative hypotheses at the individual level. The first is the pre-
diction that these facilities are part of a larger effort to alienate beneficiaries from
traditional politics. Second is that this provision generates an intense change in
beneficiaries’ ideological commitment to Islam. The results of the experimental
manipulation support neither of these predictions. Treated respondents are nei-
ther more likely to express a greater willingness to support a larger role for Islam
in politics, nor do they exhibit more pessimistic attitudes towards processes of
electoral competition.
An Alienation Effect?
Especially in conjunction with the prior two chapters, the above experimental ma-
nipulation shows that social service provision is an important driver of electoral
mobilization. Not only is this critical support for the overall theory advanced in
chapter one, it also calls into question theories tying Islamist social service pro-
vision to political alienation. To review, those theories suggested that Islamists’
social service provision, and their civil society activism in general, served to alien-
ate recipients from the existing system and incorporate them into an alternative
political universe. “An integral aspect of Islamist identity,” Clark tells us, “is the
creation of alternative institutions to those of the state. In this regard, Islamic so-
cial welfare institutions represent the foundations of an alternative society. They
represent an ideological and practical alternative to the present system” (Clark
2012, 70). In her 2003 essay, “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society,” Berman
articulates a similar logic:
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Where existing political institutions are weak and the regime is per-
ceived as ineffectual and illegitimate...civil society may become an al-
ternative to traditional politics, increasingly absorbing citizens’ ener-
gies and satisfying their basic needs. In such situations, civil soci-
ety can work to undermine political stability further by alienating cit-
izens from traditional political structures, deepening dissatisfaction,
and providing a rich soil for oppositional and revolutionary move-
ments to mobilize and grow (2003, 266).
Chapter two showed little historical support for these arguments, while chap-
ter three revealed little evidence for one spatial implication of this theory- that
these facilities would exist in areas where the regime is weak. To be fair, however,
these theories posit an attitudinal process that spatial and historical data might
overlook. This can be summarized as:
• Hypothesis: Exposing respondents to information about the Brotherhood’s social
service activism should reduce their support for formal political participation
The survey included two post-treatment questions designed to capture how
social service provision shifts Egyptians’ attitudes towards formal political insti-
tutions. The first queried Egyptians about their satisfaction with the ability of
Egyptian political parties to represent their point of view. The second assessed
Egyptians’ support for democratic elections as the best method of alternating po-
litical power. Figures 5.8 and 5.9 report responses to both of the questions. As a
reminder, the below figures report p values, while asterix denote those relation-
ships that remain significant following a post-hoc correction.
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Figure 5.8: Alienation from Traditional Political Parties
“To what extent are you satisfied with the ability of Egyp-
tian political parties to represent your point of view?”
(0= Very Dissatisfied, 3= Very Satisfied)
1.50
Full Sample
(nt = 1025, nc = 1022) (p = .2335)
Poor
(nt = 397, nc = 394) (p = .5509)
Non-Poor
(nt = 628, nc = 648) (p = .0321)
Brotherhood
Opponents
(nt = 218, nc = 195) (p = .1983)
Non-Opponents
(nt = 807, nc = 827) (p = .4725)
= treatment (Muslim Brotherhood)
= control (Ministry of Health)
The results here provide little support for the argument that these facilities
engender attitudes of disillusionment with and alienation from state institutions
(Egyptians’ baseline condition vis-á-vis their political parties is strong dissatisfac-
tion). In the question specifically querying respondents about their satisfaction
with Egypt’s political parties (Figure 5.8), the treatment produces a predicted but
weak shift among the middle class. The inability of this result to withstand a
statistical correction, however, warrants caution in interpretation.
The following question (Figure 5.9), assessing Egyptians’ views of elections as
the best way to change the president likewise produces only very weak support
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Figure 5.9: Support for Electoral Turnover
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
“in general, the best way to change the president is through elections?”
(0= Strongly Disagree, 3= Strongly Agree)
31.5
Full Sample
(nt = 1183, nc = 1175) (p = .045)
Poor
(nt = 483, nc = 463) (p = .0943)
Non-Poor
(nt = 700, nc = 712) (p = .1980)
Brotherhood
Opponents
(nt = 240, nc = 214) (p = .6866)
Non-Opponents
(nt = 943, nc = 961) (p = .0463)
= treatment (Muslim Brotherhood)
= control (Ministry of Health)
for the depoliticization/alienation hypothesis. The full sample, as well as the
sample truncated to remove the Brotherhood’s harshest opponents, both shifted
in the direction that the alienation/depoliticization theory predicts. As in Figure
5.8, however, the change did not remain significant after applying the statistical
correction.
Together, these tests revealed at best tenuous support for the alienation and
depoliticization theory. However, it is important to situate this alternative theory
against the much stronger findings showing that these facilities drive electoral
support by convincing voters of the Brotherhood’s candidates’ honesty, compe-
tence, and approachability. Notably, these two arguments are almost completely
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opposite in their predicted effects. While the alienation/revolution argument pre-
dicts that these facilities will estrange recipients from formal politics in favor of al-
ternative forms of activism, the politicization argument shows instead how these
facilities channel citizen activism into traditional channels of political mobiliza-
tion.
Instead of reputation, however, a potent Islamization effect could link social
service provision to electoral support. For instance, if social service provision
increased an individual’s religiosity, one manifestation of this effect might be in-
creasing political support for Islamist candidates at the ballot box. While chapter
three found little spatial correlation between density of social service provision
and clusters of conservative Muslims, the following section uses the experimental
manipulation to test this argument at the individual level.
An Islamization Effect?
Some authors claim that these facilities produce more devout Muslims. Wick-
ham finds that continual exposure to new interpretations of Islamic doctrine and
practice “chang[es] the preferences of educated youth” (Wickham 2002, 148). In
his study of Islamic social service provision and electoral success, Siyam suggests
that the Brotherhood’s social service provision is so potent because it generates a
pool of ideological adherents “which is impossible to uproot through campaigns
of liquidation or siege” (2006, 79). We can summarize these individual-level im-
plications as:
• Hypothesis: Exposing Muslim respondents to information about the Brotherhood’s
social service activism should increase their religious conservatism
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The survey queried all Muslim respondents as to their opinion of the impor-
tance of three specific activities to Islamic practice. The three items were strategi-
cally chosen to encompass sequentially larger, and potentially more costly, realms
of activism: the personal, the social, and the political. On a personal level, respon-
dents were asked the importance of having the women in their family wear the
niqab, the full face veil. On a social level respondents were asked how important
it was to preach about Islam to their friends and neighbors (da’wa). Finally, to ex-
plore respondent attitudes towards the political role of religion they were asked
their assessment of the statement that religious authorities should be given the
ability to review legislation. Figures 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12 report these answers.
Figure 5.10: Personal Dimension of Religiosity
“It is important that women in your family
wear the full-face veil (asked of Muslims only).”
(0= Strongly Disagree, 3= Strongly Agree)
31.5
Full Sample
(nt = 1077, nc = 1069) (p = .007)
∗
Poor
(nt = 455, nc = 433) (p = .0544)
Non-Poor
(nt = 622, nc = 636) (p = .063)
Brotherhood
Opponents
(nt = 212, nc = 191) (p = .5588)
Non-Opponents
(nt = 865, nc = 878) (p = .0053)
∗
= treatment (Muslim Brotherhood)
= control (Ministry of Health)
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Figure 5.11: Social Dimension of Religiosity
“It is important that you proselytize to your
friends and neighbors (asked of Muslims only).”
(0= Strongly Disagree, 3= Strongly Agree)
31.5
Full Sample
(nt = 1092, nc = 1089) (p = .0013)
∗
Poor
(nt = 451, nc = 436) (p = .0085)
∗
Non-Poor
(nt = 641, nc = 653) (p = .0505)
Brotherhood
Opponents
(nt = 216, nc = 193) (p = .2504)
Non-Opponents
(nt = 876, nc = 896) (p = .0019)
∗
= treatment (Muslim Brotherhood)
= control (Ministry of Health)
The results of the experimental manipulation are somewhat contradictory. On
one hand they support the Islamization hypothesis: those receiving information
about the Brotherhood’s medical provision efforts were more likely to rate Is-
lam’s personal and social dimensions (women in the family wearing the niqab and
speaking to friends and neighbors about Islam, respectively) as highly important
aspects of religious practice. Further, on both of these questions the reaction of
the full samples were robust to the statistical correction.40
40Recall that a somewhat similar measure of personal religiosity- the belief that female genital
mutilation is required by religion- was used to construct the spatial measure of religious conser-
vatism used in chapter three. There it did not appear to yield an effect.
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Figure 5.12: Political Dimension of Religiosity
“It is important that religious authorities be given the au-
thority to review legislation (asked of Muslims only).”
(0= Strongly Disagree, 3= Strongly Agree)
31.5
Full Sample
(nt = 1059, nc = 1028) (p = .0033)
∗
Poor
(nt = 416, nc = 395) (p = .3554)
Non-Poor
(nt = 643, nc = 633) (p = .0025)∗
Brotherhood
Opponents
(nt = 218, nc = 192) (p = .2482)
Non-Opponents
(nt = 841, nc = 836) (p = .0056)
∗
= treatment (Muslim Brotherhood)
= control (Ministry of Health)
On the other hand, the the treatment shifted attitudes about the politicization
of religion in a direction opposite what those theories would predict. Instead of
spurring respondents to support the idea of giving religious authorities a role in
reviewing legislation, receiving the treatment made respondents more hostile to
the idea. The fact that the mere mention of these facilities estranges respondents
from the Brotherhood’s core principle of combining religion and state renders it
difficult to argue that this provision pulls individuals into the Muslim Brother-
hood’s organizational orbit.41
41It may be tempting to suggest that this finding is simply the result of a visceral dislike of the
Muslim Brotherhood and nothing to do with the role of social services. While this may be possible,




Prior chapters showed the history of and political logic behind the distribution
of the Brotherhood’s medical facilities and charted their electoral impact during
periods of both autocracy and democracy. This chapter used an original survey
experiment to explain, on an individual level, why the Brotherhood’s efforts at
social service provision produced such a potent mobilizing effect at election time.
As it shows, a powerful reputational effect transformed social service provision into
electoral success by convincing recipients of Brotherhood candidates’ honesty,
competence, and approachability.
To support this mechanism, the chapter’s opening sections produced a variety
of qualitative evidence to depict the honest, compassionate, and high-quality care
that is a hallmark of the Brotherhood’s medical initiatives. A key finding is that
the competence and professionalism of staff is as much the product of rigid man-
agerial standards and constant assessment as an ideological devotion to Islam.
Further, data drawn from both internal management documents and the survey
instrument show the extent of this provision, which serves an nearly 1.5 million
Egyptians per year.
A consistent problem in the study of Islamist social service provision, and
isolating the attitudinal effect of this provision specifically, is the lack of empir-
ical data. To isolate the causal mechanism connecting social service provision
to electoral mobilization, this chapter analyzed an original survey experiment of
over 2400 Egyptians. The results show conclusive support for the reputational
effect outlined above. Priming Egyptians with information about the Brother-
hood’s medical facilities makes them broadly more likely to consider voting for
the Brotherhood’s candidates in parliamentary elections. Second, those receiving
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the informational prime rate Muslim Brotherhood candidates’ honesty, capabil-
ity, and approachability more highly than those in the control group. Finally, a
mediation analysis strongly supports the proposed causal chain: recipients visit
the Brotherhood’s medical facilities, use the high-quality and compassionate care
therein to make inferences about the Brotherhood’s candidates, and apportion
their political support on the basis of these judgements.
The survey findings simultaneously cast doubt on alternative hypotheses. Ques-
tions used to assess theories of political alienation and disillusionment with democ-
racy produce only very weak support that disappears when adjusted to account
for the possibility of false positives. Results of the questions designed to measure
the effect of this provision on religious beliefs, however, produce mixed results.
On the one hand, the treatment does seem to provoke a general conservative shift
in attitudes towards the personal and social dimensions of Islam. On the other,
the treatment actually produces a more liberal shift in Islam’s political dimensions,
directly contradicting theories that this provision draws recipients into tight ide-




The prior chapters presented a variety of historical, spatial, qualitative, and ex-
perimental data to show how the Muslim Brotherhood’s provision of medical
facilities was nested in a broader electoral logic. These facilities emerged with the
state’s encouragement and proliferated in electorally competitive middle class ar-
eas. There, they generated a political advantage by broadcasting a signal of the
Muslim Brotherhood’s candidates’ honesty, competence, and approachability. At
the same time, evidence supporting alternative hypotheses connecting this provi-
sion to charity, recruitment and group cohesion, and revolutionary agitation was
much weaker.
Theoretically, a focus on social service provision and electoral mobilization
helps explain why the Brotherhood was able to escape the fate of other opposi-
tion parties in non-democratic regimes. As the introduction described, in other
non-democratic contexts opposition parties’ use of ever more strident ideological
appeals to mobilize voters caused them shrivel into electorally impotent niche
parties. Instead, the Brotherhood’s provision of social services broadened their
electoral coalition by establishing ideologically neutral avenues through which
voters could connect with the organization. Put differently, the Brotherhood’s po-
litical success in Mubarak’s Egypt was as much a product of their non-ideological
supporters as their ideological core.
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This dissertation’s research strategy was to isolate and test the empirical im-
plications of each alternative theory, in effect examining multiple types of data
for evidence we would expect to find if that theory were true. This conclusion
first summarizes the predictions of each alternative hypothesis against the histor-
ical, spatial, political, and attitudinal evidence assembled over the prior chapters.
While a number of alternative hypotheses receive support for one or two of their
empirical implications, the consistency of support for the politicization theory
advanced in chapter one is particularly notable. Not only does this raise confi-
dence in that theory’s explanatory power, it reduces the risk of drawing fallacious
inferences.
The conclusion’s second section expands the argument beyond the Islamic
Medical Association by introducing original geolocated datasets of nearly 100
Brotherhood schools and approximately 1,000 Brotherhood community associa-
tions. These schools and community associations correlate with the group’s po-
litical contestation even more strongly than the medical facilities. Intriguingly,
however, in both cases the positive correlation with district wealth drops to statis-
tically insignificant. While I hypothesize a number of factors which may explain
this result, this realm holds considerable promise for new theoretical and empiri-
cal investigation.
The relative unimportance of Islam in the preceding chapters raises the ques-
tion of why only the Muslim Brotherhood was able to leverage their social ser-
vices for political gain. One key factor, I argue, is that while Islamists ran these
facilities on a business model, their opponents tended to run their enterprises as
charities or- more accurately- as vehicles of clientelism. This influenced the audi-
ences those parties attracted, as well as the types of linkages that this provision
generated between party and voter.
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Summary of Empirical Implications
This dissertation’s research strategy was to draw out multiple empirical implica-
tions of each theory purporting to explain why Islamists distribute social services
and test it against the evidence. This dissertation focused on four levels of analysis
in particular. Chapter two used Arabic-language memoirs, coverage in Islamist
periodicals such as al-Da’wa, and government documents to explore how these
facilities have developed and historically related to the state. Chapter three intro-
duced original spatial data, including a geolocated dataset of the Brotherhood’s
medical facilities, to reveal the conditions under which the group distributes so-
cial services. Chapter four cross-referenced geolocated ballot box-level voting
returns with the locations of the Brotherhood’s social services in order to iso-
late the political effect of the group’s social service networks. And chapter five’s
survey experiment precisely demonstrated how this provision translates into an
election-day advantage for the Brotherhood.
Tracking how well (or how poorly) the empirical material at each level of anal-
ysis satisfies the predictions of each alternative explanation increases confidence
in the explanatory power of the theory and also guards against the possibility
that the findings are an artifact of a particular level of analysis. The below tables
summarize theoretical predictions at these four levels of analysis: historical (Table
6.1), spatial (Table 6.2), political (Table 6.3), and attitudinal (Table 6.4).
173
Table 6.1: Summary of Historical Implications
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As Chapter two shows the IMA accommodated the state at each turn: they
registered with it, accepted its funding, complied with its laws, and benefitted
from its symbolic support. Instead of an subversive opposition lurking in inter-
stices beyond regime control, the Brotherhood’s social service activism was in
important ways a constituent part of the regime itself.
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Table 6.2: Summary of Spatial Implications












































The spatial analysis in chapter three shows how the Brotherhood’s social ser-
vice institutions exist in middle class, electorally competitive districts. Evidence
did not support other theories’ predictions that these facilities would correlate
with the dense networks of pro-Brotherhood activism, pockets of poverty, areas
of state weakness, or concentrations of conservative Muslims.
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Table 6.3: Summary of Political Implications
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Chapter four highlights twin empirical implications of the politicization the-
ory. Not only did the Brotherhood’s candidates in the vicinity of these facilities
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trumpet their affiliations in campaign materials, ballot boxes proximate to these
facilities supported Mohammed Morsi to a greater extent than those more distal.
Table 6.4: Summary of Attitudinal Implications
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The survey experiment discussed in the previous chapter was particularly use-
ful for its ability to simultaneously examine multiple individual-level implications
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of each theory. The experimental manipulation showed how the Brotherhood’s
provision of social services generated a reputational effect, in which the honest
and high-quality care at these facilities reflected onto the Brotherhood’s candi-
dates for elected office.
Finally, to guard against the possibility that findings are the artifact of a partic-
ular level of analysis, it is also worthwhile to consider the above tables vertically,
mapping how well different collections of evidence support a theory’s prediction
at that level. For instance, in the historical record there is support for a general
recruitment argument: the Muslim Brotherhood was deeply involved with estab-
lishing and operating these facilities from day one. Yet wading into deeper waters
reveals little support for additional implications of this argument: there is no spa-
tial correlation between density of pro-Brotherhood protests and the locations of
these facilities, they do not discriminate against non-members, and hearing about
these facilities does not incline Egyptians to support the core tenet of the Broth-
erhood’s ideology (the result was, in fact, the opposite). In contrast, the prior
chapters weave together a convincing story that these facilities developed under
the watchful eye of the state in competitive electoral districts, where they drove
political support by conveying an image of Brotherhood candidates for elected
office as honest, capable, and approachable.
Extending the Theory: Schools and Community Associations
This project’s ambitions are to use one discrete piece of the Muslim Brotherhood’s
social service network- the IMA- to make inferences about the group’s broader
social service umbrella. These services literally encompass an individual’s entire
lifecycle, from childbirth services, to schooling, to marriage, to loans and business
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training, to medical services, to burial preparation. Further research will be nec-
essary to gather the same depth of historical, qualitative, and experimental data
about these services as was used to study the group’s medical services. However,
the raw material for a spatial analysis of the Brotherhood’s schools and commu-
nity associations does exist, facilitating an initial inquiry into how well (or how
poorly) the theory articulated and supported over the previous chapters explains
other aspects of the Brotherhood’s social service provision.
Following July 3, 2013 Egypt’s regime aggressively targeted the Brotherhood’s
schools and community associations (Brooke Forthcoming). A list of 87 Brother-
hood schools placed under official government supervision appeared on Decem-
ber 30th, 2013.1 I precisely geolocated these schools using open-source data in a
similar fashion to the medical facilities, producing the maps in Figures 6.1 and
6.2.
1Sara Jamil, “al-Masri al-Youm Tanshir Qa’imat Wazirat al-’Adel bi-Isma’ 87 Madras-
sat Taba’a Lil-Ikhwan (al-Masri al-Youm Publishes the Ministry of Justice’s list of 87
Brotherhood-affiliated Schools),” al-Masry al-Youm, December 30, 2013. Available online at:
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/369022. Accessed December 31, 2013. One
school in Cairo and another in Fayyoum were later cleared of links, and thus they are not
included in the below figure. See “Ba’d Tahafuz ’ala Madaris al-Ikwan, Khubra’...al-Qarar
Siyasi, laysa Ta’leemi (After the Decision to Seize the Brotherhood’s Schools, Experts...This is
a Political Judgement, not an Educational One),” al-Rassd, April 21, 2014. Available online at
http://goo.gl/g2wHL1. Accessed March 3, 2015. I was also unable to locate three schools.
179
Figure 6.1: Spatial Distribution of Muslim Brotherhood Schools (Nationwide)
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Figure 6.2: Spatial Distribution of Muslim Brotherhood Schools (Cairo
Metropolis)
On December 25, 2013 the Egyptian press published a list of 1,030 Brotherhood-
linked community institutions subject to a general asset freeze.2 The community
institutions, however, were listed only in terms of their village or neighborhood
so the geolocation process was more coarse.3 This process rendered the map in
Figure 6.3.
2I rely on the lists published in al-Wafd: Salah al-Deen Abdallah, “Nunfarid bi-Nushr Isma’
Jama’iyat al-Ikhwan al-Mutahafiz ’Aleyha (We Exclusively Reveal the Names of the Broth-
erhood’s Associations Placed under (State) Control),” al-Wafd, December 25, 2013. Avail-
able online at: http://goo.gl/z7K5lQ. Accessed December 26, 2013; Mohammed al-Sa’adni,
“al-Masry al-Youm Tanshir Qa’ima bi-Isma’ Jama’iyyat al-Ikhwan al-Mujamida (al-Masry al-
Youm Publishes a List of Names of the Brotherhood’s Community Associations (Who Have
Had Their Funds) Frozen,)” al-Masry al-Youm, December 24, 2013. Available online at:
http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/363611. Accessed December 26, 2013.
3I dropped third-party institutions, particularly al-Gam’iyya al-Shari’iyya and Ansar al-Sunna
from the list because they have been since cleared of links to the Brotherhood.
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Figure 6.3: Spatial Distribution of Muslim Brotherhood Community Associations
(Nationwide)
Table 6.5 summarizes a spatial analysis of the distribution of the Brotherhood’s
schools and community associations using the same basket of independent vari-
ables as in chapter three. Model one reports results of a logit regression, where
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the dependent variable is the presence or absence of a school in that district.4
Model two is a linear model, where the dependent variable is a log-transformed
count of community associations appearing in that electoral district.
Table 6.5: Regression Results, Distribution of Brotherhood Schools and
Community Associations
Schools Community Associations
Brotherhood Political Contestation 2.966∗∗ 0.890∗∗
(3.02) (2.71)
Brotherhood Protest Events 0.0296 0.0134
(1.26) (1.66)




Percent Births Unattended 0.133 -0.292
(0.09) (-0.63)




R2 .1538 (pseudo) .183
N 216 216
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
These results should raise confidence that the Brotherhood’s provision of med-
ical facilities is a reliable guide to other aspects of the group’s social service en-
deavors. The Brotherhood’s district-level electoral history strongly predicts where
schools and community associations will exist. In fact, the relationship is even
more robust than the spatial analysis of medical facilities. Similarly, those vari-
4In a linear model, the correlations between political contestation and wealth and the density
of schools both strengthen. In addition, protest events emerge as highly significant.
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ables exploring state capacity, religiosity, and membership density did not return
statistically significant results.
For both schools and community associations the positive and significant cor-
relation that appeared between medical facilities and district wealth drops out.
Further, in the case of community associations the sign on the coefficient flips
(although it too is not statistically significant), suggesting the possibility that is
poorer locales that are more likely to host the Brotherhood’s community associa-
tions.
An inability to control for an over-time component of schools and commu-
nity associations (unlike with the medical facilities) potentially blurs the causal
mechanism at work. For instance, one article mentions that the construction of
Brotherhood schools dramatically increased following the fall of Hosni Mubarak.5
Were this the case, then the Mubarak-era political economy’s ability to influence
the placement of these schools would be limited.
These results also suggest directions for future research. For example, it is
possible that the Brotherhood more actively conditions social services on district
socioeconomic profile than chapters one and three suggest. While poorer areas
cannot sustain the resource-intensive medical facilities and schools (which op-
erate more or less as businesses), community associations tend to offer a much
more diverse basket of goods, things like poverty and food assistance, wedding
services, job training, micro-loans, and burial services. These highly scalable en-
terprises would be much less tied to the underlying socioeconomic structure- they
5Samah Abdel Hamid and Huda Zakariya, “al-Ta’meem’ Yuntazir Madaris al-Ikhwan...Ta’sisha
Bida’ fi Ahad Mubarak wa Wasalat 60 Madrassa fi Hukm Morsi...wa Asiyut wa Sohag
wa Menoufiyya Abraz Amakin al-Intishar (Nationalization Awaits the Muslim Brotherhood’s
Schools...They Were Established in the Mubarak Years, and by the Time of Morsi there were 60
Schools...Their Spread is Most Prominent in Asiyut, Sohag, and Menoufiyya),” Cairodar, October
28, 2013. Available online at: http://goo.gl/ZHJDa9. Accessed March 3, 2015.
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could operate as large, multi-employee associations with extensive physical assets
or, just as easily, they could take the shape of a private association run by a single
successful professional.
This suggests that the mechanism connecting social service provision to elec-
toral mobilization may be contingent on the type of good provided. For instance,
in their classic City Politics Banfield and Wilson noted a division between working
class “river wards” where vote buying was rampant and middle class “newspaper
wards” where citizens voted on a more ideological basis (i.e. on the endorsement
of newspapers) (1966, 118). Chapter five showed that social service provision
drove voting in Egypt’s middle class“newspaper wards” by generating a repu-
tational effect. Perhaps in Egypt’s poorer “river wards” the Brotherhood relied
on community associations to pursue a mobilization strategy more reminiscent of
classic vote buying.
The Secular Sources of the Islamist Advantage
When I asked Mohsen Radi, the Brotherhood’s longtime parliamentarian from
Qaloubiyya, why the Brotherhood was so effective at providing social services, he
had a simple answer: “no one can offer these services except someone working for
God.”6 Yet one finding that stands out from the preceding pages is the relative
unimportance of religion to the story of the Muslim Brotherhood’s provision of
social services. In the historical, spatial, qualitative, and experimental record
there is little to suggest that religion was either a necessary or sufficient condition
to explain why the Muslim Brotherhood’s social service network generated such
notable political gains.
6Author Interview, May 9, 2013
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But if the electoral effect rests so heavily on competent, effectively managed
and professional medical provision, then why was only the Muslim Brotherhood
able- or willing- to reap the reputational benefit from providing these services?
The disjuncture becomes even more pronounced considering that both during
the Mubarak years and after, nearly every political party in Egypt operated their
own network of social services. Even Hosni Mubarak’s son- and heir apparent-
used medical charity to restore the NDP’s shine during the party’s waning years.7
What caused the Muslim Brotherhood to stand out?
During the fieldwork for this project, I also visited one of the medical clinics
of Hizb al-Asala, a salafi party, in a run down Cairo neighborhood. The clinic
itself occupied the second floor of an old apartment building and consisted of a
cluttered waiting room (the old living room/kitchen), a bathroom that doubled
as a supply closet, and the doctor’s office/examination room in what was once
the bedroom. A sign with the party logo sat in a corner, waiting to be hung
outside. When I arrived at the appointed time the waiting room was already
filled with mothers and sick children, and the doctor was nowhere in sight. After
waiting for thirty minutes or so, I decamped to the cafe next door and sipped tea
underneath a giant banner showing the National Democratic Party’s candidates
for the district in the 2010 elections. The cafe owner thought so highly of the men
that he had kept the banner up, long after the NDP’s collapse and despite the
Muslim Brotherhood’s rise.
Two hours later a harried, middle-aged doctor dashed in and, eventually, we
sat down to talk. The clinic in which we sat was, as he explained, his own way of
serving the political party. He was from the area, and he had established the clinic
7Ahmed Amin ’Arafat, “al-Qawafel Tibiyya: Rishwa Siyasiyya! (Medical Car-
avans: Political Bribery!),” al-Ahram, December 21, 2013. Available online at:
http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=1495761&eid=19. Accessed November 28, 2013.
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in consultation with party leaders to try and “bridge the gap” between ordinary
people’s lives and the rhetoric they heard from politicians. Using donations he
had opened the facility, and few patients paid. He was the only doctor who
worked there and, as I had witnessed, he came by once or twice a week when he
could spare the time from his main job at a university hospital and his secondary
job running a private clinic.
After spending months visiting the Muslim Brotherhood’s facilities, the scene
here was particularly jarring. The divergent levels and quality of care were par-
ticularly notable, but what particularly drew my interest was the underlying dif-
ferences in the way that the facility was organized and managed. The doctor kept
irregular hours, was usually late, and sometimes he simply did not show up at
all. The clinic was tidy but not particularly clean. There were very few medical
supplies or dedicated pieces of medical equipment. In fact the doctor examined
children by laying them on his desk. If the problem was particularly acute or
difficult, he would have to simply send the family to a government or university
hospital for care.
While the doctor was obviously doing his best in a tough situation, these diver-
gent experiences highlight how the poor clientele shaped the broader atmosphere
at the facility. Hizb al-Asala had made a conscious decision to locate their clinic in
a poor area, and were quite open about their hope to translate their medical provi-
sion into electoral support. Other Egyptian opposition parties adopted the same
strategy- consider this dispatch from the official newspaper of Egypt’s opposition
Hizb al-Wafd, describing a campaign rally in Suez governorate:
Doctor al-Sayyid Badawi, head of the Wafd Party, confirmed that through-
out the past years the the party’s social role has been no less beneficial
to the people than the party’s political role. He pointed to the tens of
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thousands of citizens who found in the party’s clinics free medical ex-
ams by well-regarded professors of medicine, free surgical procedures
in the best hospitals, and the distribution of numerous medicines, all
free of charge.8
While the Asala and Wafd parties clearly hoped to leverage these services for
electoral effect, the type of voter-party linkage they were forging was quite differ-
ent than the reputational effect that benefitted the Muslim Brotherhood. In effect,
Asala and Wafd were engaged in classic clientelism: the contingent, episodic ex-
change of goods or services for electoral support. Their provision was aimed at
the poor (the classic targets of clientelism), and those beneficiaries were expected
to repay the provision at the polls rather than in cash.
The decision to target the poor shaped the character of Asala and Wafd’s provi-
sion in important ways. By providing free medical services (as the Wafd dispatch
mentioned three times in two sentences) these parties precluded the possibility
of a sustainable, competitive income stream. This, in turn, affected the quality of
the medical provision. For instance, at the Asala clinic the doctor was committed
to helping but the services were rudimentary, the equipment was lacking, and
the hours were unpredictable. In contrast, the middle-class base produced for the
Brotherhood a steady income stream facilitating well-paid staff, extensive services
and supplies, and reliable hours. This is not to say that Asala, Wafd, and parties
like them would see zero benefit on election day. But any effect their social ser-
vice provision produced would run through the contingent, episodic exchange
of clientelism rather than the reputational effect that proved so powerful for the
Brotherhood.
8Abdullah Da’if, “Ta’yeed Sha’abi Wasia’ Li-Murashahi al-Wafd fi Hayy al-Arba’een bil-Suez
(Wide Popular Support for the Wafd’s Candidates in the Arba’een Neighborhood of Suez),” al-
Wafd, November 16, 2011. Available online at: http://goo.gl/ToSV21. Accessed November 28,
2013.
188
And as chapter one showed, targeting the poor with clientelist appeals forced
these parties to compete against well-stocked and powerful regime clientelist net-
works. Indeed, the Asala clinic was embedded in precisely the places where the
NDP had historically been strong- witness the cafe owner beside the clinic who
had kept up his NDP banner into the summer of 2013. So even when these par-
ties did deploy their social service networks in an attempt to mobilize voters, they
were picking a fight with the regime on its home turf.
Appreciating the Politics of Islamist Social Service Provision
Nearly every study of the Muslim Brotherhood mentions the group’s proficiency
in social service provision. Yet few authors provide basic information about this
network, detail its effects in Egypt’s cities and villages, or explain why it varies
across the country’s socioeconomic terrain. At the same time, attempts to connect
this provision to the Brotherhood’s remarkable history of electoral success rarely
amount to more than convenient but unfalsifiable “just-so” stories.
This dissertation proposed an explanation for both the observed empirical
variation in the Brotherhood’s pattern of social service provision and the Brother-
hood’s theoretically unexpected ability to expand their electoral coalition under
Egypt’s authoritarianism. By extending social services in electorally competitive
districts, and bypassing those where their opponents were strong, the Brother-
hood maximized both their resources and chances to prevail in these contests.
And the Brotherhood expanded their electoral appeal by using these facilities to
signal the competency and compassion of their candidates for elected office, sta-
pling Egypt’s disaffected middle class to their own ideological core.
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Appendix A
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral History, 1976-2011
Despite the singular importance of elections to the story of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, specifics about these contests are limited. In the following section
I discuss the process, controversies, and sources I used to compile the history of
the Brotherhood’s electoral participation.
A primary difficulty of studying Egypt’s elections is the lack of detailed, use-
ful information on opposition candidates, including their names, the districts in
which they competed, and their vote totals. The Egyptian government’s official
election results only contain the names of winners, their vote tallies, and the num-
ber of spoiled ballots. Theoretically, the names of opposition candidates should
be available in pre-election editions of Egyptian newspapers, as Egyptian law
requires that all candidates publish their names in a “newspaper of national cir-
culation” prior to the election. The problem is that the law is followed to the
letter only. Individuals appear by name and district without affiliation or any
other potentially identifying information.
In some ways focusing on the Muslim Brotherhood makes this task easier. The
intense interest in their parliamentary activity has generated a number of studies
and other potential sources of information, although many of these accounts are
in Arabic and focus primarily- if not totally- on the group’s activities in parliament
itself (Ahmed 2005, Markaz al-Umma 2005, Ragheb and Ibrahim 1996, Tawil 1992,
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Radi 1990). Heshmat also offers a helpful but brief summary of the Brotherhood’s
time in parliament (2006, 13-20). At the same time, many of these accounts contain
contradictory information and mistakes. This is doubly true for the earlier stage
of the Brotherhood’s parliamentary participation in the 1970s and 1980s.
I combined this literature with newspaper coverage and interviews in an at-
tempt to collect a name, election year, and electoral district for each candidate
the Muslim Brotherhood put forward for election to Egypt’s lower house of par-
liament. If I could not obtain all three of these pieces of information, I did not
include the candidate in the dataset. That said, I believe I am missing roughly a
dozen candidates- mostly from the 1984 elections- and that I have accounted for
all the winners.
Two caveats are in order. First, in addition to the three categories above I also
tried to collect accurate information on the seat for which the candidate contested
(worker/farmer or professional). In nearly all cases I found this information,
although there were occasional conflicts- in some cases two sources identified
a candidate differently, in other cases the candidate would be identified as one
category, but in the parliamentary directory the other. Second, for my research
the presence or absence of a Brotherhood candidate in a district is more important
that the identity of the specific candidates themselves. This matters given the
occasional practice of nominating “replacement” candidates, whereby in some
districts a backup candidate stands ready to step in if the original Brotherhood
candidate is arrested, disqualified, or otherwise indisposed.
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1976
The Brotherhood participated in the 1976 elections as part of their efforts to “test
the waters” after their Nasser-era absence from circulation.1 Notably, in these
and the following elections (1979) the Brotherhood participated as individuals,
rather than a group. The first conflict over who was, and was not, a Brotherhood
candidate begins with these elections.
In her 2013 book Carrie Wickham states that “six members of the Muslim
Brotherhood won seats in (the 1976) parliament,” although she only mentions
Salah Abu Ismail by name (2013, 31). Her source, Abdelaziz Ramadan, notes
further that all six ran as members of Sadat’s “Middle” platform (in lieu of of-
ficial parties Sadat had authorized three “platforms:” left, middle, and right).
Ramadan’s chapter also supplies some specific names: Saleh Abu Ismail, Jamal
Rabi’, and Adel ’Eid. He also identifies Saleh Abu Ruqaiq as an additional can-
didate without a constituency (1993, 166-167, 181).2 Abu Ruqaiq apparently did
sit on the “steering committee” of Sadat’s center trend, although since he lacks a
constituency I do not include him in my dataset (Ramadan 1993, 166-167). I also
lack enough information to include Jamal Rabi’ in my dataset.
Adel ’Eid (Adel ’Eid Abdel Maqsoud), from Alexandria, exemplifies the diffi-
culties of classification. Hussam Tammam suggests that the Brotherhood simply
backed him in 1976 because of some ideological affinity, but that he was a non-
aligned candidate (2011, 28). In their official wiki (Ikhwanwiki), the Muslim Broth-
1Author Interview, Mohsen Radi, May 9, 2013.
2Abdel Aziz Ramadan, “Le Nouvel Élan Des Frères Musulmans (The Brotherhood’s
New Verve),” Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1977; and U.S. Embassy Cairo, “Preliminary
Look at Election Lists,” September 26, 1976, ID: 1976CAIRO13146_b. Available online at:
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976CAIRO13146_b.html. Accessed January 8, 2014;
“al-Mustashar Saleh Abu Ruqaiq,” ikhwanwiki, N.D. Available online at: http://goo.gl/U5fgws.
Accessed January 22, 2014.
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erhood identifies ’Eid as a sympathetic, but non-Brotherhood MP (they actually
affiliate him to the Wafd, which also seems incorrect).3 An obituary says that he
was often misidentified as a member of the Brotherhood due to his piety, but he
was in fact not aligned with them.4
Other sources differ. An Arabic-language study clearly identifies him as a
member of the Brotherhood’s bloc (Ragheb and Ibrahim 1996, 159, 183).5 ’Eid also
wrote the foreword to longtime Brotherhood parliamentarian Gamal Heshmat’s
account of his time in parliament (2006, 5-7), and also wrote in contemporaneous
issues of the Brotherhood’s al-Da’wa.6 Al-Da’wa also covered his campaign rallies
in its 1976 issue.7 Another source claims that Eid was the Brotherhood’s repre-
sentative (along with Saleh Abu Ismail) in forging the 1984 electoral alliance with
the Wafd Party.8
Ultimately I include Adel ’Eid in the Brotherhood’s bloc because in his mem-
oirs he reproduces a parliamentary interpolation of the Interior Minister in which
he identifies himself as “affiliated to the thought of the trend of Islamic da’wa”
(’Eid 1984, 79). This was a common way for members of the Brotherhood to refer
to themselves. Further, his willingness to declare it in open parliament- while
challenging the Interior Minister over his treatment of Islamic groups- reveals the
depth of the commitment.
3“Nuwwab al-Ikhwan fi al-Barliman ’Abr al-Tarikh,” ikhwanwiki. Available online at
http://goo.gl/TH73Jl. Accessed January 8, 2013.
4“‘Adel ’Eid: Hayat Barlimaniyya Sakhiba wa Mawt Hadi’ (Raucous Parliamentary
Life and Peaceful Death),” al-Ittihad (UAE), February 19, 2006. Available online at:
http://www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=49859&y=2006. Accessed January 8, 2013.
5Note that ’Eid’s name is misspelled on the chart on p. 159, but spelled correctly on p. 183.
6see, for instance the July 1981 issue, pp. 78-79.
7Mohammed Abdel Hakim Tiyal, “Illa Allah...Illa Allah ya Masr (To Allah, oh Egypt, to Allah!)
al-Da’wa, No. 7 (December 1976), p. 13.
8Adel al-Dargali, “Mustapha Tawil: al-Ikhwan Khanu al-Wafd ‘Am 84 wa Yunqudun ay Itifaq
(The Brotherhood Betrayed the Wafd in 1984 and Broke the Agreement),” al-Masry al-Youm, October
10, 2011. Available online at: http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=313467.
Accessed January 8, 2013.
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I also include Sheikh Saleh Abu Ismail, father of 2011-2012 presidential can-
didate Hazem Abu Ismail, to my dataset. Saleh Abu Ismail stood for election
in Giza, winning in 1976, 1979, 1984, and 1987 (he died in 1990), although in a
number of works he is not included among the Brotherhood’s bloc in Parliament.
In the 1987 parliament, according to a semi-official parliamentary directory, he
was the only Brotherhood parliamentarian to affiliate to Hizb al-Ahrar, when all
other members of the bloc affiliated to Hizb al-Amal (al Sayyid N.D., 179). Al-
though he was certainly an independent voice in the Brotherhood, Abu Ismail
was undoubtedly a member, and so I include him.9
1979
In the 1979 elections the number of independent Brotherhood candidates stood at
three. Saleh Abu Ismail stood for re-election and was joined by Hussein Gamal
in Cairo and Mohammed Maraghi in Alexandria.10 I have found no controver-
sies around their inclusion, and they appear in future elections as Brotherhood
candidates, so I add all three.
1984
In 1984 the Brotherhood formally entered electoral politics, joining in an alliance
with the new Wafd party (El-Telmessani 1985, 184-185). In a post-election inter-
view, Brotherhood General Guide Omar El-Telmessani claimed “we had twenty-
9For example, in a 1984 interview in the pan-Arab daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, Abu Ismail noted that
“I am one of them” in reference to the Brotherhood. “Maadi Hizb al-Wafd wa Hadirhu Khathu
al-Siyasi: Da’m al-Huriya al-’Ama wa al-Dimoqratiya, (Hizb al-Wafd’s Past and Present Political
Outline: Supporting General Freedoms and Democracy), al-Sharq al-Awsat, April 7, 1984, p. 10.
10“Nuwwab al-Ikhwan fi al-Barliman ’Abr al-Tarikh,” ikhwanwiki. Available online at
http://goo.gl/TH73Jl. Accessed January 8, 2013.
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two candidates.”11 Although I have found the seven winners, I have been unable
to assemble a complete list of candidates for the 1984 elections. The most com-
plete record of this period lies in Ragheb and Ibrahim’s The Political Role of the
Muslim Brotherhood in the Shadow of Restricted Political Pluralism in Egypt 1984-1990
(1996) and Abdallah’s The Egyptian Parliament 1976-1995 (1998). Both provide
lists of candidates and winners, although Abdallah mostly relies on Ragheb and
Ibrahim’s list. Importantly, Ragheb and Ibrahim admit that they were unable to
find information on more than 12 candidates (1996, 159). In an effort to expand
their findings I obtained the official list of all candidates running on the Wafd
party’s list as published in the Wafd party’s newspaper, al-Wafd, and I also visited
Wafd party officials active during the period, although I could not expand their
list beyond the two names discussed below.
One controversy is over the inclusion of Sheikh Abdelghaffar Aziz (Dakhiliyya)
in the list. Ragheb and Ibrahim include neither Aziz nor Saleh Abu Ismail in
their list of candidates, saying that although people tend to include them in
lists of Brotherhood parliamentarians, the two do not tend to identify themselves
that way (1996, 158, 181).12 Abdallah notes this same objection (1998, 90-91).
Other sources include Aziz among the list of Brotherhood parliamentarians.13
Because I include Saleh Abu Ismail, I also include Sheikh Abdelghaffar Aziz in
my dataset.14 All told, I am confident that I have located all but a handful of
11“Muslim Brotherhood Leader on Elections, Policy,” al-Majallah, June 9-15, 1984. Translated in
FBIS, June 13, 1984.
12Shamakh includes Ismail in his list, but drops Gamal and Mesmari (2011, 89).
13“al-Islamiyoun wa al-Barliman (Islamists and Parliament),” al-Ahram, January 29, 2012, p. 13.
Available online at: http://digital.ahram.org.eg/youmy/EventBrowes2.aspx?addd=49486. Ac-
cessed January 12, 2013.
14Both Ismail and Aziz are listed in the Wafd’s list. For Ismail, see “Qawaim Murashahi al-Wafd
fi al-Intikhibat Majlis al-Sha’b (List of Wafd Candidates in the Parliamentary Elections),” al-Wafd,
April 26, 1984, pp. 6-7. Available online at http://www.alwafd.org/digital/index.php?date=26-
04-1984. Accessed February 12, 2013. For Aziz, see “Qawaim Murashahi al-Wafd fi Muhafizat al-




In the 1987 elections the Brotherhood dropped the Wafd and joined the tripartite
“Islamic Alliance” (al-Tahaluf al-Islami) with the Labor party (Hizb al-’Amal) and
the “People’s Party” (Hizb al-Sha’b). I began the dataset for the 1987 elections by
compiling a list of Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarians from a number of books,
including those from the group’s own printing house (Tawil 1992, Radi 1990).15
Some of the entries do not list complete information on the electoral district,
so to confirm I relied on a parliamentary directory to complete the information
(al Sayyid N.D.). Ragheb and Ibrahim list 36 parliamentarians, but they admit
they cannot find two more (1996, 351-354). The Brotherhood’s magazine, Liwa’ al-
Islam, also references 36 parliamentarians.16 My list includes 38 parliamentarians
because, as discussed earlier, I add Salah Abu Ismail and Abdelghaffar Aziz.
In order to locate the candidates for that election I obtained an official list of
Islamic Alliance candidates published in the Labor Party’s newspaper, al-Sha’b.17.
In some cases the names of Brotherhood candidates were recognizable due to
their participation in the 1984 elections (or in later elections). However to com-
didates in the governorates of Dakhiliyya, Giza, Beni Suef, Minya, Sohag, Qena, and Aswan),” al-
Wafd, May 3, 1984, p. 4. Available online at http://www.alwafd.org/digital/index.php?date=03-
05-1984. Accessed February 12, 2013.
15Radi’s book appears to form the basis for the list published on Ikhwanwiki (primarily because
both make the notable error of not including Saif al-Islam Hasan al-Banna, son of the group’s
founder).
16Mohammed Abdel Quddous, “al-Tahaluf al-Islami Abraz al-Sawt al-Islami wa Wajh Latma
lil-Hukm al-Shumuli (The Islamic Alliance is the Most Prominent Islamic Voice and Face Striking
at the Totalitarian Regime),” Liwa’ al-Islam, May 17, 1987, p. 16.
17“Isma’ al-Murashaheen ’ala Qawaim Hizb al-Amal, (Names of Candidates on the Labor
Party’s List),” al-Sha’b, March 10, 1987, p. 7. A second, updated list was published one month later,
“Isma’ al-Murashaheen ’ala Qawaim Hizb al-Amal, (Names of Candidates on the Labor Party’s
List),” al-Sha’b, April 6, 1987, p. 15
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plete the list of candidates I visited members of the Labor Party active during the
1987 elections and went through the remaining candidates name-by-name as they
identified who was from the Brotherhood.18
1990
The Brotherhood, along with nearly every other opposition political party, boy-
cotted the 1990 parliamentary contests over a change in electoral rules. Appendix
B discusses these changes and the associated controversy.
1995
In the 1995 elections the Brotherhood came back in force. Despite a campaign of
arrests and the use of military trials, the Brotherhood nominated roughly 170 can-
didates.19 On October 10 the London-based Arabic newspaper al-Hayat published
a list of 142 candidates and their districts.20
As the elections were not scheduled until Nov. 29, in the interim occurred a
number of relevant developments. Another group of sixteen Brotherhood candi-
dates nominated themselves from behind bars a few weeks later.21 Although the
al-Sha’b article simply listed the candidates’ names and governorates, I extrapo-
lated the specific district in which they ran by referring to the legal documents
18I am especially grateful for the assistance of Mohammed Ibrahim and Hasan Elfeel at the
Cairo headquarters of Hizb al-Amal al-Gedid on May 1, 2013.
19U.S. Embassy Cairo,“Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: Down but not Out,” November 12, 1997,
ID: 97CAIRO11981_a.
20Muhammed Salah, “al-Hayat Hasalat ’ala al-Isma’ wa Amakin al-Tarsheeh: al-Hudaybi fi al-
Dokki wa al-Banna fi al-Darb al-Ahmar: La’iha Murashihi al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen fi Intikhibat
Majlis al-Sha’b al-Masri, (al-Hayat Obtains the List of Names and Places of (Brotherhood) Nomi-
nations: al-Hudaybi in Dokki and al-Banna in al-Darb al-Ahmar: The list of Muslim Brotherhood
Candidates for the Egyptian Majlis al-Sha’b elections),” al-Hayat, October 10, 1995, p. 7.
21Imad Mahgub, “16 Murshahan Jadidan Lil-Tahaluf al-Islami min Khalaf Aswar al-Sijin (16
New Candidates for the Islamic Alliance from Behind Bars),” al-Sha’b, October 22, 1995.
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that Mohammed Salim al-’Awwa’s reproduces in his authoritative account of that
1995 military trial (El-’Awwa 2012). These documents listed the home addresses
of each of the men, and I assume that each ran in the district in which his home
was located (cross-checking the candidates for whom I had third party data on
their precise district revealed no discrepancies). In addition, I have been able to
add a few more candidates through following the press coverage of the elections,
primarily in al-Ahram Weekly and al-Sha’b (the Brotherhood was still nominally a
member of the Islamic Alliance, so their candidates received coverage in the Labor
party’s paper).22 Despite fielding so many candidates only one, Ali Fath al-Bab,
managed to find his way into parliament.
2000
The 2000 elections were held over three rounds during October and November
2000 and featured 74 candidates from the Brotherhood. The Islamist newspaper
Afaq Arabiyya profiled the candidates during October and November 2000.23 I also
found information on candidates, including their distribution, in the al-Ahram
center’s analytical report (Reda 2001), as well as the Brotherhood’s Ikhwanwiki
website. From the 74 candidates would emerge 17 deputies, each of whom I
identified from a parliamentary directory (Rabie 2002).
22Amirah Huwaydi, “Islamist Allies Part Ways,” al-Ahram Weekly, Oct. 12-18, 1995.
23Three issues were particularly important. “Tanfarud ’Afaq Arabiyya’ bi-Nashr Isma’ wa Ru-
muz Murshahi ’al-Ikhwan’ fi al-Marhala al-Ula (Afaq Arabiyya Exclusively Published the Names
and Symbols of the Brotherhood’s Candidates in the First Round),” Afaq Arabiyya, Oct. 19, 2000,
p. 3; “Tanshur ’Afaq Arabiyya’ Isma’ Murshahi ’al-Ikhwan’ fi al-Jowla al-Thaniya wa Moa’idha
al-Ahad 29 min October al-Jari (Afaq Arabiyya Publishes the Names of the Brotherhood Candi-
dates in the Second Round, and the Date of the First Round is this Coming October 29th),” Afaq
Arabiyya, October 26, 2000, p. 3; and “Isma’ al-Murashiheen al-Ikhwan fi al-Marhala al-Thalitha
illate Tajri al-Youm al-Arba’a (Names of the Brotherhood Candidates in the Third Round, that is
Occurring on Wednesday),” Afaq Arabiyya, November 9, 2000, p. 3. I appreciate Jason Brownlee
sharing these issues with me.
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2005
The 2005 elections were held over three rounds during November and December
2005. The Brotherhood published a list of 170 candidates on the group’s official
Ikhwanonline website, and also provided a number of articles tracking the results
of specific races.24 The candidates are also listed in Ahmed’s self-published study
of these elections (2005, 243-253). Of the 170 candidates, 89 entered Parliament,
the Brothers’ best showing prior to Arab Spring (Rabie and ’Azbawi 2006).
2010
For the 2010 elections, I relied on the Brotherhood’s list of candidates as published
on the Fatakat forum.25 In some cases, it was not indicated whether the candidates
were competing for a worker or farmer seat. In these cases, I made an individual
judgment based on their biographical details, including their occupation and ed-
ucational history. Despite the list of candidates, none made it through to victory,
as the Brotherhood decided to boycott runoffs in the face of widespread fraud.
Observer organizations later denounced these elections as the most fraudulent in
Egypt’s history. Less than one year later Egyptians forced Mubarak from power.
24see http://www.ikhwanonline.com/data/baralman2005/ikhwan.htm. Accessed March 26,
2013. For articles, see in particular “al-Nata’ij al-Niha’iyya: Fawwaza Arba’ min al-
Ikhwan wa 42 youkhawadoun al-’Aida, (Final Results: Four Brotherhood candidates win
(outright) and 42 contest runoffs),” Ikhwanonline, November 10, 2005. Available online at
http://www.ikhwanonline.com/print.aspx?ArtID=15725&SecID=212. Accessed March 28, 2013;
Abdel Ma’uaz Mohammed, “al-Ikhwan Haqqaqou 30.4% min Maqaid al-Marhala al-Thaniya, (The
Brotherhood Achieve 30.4% of the Seats in the Second Round),” Ikhwan Janub Qahira, N.D. (Late
November 2005?). Available online at: http://www.dayra23.com/asp/Newsdtls.asp. Accessed
March 28, 2013.
25Available at: http://forums.fatakat.com/thread1001924. Posted November 22, 2010, pp. 1-3.
Accessed March 28, 2013.
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2011-2012
The first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections spread from November 28, 2011
to January 11, 2012. The electoral system was divided between 2-member majori-
tarian districts and multiple-member proportional representation districts. The
Brotherhood fielded 474 total candidates, 336 list candidates and 138 individual
candidates. The Freedom and Justice Party published three press releases iden-
tifying the candidates.26 I identified the winners by cross-checking the al-Ahram
Center’s directory of parliamentarians with data compiled by independent re-
searchers (Rabie 2012, Sallam 2013).
26“Bayan bi-Isma’ Murashahi al-Huriyya wa al-’Adala (Qawaim wa Fardi) fi Muhafizat
al-Marhala al-’Ula (Statement of Freedom and Justice Candidate Names for Gover-
norates in the First Round),” Nafidhat Misr, November 26, 2011. Available online at:
http://www.egyptwindow.net/news_Details.aspx?News_ID=15632. Accessed March 28, 2013;
“Bayan (18) lil-Huriyya wa al-’Adala: Isma’ Murashahi al-Hizb ’ala (al-Qawaim wa al-
Fardi) lil-Marhala al-Thaniyya, (Freedom and Justice Party Statement No. 18: Party Candi-
dates (List and Individual Candidacies) for the Second Stage),” Nafidhat Misr, December 11,
2011. Available online at: http://www.egyptwindow.net/news_Details.aspx?News_ID=15921.
Accessed March 28, 2013; “Bayan (35): al-Huriyya wa al-’Adala yukhoud al-Marhala al-
Thalitha bi-136 Murashahan (Isma’ Murashahi al-Qawaim wa al-Fardi), (Statement 35: Free-
dom and Justice Party Contests the Third Stage with 136 Candidates (Names for Candidates
of the List and Individual Seats),” Nafidhat Misr, December 29, 2011. Available online at
http://egyptwindow.net/news_Details.aspx?News_ID=16210. Accessed March 28, 2013.
200
Appendix B
Egypt’s Shifting Electoral Geography, 1971-2011
Egypt’s rulers have endlessly tinkered with the country’s electoral institutions,
including the country’s political geography. Given the importance of mapping
Egypt’s constituencies for this research project, this appendix briefly describes
the major presidential decisions, laws, and court decisions that have shaped the
electoral map at various points in Egypt’s modern history. This is not meant to
be a comprehensive study of Egypt’s electoral institutions and geography, rather
a short summary of those decisions affecting the total number, constituency bor-
ders, and magnitude of each electoral district for the lower house of parliament,
the Majlis al-Sha’b.
Soon after his 1970 ascent to power Anwar Sadat introduced a new constitu-
tion. The 1971 constitution established a legislature composed of “at least” 350
elected officials and up to ten additional members that the president would di-
rectly appoint (article 87).1 Egyptians would elect these 350 members, two at
a time, from 175 electoral districts (da’ira, pl. dawa’ir) whose borders were first
specified eight years earlier, in Law 171 of 1963.2
Presidential Decree Law 73 of 1968 altered the internal administrative divi-
1The 1971 Egyptian Constitution is available, in English, on the Egyptian State Information Ser-
vice website: http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=208. Ac-
cessed July 12, 2015.
2“Qanun Riqm 171 li-Sina 1963 (Law 171 for 1963),” al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, No. 300 (December
30, 1964), pp. 2053-2115.
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sions of the electoral districts. For instance, some decisions separated neighbor-
hoods from existing aqsam to constitute a new qism, both of which remained in the
original electoral district. In other cases, however, the laws amended the borders
of the electoral districts themselves.3 A second round of amendments came with
Law 70 of 1971 that, among other things, altered the border between the Cairo
and al-Qaloubiyya governorates.4
Law 38 of 1972 officially re-established the 175 two person districts, based on
the new constitution and effectively reverting back to the system specified in law
171 of 1963, although it did leave some borders open to amendment.5 Law 119 of
1976 amended some of these boundaries in preparation for the 1976 elections, held
in October.6 These elections christened Sadat’s experimentation with political
liberalization, and he split the Arab Socialist Union into three platforms: left,
right, and center. In addition, independents were also allowed to contest seats
(Baker 1990, 109).
Prior to the 1979 elections, Law/Decision 21 of 1979 further amended Law
38 of 1972 to create a 382-member parliament. The only amendment to the elec-
toral map was the addition of a two-person district (the 176th), which came from
splitting the Sinai Peninsula into North and South districts. The 30 additional
members came from adding a third seat in 30 districts that was reserved for fe-
male candidates (specified in article 3).7
3“Qarar al-Ra’is al-Jumhuriyya al-Arabiyya al-Mutahhida bil-Qanun Riqm 73 li-Sina 1968 (De-
cision of the President of the Egyptian Arab Republic of Law 73 of 1968),” al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya,
No. 49, (December 5, 1968), pp. 781-792.
4“Qarar al-Ra’is al-Jumhuriyya al-Misr al-Arabiyya bil Qanun 70 li-Sina 1971 (Decision of the
President of the Egyptian Arab Republic of Law 70 of 1971),” al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, No. 39,
(October 5, 1971), pp. 1-24.
5“Qanun Riqm 38 li-Sina 1972 (Law 38 of 1972),” al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, No. 39 (September 28,
1972), pp. 550-554.
6“Qanun Riqm 119 li-Sina 1976 (Law 119 of 1976),” al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, No. 37 (September
12, 1976), pp. 1-19.
7“Qarar Ra’is Jumhuriyyat Misr al-Arabiyya bil-Qanun Riqm 21 Li-Sina 1979 (Decision of the
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In advance of the 1984 elections, Law 114 of 1983 transformed Egypt into a
party list system in which 48 constituencies elected 448 parliamentarians. Indi-
vidual candidates were barred from participation. In 31 districts a seat was also
reserved for female candidates. The law was also notable because it established
a 8% national threshold for each party’s vote tally. If a party fell below this
threshold, their votes would instead accrue to the top nationwide vote-getter (the
National Democratic Party, conveniently).8
Activists mounted a challenge to the law in court alleging, among other things,
that it unfairly discriminated against individual candidates. Probably to pre-empt
their challenge, the government dissolved parliament and issued a new electoral
law, Law 188 of 1986. The new law amended Law 114 of 1983 to create a mixed
party list/individual candidacy system of 48 districts. Each district would elect
one representative individually and the remainder of the representatives from a
party list system.9 For instance, in the 1987 elections Ibrahim Zaafrani contested
the individual seat for the Brotherhood in Alexandria, while two other Brother-
hood candidates contested governorate seats on the list of the Islamic Alliance.
In May 1987 Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court did rule parts of Law 114
of 1983 unconstitutional because it barred individuals from contesting seats.10 Of
course, by this time the new parliament had been seated, so the ruling’s rele-
vance was questionable. However in May 1990 the Supreme Constitutional Court
President of the Egyptian Arab Republic of Law 21 of 1979),” al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, No. 17 (26
April 1979), pp. 1-2.
8“Qanun Riqm 114 li-Sina 1983 (Law 114 of 1983),” al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, No. 33 (August 11,
1983), pp. 1864-1882.
9“Qanun Riqm 188 Li-Sina 1986 (Law 188 of 1986),” al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, No. 52 (December
31, 1986), pp. 3-8.
10“Qidayat Riqm #37 Li-Sina 6 Quda’iyya (Case #131 for the 6th Judicial Year),”
al-Muhakima al-Dustoriyya al-’Aliya, Cairo, May 16, 1987. Available online at:
http:/www.hccourt.gov.eg/Rules/getRule.asp?ruleId=437&searchWords=. Accessed August 2,
2013.
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also ruled that Law 188 of 1986 was unconstitutional.11 Parliament was again
dissolved, and elections scheduled for later in 1990.
Because the Supreme Constitutional Court had ruled both the pure list and
mixed list-individual electoral systems unconstitutional, the Mubarak govern-
ment drafted a new electoral law from scratch. Shortly before the 1990 elections
the government presented Law 206 of 1990, based on a nationwide system of 222
two person, first-past-the-post districts (Majls al-Sha’b 1990). Although the law
angered the opposition to the point where most would boycott of the 1990 elec-
tions, it would be remarkably stable and endure for nearly two decades. One
notable change was in Law 27 of 1995 which advanced several small amendments
to some constituency borders, in Menoufiyya, Beheira, Qena, and Red Sea.12
In April 2008 Hosni Mubarak issued presidential decree No. 114 creating
two new governorates, 6 October and Helwan, from sections of the Cairo and
Giza governorates.13 In December 2009 he issued presidential declaration No.
378 carving out the Luxor governorate from the Qena governorate.14 In order to
incorporate these changes into the electoral system, Law 68 of 2010 outlined the
new electoral constituencies in these governorates. These took effect for the 2010
Majlis al-Sha’b elections. The total number of constituencies remained 222.15
11“Qidayat Riqm #37 Li-Sina 9 Quda’iyya (Case #37 for the 9th Judicial Year),”
al-Muhakima al-Dustoriyya al-’Aliya, Cairo, May 19, 1990. Available online at:
http:/www.hccourt.gov.eg/Rules/getRule.asp?ruleId=421&searchWords=. Accessed August 2,
2013.
12“Qanun Riqm 27 li-Sina 1995 (Law 27 of 1995),” al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, No. 16 (April 20, 1995),
pp. 16-19.
13“Qarar Rais Jumhuriyyat Misr al-Arabiyya Riqm 114 li-Sina 2008 (Decision of the President of
the Egyptian Arab Republic No. 114 of 2008),” al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, No. 16 (April 17, 2008), pp.
3-5.
14“Qarar Rais Jumhuriyyat Misr al-Arabiyya Riqm 378 li-Sina 2009 (Decision of the President of
the Egyptian Arab Republic No. 378 of 2009),” al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, No. 49 (December 9, 2009),
pp. 3-5.
15“Qanun Riqm 68 li-Sina 2010 (Law 68 of 2010),” al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya, No. 19 (May 18, 2010),
pp. 2-201.
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Following Mubarak’s February 11, 2011 departure the Supreme Council of
the Armed Forces (SCAF) took control of Egypt’s transition. On March 30, 2011
SCAF issued a “Constitutional Decree” that established a framework for new,
post-Mubarak presidential elections.16 In May 2011, SCAF released a draft elec-
toral law that introduced a split Majoritarian/Proportional Representation sys-
tem, with two-thirds of the deputies elected from Majoritarian districts with one-
third from the PR districts. The SCAF settled on this system despite the fact that
Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court had ruled a similar mixed system uncon-
stitutional (as discussed above). After public outcry, on September 26, 2011 SCAF
pronounced decree 120/2011 formalizing the dual Majoritarian/List electoral sys-
tem. However the specific ratio was reversed from the May draft: Egypt would
be partitioned into 46 list districts and 83 Majoritarian (2 member) districts. Three
hundred thirty-two members would hail from the PR districts, while 166 came
from the majoritarian districts.17
16“al-Masry al-Youm Tanshir Nus al-’Alan al-Dustori...wa al-Intikhabat al-Rai’siyya Qabl Ni-
hayat al-’Aim al-Gari (al-Masry al-Youm Publishes the Text of the Constitutional Announce-
ment...Presidential Elections Before the End of the Coming Year),” al-Masry al-Youm, March 30,
2011. Available online at: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/122361. Accessed July
10, 2015.
17“Marsoum bi-Qanun Riqm 121 li-Sina 2011 bi-Ta’deel Ahkam al-Qanun Riqm 206 Li-Sina
1990 (Decree/ Law 121 for 2011 Amending Some Judgements of Law 206 of 1990),” al-Jareeda




This appendix spells out the structure, sampling methodology, quality control
efforts, and background of my May 2014 survey experiment of Egyptians’ expe-
rience with social service provision (discussed in Chapter five). A series of tests
on the varying survey subgroups (treatments and controls) is also included in or-
der to assess the quality of the random assignment. Finally, this section includes
series of validity checks which, while important, do not warrant inclusion in the
body of the chapter. For further information or specific .DO files related to the
analysis of the survey or this appendix, please contact me directly.
The results reported here are part of a broader telephone survey of Egyptians’
experiences with non-state provision of social services, in collaboration with Jason
Brownlee of the University of Texas at Austin. The University of Texas at Austin
Institutional Review Board approved the study (study no. 2012-05-0084). The
full survey included 3707 respondents separated across three groups. The control
and Muslim Brotherhood groups (n=2483) are discussed in this dissertation and
appendix. A third group, consisting of 1224 respondents, received a similar prime
that discussed a third religious organization, al-Gam’iyya al-Shar’iyya. I report
those findings in a separate paper (2015).1
1A full description of the survey structure is available by visiting my website,
www.steventbrooke.com.
206
The Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research (Baseera) carried out the
survey over seven days, from May 14 to May 20, 2014. The full sample included
3707 respondents. This was 107 respondents larger than the targeted sample size
of 3600 (three 1200-respondent groups). The control group (Ministry of Health)
included 1238 respondents, while the treatment group (the Muslim Brotherhood)
included 1245 respondents. The survey response rate was 50.8%.
The survey queried Egyptians aged 18 to 91 over both landline (48.21% of the
sample) and mobile phones (51.79%). Mobile customers were selected through
random digit dialing, while landline numbers were randomly selected from a
comprehensive database of Egyptian landlines. Combining landlines with mobile
lines captures over 90% of the Egyptian population. Face-to-face surveys typically
capture a similar proportion of the Egyptian population, but do so by skipping a
number of lightly-populated governorates for logistical or security reasons. This
telephone survey included respondents from each of Egypt’s 27 governorates.
Not only are telephone surveys well accepted in Egyptian survey research,
they offer a number of advantages germane to this specific project. First, the
CATI (computer aided telephone interviewing) software automates randomiza-
tion and skip patterns. In early iterations of this survey a face-to-face version
was considered and piloted multiple times, but the lack of computer tablets left
randomization and proper skipping up to the enumerators. This, in addition
to enumerators’ relative lack of experience with experimental research, created
problems in the early pilots and necessitated a shift to the phone version. Fur-
ther, the vagaries of Egyptian law mean that telephone surveys are not subject
to Ministry of Interior veto power. Face-to-face surveys, on the other hand, must
be pre-cleared by the Ministry. Especially given the sensitivity of this project this
was a significant concern.
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This survey was piloted four times beginning in November 2012. The experi-
mental format (very rarely used in Egypt) and a series of difficult randomizations
required multiple pilot attempts to execute correctly. As an additional check on
the methodology, I contracted a third-party Egyptian researcher and instructed
him on proper selection processes, interview techniques, attention to detail, and
faithfulness to the questionnaire form. He followed the survey as it was piloted
and separately reported back to me. The full survey was executed only after I
was satisfied with the survey company’s ability to correctly follow the protocol
and implement the survey instrument.
For purposes of external validity, Table C.1 compares the survey sample against
the most recent iteration of the Egyptian census, from 2006. Note that “Urban
Governorates" encompasses four governorates designated as such by the Egyp-
tian government: Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez.
Table C.1: Survey and Population Characteristics
Survey (2014) Census (2006)
Mean Age 39.7 years 36.9 years
Modal Age 50 years 35 years
Percent Female 47.05% 49.25%
Percent Christian 5.62% 5.8%
Percent Unemployed 8.79% 5.16%
Modal Education Level Completed Secondary/Votech Secondary/Votech
Percent Living in Urban Governorates 22.63% 18.23%
For purposes of internal validity, Table C.2 reports the distribution of key
variables of each subgroup across the treatment and control, as well as the results
of t-tests.
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Table C.2: Distribution of Key Variables, Treatment (T) vs. Control (C)
Subgroup µT σT µC σC t value
Mean Age 39.912 .401 39.851 .409 -.1057
Percent Urban .621 .014 .688 .013 3.4852
Percent Female .477 .014 .474 .014 -.1336
Percent Christians .048 .006 .062 .007 1.51
Percent Unemployed .095 .008 .092 .008 -.2516
Percent Anti-Brotherhood .195 .011 .175 .011 -1.3066
Socioeconomic Status (1-3) 1.832 .023 1.827 .022 -.1743
Percent Contacted via Mobile .561 .014 .502 .014 -2.928
Mean Years of Formal Schooling 12.737 .162 12.799 .158 .2769
Percent Receiving a Male Enumerator .282 .013 .288 .013 .3308
Of the socioeconomic or politically-distinguished subgroups, urbanization was
systematically different across the populations, and those receiving the Brother-
hood treatment were significantly more rural than those in the control. However,
the difference was in a direction opposite of what we would expect to create a prob-
lematic bias in the results. In the 2012 parliamentary elections the Brotherhood’s
party performed better in the urban areas and worse in the rural ones, and a num-
ber of authors have noted that the Brotherhood’s strength generally lies in urban
areas (Masoud 2014a, Bayat 2007b, El-Ghobashy 2005, Wickham 2002, Kupfer-
schmidt 1982).2 Thus the observed difference between the two groups would,
theoretically, make it more difficult for the treatment to move individuals in a
pro-Brotherhood direction. This raises confidence that the observed treatment ef-
fects are not artifacts of underlying differences in the two groups. The distribution
of landlines versus mobile phones was also uneven across the groups at the p <
.01 level. Specifically, a higher percentage of the treatment group was contacted
via mobile phone than was contacted through land lines (49.8% to 43.9%). This
is, potentially, the reason for the urban/rural variation as well (rural individuals
would assumedly be more likely to rely on mobile phones).
2Tammam, however, claims the Brotherhood’s base has steadily shifted to rural areas in recent
decades, a process he calls the “ruralization” taryeef of the group (2012, 71-83).
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The random assignment to treatment and control minimizes concerns about
selection bias in the overall experiment. However there is the possibility, men-
tioned in the chapter, that bias may influence opinions in the treatment (Brother-
hood) subgroup. In other words, those respondents randomly selected into the
Muslim Brotherhood subgroup may artificially inflate their ratings of the Brother-
hood’s facilities- in effect being primed by the mention of the Muslim Brotherhood
to inflate their opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood’s medical facilities. This would
obviously distort both the word cloud (Figure 5.7) and the associated t-test (Fig-
ure 5.5). While this seems unlikely, given the social and political pressures for
respondents to strategically deflate their opinions of the Brotherhood, it is possible
to test for this effect.
To do so, this section repeats both the word cloud and t-test as in chapter
five. In this iteration, however, the Muslim Brotherhood subgroup is limited only
to those who, unprompted, expressed hostility towards the Brotherhood prior to
receiving the treatment. Table C.3 shows the opinions of Brotherhood opponents
as to the quality of the Brotherhood’s medical facilities.
Table C.3: Difference of Means Test, Brotherhood Opponents’ Satisfaction with
Facilities
Respondents Descriptors Mean Std. Dev.
Muslim Brotherhood Facilities 24 54 .833 .376
Health Ministry Facilities 774 1841 .307 .461
t = -8.3042, p < .00001
Likewise, Table C.1 only uses descriptive terms from those respondents who,
prior to receiving the treatment, expressed hostility towards the Muslim Brother-
hood.
210
Figure C.1: Brotherhood Opponents’ Description of Brotherhood Facilities
Both the above t-test and word cloud support the results presented in the main
body of the chapter. Specifically, they show that even those who expressed an ex-
ante hostility towards the Brotherhood were willing to rate the group’s medical
provision efforts highly. This shows, to the greatest extent possible with the cur-
rent data, that the positive effects of the Brotherhood’s social service recorded in
the survey are likely not the result of a selection bias. In this case, the positive
effects were detected even among those least likely to be affected by the treatment.
Sensitivity Analysis
The causal mediation analysis in chapter five rests on an assumption of sequential
ignorability that cannot be directly tested (Imai et al. 2011). However the mediation
package for Stata also allows iterative violations of the assumption by allowing the
error terms of the two OLS regression models (mediator and outcome) to correlate
more and more strongly. As this sensitivity parameter (ρ) approaches complete
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correlation (1 or -1), the value of ρ when the Average Causal Mediation Effect
reaches zero provides a metric of the validity of the causal mediation analysis.
Figure C.2 graphically presents the relationship.
Figure C.2: Sensitivity Analysis
In this case, the ACME reached zero at ρ = .6341. As Imai et. al. point out,
there exists no baseline standard for judging the acceptable value of ρ. Instead,
they suggest comparing the value of ρ in the present analysis with the value of ρ
as observed in other examples of mediation analysis in the literature (2011, 776).
For instance, in a separate article, Imai et. al. (2010) note a value of ρ = .48 for
a study of media framing (Nelson and Kinder 1996). Again, while a substantive
explanation of the value of ρ as observed in the above causal mediation analysis,
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it is possible to say that it is notably stronger than in this example, and robust to
fairly significant violations of the sequential ignorability assumption (ρ = 0).
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